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Summary  
Variation in health care, whether it be in terms of the utilisation of resources, 
observed health outcomes, costs, quality or access to health care is a well recognised 
and ever present feature of the modern day health care system.  Health care 
variations challenge basic assumptions about the nature of the health care economy 
and raise questions about efficiency, equity and where best to direct policy 
instruments in health care markets.  Despite the vast literature documenting 
variation, and the many discussions around ways to reduce variations in health care 
markets, the field of dental care has received little interest, in comparison to that of 
general medical care.  This thesis will address this gap and will analyse the variation 
observed in a specific dental care treatment (dental radiographs) within NHS 
Scotland, with particular emphasis on the contribution of both dentist and patient 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 The thesis takes its focus from two strands of the literature; the underlying 
theoretical aspect draws on the literature concerning the theory of incentives and 
physician agency, whilst the empirical component makes use of recent advances in 
micro-econometric methods, documented in the labour economics literature.  
Although the thesis is predominantly an empirical analysis, the estimation strategy 
combines ideas from both the theoretical and empirical literature.  A matched patient 
provider dataset from NHS Scotland is used to conduct an analysis of the variation in 
dental radiographs, in the presence of, and controlling for unobserved dentist and 
patient heterogeneity. 
 The results indicate that the remuneration structure alone has little or no 
impact on the treatment decision to provide a radiograph.  When a dentist changes 
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from being on a fixed salary contract to being paid on a fee-for-service basis, they 
are in fact less likely to provide a radiograph.  This result changes in the presence of 
insurance (identified as being when patients are exempt from the patient charge) and 
indicates that when the self employed dentist can identify the patient as being 
exempt, they are more likely to provide a radiograph.  This result provides some 
support for the theory that in the presence of insurance, financial incentives do 
influence the treatment decision. 
 A final result of the study highlights the importance of accounting for 
unobserved patient and provider heterogeneity, a factor that has had little attention in 
the healthcare literature. The results suggest that patient variation, as opposed to the 
variation across dentists, is much more important in explaining total variation.  This 
is a similar result to that found in both the labour and education literatures.   
  
 
1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction      
1.1 Introduction 
 Variation in health care, whether it be in terms of the utilisation of resources, 
observed health outcomes, costs, quality or access to health care is a well recognised 
and ever present feature of the modern day health care system.  There is evidence 
documenting its existence in all sectors and across all levels of the health care 
delivery process, for example across regions, demographic groups, health care 
institutions (hospitals, GP practices), and across individual health care providers 
within the same institution.  In a world where health care costs continue to rise at 
alarming rates and with little evidence to suggest this is matched by improvements in 
the quality of care (Fisher et al, 2003; Wennberg, 2008; Gawande, 2009), 
Governments and health care providers are forced to address the issue of variation.  
 Health care variations challenge basic assumptions about the nature of the 
health care economy and raise questions about efficiency, quality, equity, and where 
best to direct policy instruments in health care markets.  It is a longstanding view 
that economists are concerned with the traditional welfare loss associated with health 
insurance; however there is growing concern in the literature about the welfare loss 
associated with variation, and what it means for health care expenditure  (Phelps & 
Mooney 1993; Phelps 1995).  Grytten & Sørensen (2003) are of the opinion that the 
welfare loss resulting from variation in clinical practice between physicians may be 
just as great as that observed in the markets for health insurance.   
 In a literature that spans more than 60 years, the same theories are 
consistently used to explain the observed variations in health care delivery, practice 
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and performance.  Featuring high on the list is the concept of physician practice 
style, the impact of economic incentives, and more recently the recognition of the 
importance of patient specific factors (observed and unobserved) in accounting for 
variation has become apparent.  Despite the vast literature documenting variation in 
general health care, there has been relatively little attention given to the field of 
dental care.   
 Many of the investigations that do consider dental services do so in the 
context of area or regional differences in the patterns of use of care (Grembowski et 
al. 1991 provide a review).  This is often in terms of the average number of services 
provided or simply based on whether the patient visited a dentist or not.  It is 
difficult to gain a clear understanding of the major contributors to variation in these 
studies as the effects are often interlinked with each other and not easily separated.  
This gap in the literature is one that this study will address.   
One of the main aims of this study is to try and account for as much of the 
variation in the provision of a single dental treatment (radiographs) as possible.  A 
key focus is placed on controlling for both individual patient and dentist 
characteristics.  There are a very limited number of studies in the field of dental care 
that have considered the variation in the provision of dental radiographs, and there 
are none to my knowledge that use a framework similar to the one being adopted in 
this study. 
Rushton et al. (1999) considered the factors influencing the selection of 
panoramic radiographs and Rushton & Horner (2006) conducted a similar study to 
identify the factors that influence the frequency of bitewing radiographs in general 
dentist practice.  Both studies were based on self reported questionnaires completed 
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by dentists that asked questions about their provision of radiographs and about their 
attitudes and beliefs towards the usefulness of radiographs as a diagnostic tool.  
There were some questions included to elicit patient characteristics as well as dentist 
characteristics, but both analyses were conducted more from the dentist perspective.  
In a study by Gilbert et al. (2006) the relationship between practice characteristics 
and patient receipt of dental diagnostic radiographs is explored.  This study did take 
account of individual patient characteristics, but this was a mixed methods approach 
that involved interviews with dentists and a review of patient records over a four 
year period.  Again, all the likely contributing factors to the variation in the receipt 
of radiographs have not been considered simultaneously in a single estimation 
framework.  Essentially this aspect sets this study apart from anything that has been 
done before. 
 Chalkley & Tilley (2006); Chalkley et al. (2010) and Young (2009) have 
considered the impact of different payment structures on the treatment decisions of 
dentists in the UK.  All find some support for the idea that under a fee-for-service 
remuneration contract, dentists are motivated to some extent by potential financial 
gains.  This thesis derives its focus from these empirical studies, but also from the 
labour economics literature on matched employer-employee data.  Whilst the studies 
identified above have considered dentist behaviour in the context of overall 
treatment intensity, this study differs in that it analyses and explores the variation in 
the provision of a single treatment, i.e. dental radiographs.   
 The Chalkley & Tilley (2006) paper was concerned with the influence of 
remuneration contracts on the quantity of dental services provided.  They recognised 
that the effectiveness of remuneration in influencing outcome is an empirical 
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question; the challenge is to isolate the effect of remuneration in the presence of 
other factors such as the unobserved heterogeneity of physicians and their patients.  
In this study both patient and dentist specific effects were controlled for in a multi-
level random effects model.  It was discussed that whilst they had gone some way 
towards controlling for patient heterogeneity, more could be achieved within a 
matched patient-provider fixed effects framework.  This was beyond the scope of 
that particular study, thus this study picks up on this point and aims to apply the 
fixed effects framework described within.  This study will also consider the 
influence of the remuneration contract on the provision of radiographs; with a view 
to finding out if there is a difference between a single treatment item and a bundle of 
treatment items.   
 The data collected in Scotland on dental care provides a highly functional 
high quality dataset with a structure and features that can assist greatly in producing 
empirical evidence on the variation in health care.
1
  The aim of this study is to 
exploit the data, with a view to being able to analyse the variation that exists across 
treatments.    As mentioned, in this study, the choice of treatment to analyse was that 
of dental radiographs.  An initial look at the data revealed that there was widespread 
variation in the use of radiographs across General Dental Services (GDS) dentists in 
Scotland (Figure 5.1).  This distribution shows the likelihood that each dentist will 
provide a radiograph in any given course of treatment.  The majority of dentists will 
provide radiographs anywhere between 10 and 40% of the time, whilst almost 4% of 
dentists almost never provide radiographs.   However there are small proportions that 
tend to provide them much more often, with some dentists having almost all their 
                                                 
1
 A detailed description of the data is given in Chapter 5 
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courses of treatment containing one of these small film radiographs.  The data alone 
therefore provides some motivation for further study of radiographs.  The fact that so 
little research has been done in this area provides further motivation to look at 
radiographs.  Is there some belief or expectation that dental radiographs would not 
exhibit the kind of variation across dentists that the data suggests there is? 
 Wennberg and others (Wennberg et al. 1982; Wennberg, 1984, 2010; Evans 
1990) found that typically variability is common when there is uncertainty or lack of 
knowledge about a procedure or treatment, in terms of its use or the potential 
costs/benefits to patients. These factors would not appear to be typical in the case of 
dental radiographs.  The benefits of radiographs in dentistry have been known for 
many years and their use has become standard practice in the field of dental care.  
Another aspect applicable in the case of radiographs is the fact that their use is 
somewhat regulated.  Guidelines are in place about when and how often radiographs 
should be carried out and dentists have certain protocols to follow when making the 
decision to give a patient a radiograph (National Radiological Protection Board, 
2001).  This makes the case of dental radiographs an interesting one to consider and 
the available data makes it quite easy to assess the provision of radiographs by 
dentists.  A detailed description of the data collection and processing is given in 
Chapter 5.  This helps to explain further where and how the use of radiographs fits 
into the dental care system.  For now it is useful to know that in the data, a 
radiograph is a separate item with an associated fee, and dentists will receive 
payment for every radiograph carried out.  Approximately 1.3 million radiographs 
were carried out in Scotland in the financial year ending March 2010 (SDPB, 2010).  
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Dentists are paid £4.00 for each small film radiograph and up to a maximum of 
£16.50 for additional films.  
 The existence of variation and the other factors surrounding the provision of 
radiographs makes them a suitable treatment for analysis.  The aim of this study is to 
use a micro-econometric modelling strategy in order to explain why this variation 
exists.  The typical questions that will be addressed are, ‘what are the sources of this 
variation’ and ‘how much does each source contribute to the overall observed 
variation in radiograph provision’. 
 To fully account for the variation in the use of radiographs, it is necessary to 
do so in a way that can consider the impact of economic incentives.  Economists are 
often concerned that in the presence of information asymmetry in health care 
markets, there may be an incentive for providers to provide treatment that the 
perfectly informed patient would not have chosen.  This can lead to a result where 
the treatment decision may not necessarily be in the best interest of the patient. This 
presents another motivation for the decision to investigate dental radiographs, given 
the nature of the treatment in terms of the potential risks to health. 
 Radiographs are without doubt an invaluable diagnostic tool, but are also, not 
without risk.  Although the dose of radiation is low in dental radiographs, the effects 
of radiation exposures are cumulative and therefore depend on the total amount 
absorbed throughout ones’ lifetime.  Today, with technological advances people are 
absorbing increasing amounts of radiation from their natural environments and so 
any exposure, however low the doses, should be limited wherever possible.  
Radiographs should only be given when needed and when the benefit far outweighs 
the potential risk (National Radiological Protection Board, 2001).   
7 
 
 
 
 Numerous studies in the literature have investigated the potential risks 
associated with dental radiographs, with a particular view to establishing a possible 
link to certain types of cancer.  The evidence is somewhat conflicting and the 
consensus is that it is very difficult to ascertain one way or another if dental 
radiographs are a contributing factor in the development of some forms of cancer.  
Some studies have, however, provided evidence in support of the idea that there may 
be some kind of link (however small) between the two (see for example, Berrington 
de González & Darby 2004; Preston-Martin et al. 1985.  More recently Memon et al. 
(2010) claimed that the risk of developing thyroid cancer increases with the number 
of dental radiographs taken.  Although this finding comes with a number of caveats, 
the researchers suggest that it might be time to review the use of dental radiographs 
as an evaluation measure for new patients and as a routine periodical procedure 
(usually every 6-12 months), particularly in children.  It may not be possible to 
definitively claim that exposure to radiation from dental radiographs causes cancer, 
however there is definitely some agreement among the profession that ‘no’ radiation 
is ‘good’ radiation and that steps should be taken to ensure radiation exposure is 
minimised.   
 Dental radiographs therefore present a case where it is of particular 
importance to understand the sources of variation in their use, with a view to 
ensuring that patients are not being exposed unnecessarily to radiation.  On the flip 
side it is also important to ensure that radiographs are being provided when 
clinically necessary as they can be used to diagnose a number of dental conditions.  
It is also a risk that if radiographs are not used when appropriate that things may be 
missed, resulting in patients requiring further and possibly more complex treatment 
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in the future.  These are all factors that have to be considered when trying to measure 
and understand the variation in the provision of radiographs. 
1.2 Thesis Outline 
 This section presents a brief outline of the thesis and describes the main 
components of each chapter.  Chapter 2 presents background information on 
variation in health care.  A review of the literature is presented with a view to 
eliciting the major sources of variation and how variation has typically been analysed 
and measured.   
 Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the origins and development of 
the empirical methods that will be used in the analysis.  Particular attention is drawn 
to the labour economics literature and the use of employer-employee datasets 
(Abowd and Kramarz, 1999a; Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999).  Issues around 
identification and estimation of the model are discussed and a practical solution to 
the problem is presented (Cornelissen, 2006).  The work of Andrews et al (2006) is 
used as a starting point to develop a general model specification for estimation, 
adapted to a health care context with dentists and patients as the units of analysis.  A 
simple principal agent model of physician induced demand is presented to motivate 
the empirical estimation in Chapter 5. 
 Gaynor et al (2001) discussed the importance of having detailed knowledge 
of the institutional context when conducting analyses that study physician behaviour.  
Chapter 4 provides such information and helps inform the development of the 
empirical model and the interpretation of its results in Chapter 5.  In terms of the 
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institutional framework, particular attention is given to describing the contractual 
arrangements of the dentist and the payment structure faced by patients. 
 Chapter 5 describes the data and presents the empirical analysis of the 
variation in the use of dental radiographs across GDS dentists in Scotland.  A 
particular aim of this study is to investigate variation in treatment in the presence of 
and controlling for individual dentist and patient heterogeneity, both observed and 
unobserved.  As indicated in Chapter 3, and highlighted by Gaynor et al (2001) the 
structure and quality of the data is central to being able to conduct this type of 
analysis.  The empirical analysis makes use of what is essentially a matched patient 
provider dataset, taken from routinely collected administrative data used to process 
the payments made to dentists.  Taking advantage of its unique panel structure and 
using the estimation method described in Chapter 3, the data is used to estimate a 
series of fixed effects models which control for individual dentist and patient effects, 
both separately and then together in a three-way error components framework. 
 Finally, in Chapter 6 the overall conclusions from the thesis are reported.  
The implications of the study in terms of policy are discussed and some suggestions 
on future avenues of research in this area are given, particularly in the context of the 
identified individual dentist and patient unobserved heterogeneities. 
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Chapter 2: Variation in Health Care 
2.1 Introduction 
 Variation in health care has been defined as “...the observation of differences 
in the way apparently similar patients are treated from one health setting to 
another” (Hannan 1999).  Variation presents itself in many forms and across many 
levels of the health care sector, for example, in the use of health care resources, 
health outcomes, costs, quality and access to health care.  It has become a well 
recognised, ever present feature that impacts on all sectors of the health care delivery 
process.  This Chapter continues with a review of the literature on variation.  Section 
2.2 provides historical background on variation and describes the key research that 
has been done in this field.  Sections 2.3 and 2.4 identify the main sources of 
variation and describe how variations in health care have traditionally been analysed 
and measured.  Finally Section 2.5 concludes.   
2.2 Variation in Health Care: Background 
 There is evidence of variation existing across regions, demographic groups, 
health care institutions (hospitals, GP practices), and across individual health care 
providers within the same institution.  These variations arise from the balance of 
interactions between patients, physicians and the wider health care organisation.  
Such interactions ultimately impact on health care management decisions which in 
turn determine factors such as the quality, cost, and supply of care delivered to 
individual patients.  The health care system is a complex organisation with complex 
interactions between its many components, making it impossible to analyze some 
without the others (Dodgion & Greenberg 2009). 
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Dodgion & Greenberg (2009), recognise that variation is a phenomenon that 
is certainly not isolated to the field of health care.  It is “...observed throughout 
society as a natural and inevitable attribute of all physical activities and events for 
which no single cause can be found”. The concept of variation in health care is not a 
new one and it has been documented for many years.  The first systematic account of 
practice variation came in the form of a report by a British physician (Glover 1938) 
on the incidence of tonsillectomy among school children in England and Wales.  
Glover found widespread variation (tenfold) in tonsillectomy rates from one area of 
the country to another.  The focus of the paper was not specifically aimed at 
analysing the economic consequences of such variation, but more to identify its 
existence.  Glover did however reveal a startling result; for every death caused by the 
complications associated with tonsillitis itself, there were at least 8 deaths caused by 
the removal of the tonsils.  Regardless of the economic issues, this observation 
presented a clear need to question practice variation, at least on ethical grounds if not 
on economic grounds.  
 Following Glover’s exposure of the variation in tonsillectomy rates, there 
was a number of intervening studies aimed at investigating the issue of practice 
variation further.  Glover (1948) followed up on his 1938 study, with an aim to 
provide guidance on how to deal with variation in tonsillectomy rates, from the 
paediatrician perspective.  Lembcke (1952) considered the variation in 
appendectomy rates, as did Lewis (1969), along with regional rates of variation for 
five other common procedures.  All studies continued to find results similar to 
Glover (1938), i.e. widespread variability across regions. 
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In the late 1960s Professor John E Wennberg began analysing US Medicare
2
 
data with a view to determining the performance of hospitals and doctors.  In a 
statement to the Managed Healthcare Executive (McCue 2003), Wennberg stated, 
“Our results were fascinating, because they ran completely counter to what 
conventional wisdom said they would be. .... When we looked at the data, we found 
tremendous variation in every aspect of healthcare delivery, even among 
communities served by academic medical centres. The basic premise - that medicine 
was driven by science and by physicians capable of making clinical decisions based 
on well-established fact and theory - was simply incompatible with the data we saw. 
It was immediately apparent that suppliers were more important in driving demand 
than had been previously realised”.  Wennberg’s early work centred mainly on 
geographical variation and the resulting variation in health care costs.  At the time 
these ideas were largely unknown and remarked upon, apart from the few studies 
that followed Glover (1938).  Wennberg was instrumental in pioneering work in this 
field and has continued to do so over the last four decades.  In 1988 he founded the 
Centre for Evaluative Clinical Services (CECS) at Dartmouth Medical School (now 
known as The Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy and Clinical Practice) and was 
the founding editor of the Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care. 
 The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care is a series of reports on how health care 
is used and distributed in the United States.  The work at Dartmouth began by 
considering variation across geographical regions (small areas) usually in the context 
of the frequency in which various common surgical procedures took place.  
Wennberg and his colleagues continued to find systematic and persistent differences 
                                                 
2
 Medicare is a state financed health insurance program for those aged 65 and over in the United 
States 
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in the standardised rates of use for these procedures (typically surgical removal 
procedures such as the appendix, tonsils, hernia, and gall bladder), but also in other 
medical services in the US (Wennberg & Gittelsohn 1973, 1982; Wennberg 1982; 
Wennberg et al. 1987). The main focus of the Dartmouth work is on the Medicare 
traditional fee-for-service patients; however several state-based studies of all health 
insurance claims (both Medicare and commercial) also show that the variations in 
resources and quality in the non-Medicare populations closely resemble those in the 
Medicare population.
3
  This implies that the experience of the Medicare patients is a 
reliable predictor of the experience of the non-Medicare population. 
 As the study of variations in health care continues to grow and develop, this 
has forced the issue of variation to become an integral part of the agenda for any 
health care organisation aiming to improve service, whether in terms of efficiency or 
quality outcomes.  A critical starting point is to recognise the existence of variation 
and understand the potential consequences.  Variation in treatment decisions gives 
rise to variations in costs, utilisation of services and quality of care and outcomes. 
Wennberg was driven by the notion that it was important to understand and identify 
medical practice variation because it suggests a misuse of care (Wennberg 1984).  
He was the first to make the distinction between ‘warranted’ and ‘unwarranted’ 
variation and defined variations as being unwarranted if they cannot be explained by 
type or severity of illness, by patient preferences or the dictates of evidence based 
medicine. 
                                                 
3
 For example see the Atlas reports on Pennsylvania (1998), Virginia (2000) and Michigan (2000). 
14 
 
 
 
2.3 Categories and Sources of Variation 
 Although variation in healthcare presents itself in many forms and at 
different levels of the healthcare sector, it is useful to consider it in terms of two 
main categories.  The first considers variations in the utilisation of services, whilst 
the other is related to variations in health outcomes.  Within each category the 
sources of variation and potential ways to influence the variation are different.  
Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 below summarise these categories and identify the main 
sources of the variation in each. 
2.3.1 Variations in Utilisation of Services 
 One of the main causes for this type of variation is due to differences in the 
approach to preference-sensitive care, either at the patient level or the physician 
level.  Wennberg (2002) defines preference-sensitive care as that for conditions 
where there are different options for treatment and where the choice between the 
options may carry different costs, benefits and risks.  Typically patients’ attitudes 
towards the health outcome in question will be different and warranted variation in 
the utilisation of services will and should exist as a result.  Examples include the use 
of lumpectomy or mastectomy in treating early stage breast cancer, or the use of 
bypass surgery for treating heart disease.  The unwarranted variation arises when the 
treatment decisions are influenced by factors related to the attitudes of the physician 
and local medical opinion, and not due to patient preferences. Wennberg (1984) 
referred to this as the ‘practice style’ factor and suggests that much of the variation 
in preference sensitive care is actually explained by the practice style of individual 
physicians.  Different practice styles are thought to reflect a number of things such as 
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differences in knowledge, training, health care environment and the interpretation of 
requirements.  In some instances a lack of the necessary scientific information can 
lead to uncertainty among physicians about the appropriate treatment, though in 
many cases the practice style factor appears unrelated to scientific controversies 
(Wennberg 1984).  
Not only is physician behaviour in terms of practice style a contributing 
factor in explaining variation in the utilisation of services, but other factors in health 
care markets, such as physician market power and financial motives, can also explain 
why physicians can influence treatment decisions, thus resulting in unwarranted 
variation.  McGuire (2000) describes these factors under the umbrella term of 
‘physician agency’ and discusses the mechanisms physicians can use to influence the 
quantity of care provided to patients.  For example, in the presence of asymmetric 
information physicians can take actions to influence patient preferences. This 
phenomenon is referred to as supplier (physician) induced demand, whereby the 
physician is able to influence the demand for services in a way that the informed 
patient would not choose.  Wennberg et al. (2007) found evidence of this when they 
found that the amount of care that would be demanded under shared decision making 
might be substantially less than what is actually provided.    The question that needs 
to be addressed when considering this type of variation is whether or not the 
physicians recommended course of treatment corresponds closely to the patients 
informed preference.  It is believed that medical practice that reflects physician 
agency will persist until patients are actively involved in the decision process and 
there are incentives for physicians to adopt shared decision making, as opposed to 
incentives that encourage financial gains. 
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The second main source of variation in the utilisation of services is due to 
variations in supply-sensitive care.  It is often the case that many clinical decisions 
seem to be subtly influenced by the supply or availability of a particular service or 
resource (NHS Confederation 2004).  The Dartmouth Atlas Research suggests that 
variations in supply-sensitive care may represent an overuse of medical services and 
the frequency at which these services are used is not determined by well articulated 
medical theory, or scientific evidence (The Dartmouth Atlas Project 2007b).  This 
type of variation is particularly apparent in the management of chronic illnesses 
where physician visits, hospitalisations, stays in intensive care, and imaging services 
are all examples of care where the local supply influences the frequency of use.  
Typically when there is more capacity in the system more care will be delivered, 
whether this is warranted or not.   
 In the US this type of variation can be used to ‘explain’ most of the variations 
in Medicare’s per capita spending among US regions (The Dartmouth Atlas Project 
2007b).  Of even greater importance to health care organisations and providers is the 
fact that research repeatedly shows that higher spending on health care and greater 
utilisation of services does not achieve better outcomes, in terms of quality of care or 
longer years of life (Wennberg et al. 2008; Gawande 2009).  The Dartmouth Atlas, 
over the course of its research, has shown that death rates in areas where there is less 
capacity and utilisation are not higher than in areas where there is much higher 
capacity and utilisation.  Fisher et al. (2009) actually found evidence of higher 
mortality in high resourced, high utilisation areas than in low resourced, low 
utilisation areas.   
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2.3.2 Variations in Outcomes 
Health outcomes can be measured in a variety of different ways, for example 
in terms of mortality rates or improvements in morbidity. In the case of dentistry, the 
main outcomes of concern are dental caries (measured in children by the mean rates 
of decayed, missing and filled teeth), the prevalence of periodontal disease and the 
rates of oral cancer.  Regardless of the field and method of measuring health 
outcomes, there is evidence of widespread variation across 
patients/physicians/hospitals etc.  This type of variation is often the result of, or 
related to variations in the use of effective-care, where effective care is that which 
includes services whose effectiveness has been proved in clinical trials or well 
designed cohort studies (The Dartmouth Atlas Project 2007a).  In other words there 
exists a sound medical evidence base to show that the benefits of use far exceed any 
potential harm, and there is no substantial trade-offs (in terms of risks) that depend 
on patient preferences.  If this is the case, the view is that all patients in need should 
receive this treatment/service.    
Variations in the use of such treatments reflect a failure to deliver needed 
care or the underuse of care, and in many instances the observed variation in many 
health outcomes can be attributed to this source.  In the UK this type of variation has 
been in the media spotlight in recent years, where the term ‘postcode lottery’ has 
been used to describe the use of, or access to a number of health care services, 
particularly in relation to the use of cancer drugs and access to mental health drugs 
and services (BBC NEWS 2008; Cordon 2008; The Guardian 2009; Goodchild & 
Owen 2006). 
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2.4 Analysing and Measuring Variation 
 The vast majority of the studies on variation identified above have used small 
area analysis as a method to describe how rates of health care use and events vary 
over well defined geographical areas.  Significant variations have been shown to 
exist in the rates of hospitalisation and in surgical procedures (Roos et al. 1986; Blais 
1993; Brook et al. 1984; Chassin et al. 1986; Wennberg 1984) and that this is an 
international phenomenon (McPherson et al. 1982; Appleby et al. 2011).   In these 
studies the unit of analysis has most often been small neighbouring areas, where it is 
assumed they are homogenous with respect to factors which influence health care 
utilisation, such as the underlying health status of the population and economic 
factors such as income and price.  In some instances the variation has been measured 
across hospitals (Blais, 1993) within the same area.   
Stano (1993) identified some methodological concerns associated with small 
area variation studies, particularly in terms of defining the small areas themselves, 
defining the at-risk patient population and ensuring the casemix in each area was 
similar.  He re-evaluated the role of small area studies and suggested that there are 
many factors in accounting for inter-area variation, other than practice style (as 
suggested by Wennberg 1984).  Small area variation studies and those which use 
aggregated data, use the practice style hypothesis to explain the observed variation, 
however they often don’t include a clear definition of what is meant by practice style 
or provide any definitive measure of how much practice style contributes to the 
observed variation.  Statements are simply made about the importance of practice 
style and that this can account for any ‘unexplained’ variation; however it could be 
argued that it is impossible to distinguish these effects from other influences, not 
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only on the supply side, but also on the demand side (for example patient 
preferences).   
Grytten & Sørensen (2003) considered further the practice style theory 
proposed by Wennberg to see if it could account for GP practice variations in 
Norway.  They argued that improvements in the analysis of variation could be made 
and suggested that identifying practice style effects and their contribution to 
observed variation can only be achieved by conducting analyses at the individual 
physician level as opposed to studies that use data aggregated to the area/hospital 
level.  In doing so they found that GP practice styles were an important determinant 
in explaining clinical practice variation and in turn expenditure on primary care 
services.  They did however point out that the unexplained variation (after 
controlling for observed characteristics of the patients) represents an upper limit that 
variation in practice styles has on expenditure.  They recognise the potential for 
overestimating the impact of practice style, which would be the case if for example, 
the patient population per physician varied with respect to health care needs. 
The idea that physician effects were likely to be the most influential factors 
in explaining health care variations led to a change in the focus of studies attempting 
to account for variation.  The literature saw a movement towards analysis at the 
physician level, but studies also emerged that used patients as the unit of analysis.  
(For a review refer to Vliet 1992; Newhouse 1994)  As Grytten & Sørensen point 
out, a common finding is that patient characteristics such as age and gender can only 
account for a small proportion (approximately 1%) of the variation in observed 
health care outcomes or expenditure.  Including other variables that reflect a patients 
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underlying health status increases the proportion of variation attributable to patients 
to approximately 15%.   
 In the last 20 years, the existence of variation within the health care sector 
has continued to be documented and very recently a similar Atlas to the Dartmouth 
Project has been produced for England (DoH 2010).
4
  Investigations have considered 
variation in terms of the frequency of treatment, the types of treatment, the cost of 
treatment and quite often look to the characteristics and the behaviour of the 
physician as ways to explain observed variations.  One such strand of the literature 
considers the theory of supplier induced demand (Wennberg et al. 1982; Gruber & 
Owings 1996; Carlsen & Grytten 2000; Grytten & Sørensen 2001)  to account for 
physician behaviour.  In these studies, the focus is on the physicians being motivated 
by financial gain, although there is a growing literature that debates this idea and 
suggests that physicians are motivated by factors other than pure economic 
incentives.  For example, Hausman & Le Grand (1999) propose that behaviour to a 
large extent is influenced by professional norms and the fact that physicians show 
some level of benevolence towards their patients.  Fuchs (2000), in his discussion 
about the future of Health Economics, discussed how social norms can affect 
consumer demand, labour force participation, employer-employee relations and 
many other levels of economic interactions.  He recognised professional norms as 
being an aspect of social norms and proposed they are of particular importance in 
health care.  
 As the evidence base grows on identifying factors that can account for 
variation it is now widely accepted that not only is it physician and supply side 
                                                 
4
 The NHS Atlas of Variation in Healthcare: Reducing unwarranted variation to increase value and 
improve quality can be accessed at http://www.rightcare.nhs.uk/atlas/  
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factors, but also patient, and demand side factors that impact on treatment decisions 
and health care outcomes.  More recently, studies have extended to consider the 
relationship between individuals (patients or physicians) and the characteristics of 
the institutions to which they belong.  Advances in statistical techniques and 
methodology have meant that now studies of variation in health care can combine 
these factors.   
 For example, multilevel models are becoming increasing popular to study 
variation in health care, particularly in the field of epidemiology.  For a review of 
their benefits in health related research and examples of where they have been used, 
refer to Rice & Jones (1997); Duncan et al. (1998); Catalán-Reyes & Galindo-
Villardón (2003).
5
  Multilevel models make use of the natural hierarchical structure 
of the data commonly found in health care markets, where there are multiple micro 
units (patients) within multiple macro units (hospitals).  It is then possible to make 
inferences and explore the variations at each level, with a view to being able to better 
account for the observed variations in medical practice.  This type of modelling 
strategy enables the researcher to take account of the heterogeneity between 
individuals and between the higher level macro units. 
 To summarise, this section shows that the following factors are important 
determinants in accounting for the variation in healthcare and treatment:  
 Institutional structure  
 Physician practice style 
 Financial incentives  
                                                 
5
 For more information Diez Roux (2002) provides a detailed glossary of the key concepts and terms 
used in multilevel analysis. 
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 Insurance contracts  
 Underlying health status of patients and casemix 
 Professional norms 
 Physician and Patient preferences 
 From the literature, the standard approach is to consider variation in 
healthcare by considering many of these factors separately.  For example, some 
studies will consider the impact of incentives in accounting for variation, others 
might analyse the impact of practice style or professional norms on variation, but 
few have analysed the two together.  This might be because some of these factors are 
quite easily identified and are measurable, whilst others tend to be not easily 
measured or are unobservable to the researcher.  In contrast to the usual approach, 
this study will use an estimation framework that enables the majority of these factors 
to be taken into account simultaneously, with a strong emphasis on the unobserved 
heterogeneity of both patients and providers.  Andersen (2009) recognises the 
benefits of such an approach and suggests that integrating the ideas from different 
theories on physician behaviour can produce different and more complete results.   
 The estimation approach adopted in this study allows for a similar analysis to 
that provided by the multilevel approach, however complexities of the real world and 
in particular complexities in the health care system mean that the data is not always 
in strict hierarchies.  It is often the case that individuals are likely to be in more than 
one unit of the higher level and over time move between units at the higher level.  
This is the case in the dataset that will be used here.  The lower level units are 
patients and the higher level units are providers (dentists).  The data consists of 
repeated observations on both dentists and patients, and patients move between 
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dentists.  Rather than adopt a multilevel approach, the empirical methods described 
in Chapter 3 provide a way to analyse variation with non-nested data in the presence 
of, and controlling for unobserved patient and dentist heterogeneity.  A fixed effects 
framework provides consistent estimates of the variables in the model and allows for 
the separate identification of the unobserved patient and dentist heterogeneity.  
2.5 Conclusion 
 There is little doubt about the existence of variation in health care.  It has 
been well documented in the literature and shown to exist across all levels of the 
health care sector.  Widespread variations raise questions about efficiency, equity 
and quality of care, at a time when health care costs continue to soar.  There is a 
growing recognition among governments and health care professionals of the 
importance of being able to identify the sources of variation, and to be able to 
understand and measure it. 
 Variation in healthcare can be categorised under two main headings; 
variations in the utilisation of services (activity) and variations in health outcomes.  
Within these categories the causes or sources of the variation are different, with any 
attempts to reduce variation being dependent on its given source.  Professor John 
Wennberg, the pioneer in the study of healthcare variation, identifies the sources of 
variation as being related to different types of care.  For example, variation in the 
utilisation of services stems from variations in preference and supply-sensitive care, 
whilst the variation in health outcomes can most often be explained by variations in 
the use of effective care. 
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 Studies of variation have moved on from the small area analyses that were 
dominant when Wennberg first began analysing variation.  The literature reveals a 
range of determinants that may help to explain variation in health care and it is 
becoming widely recognised that factors influencing both the provider and the 
patients’ behaviour can have an impact.  Many of these factors will be observed and 
easily measurable, however many will not be observable.  The result is a complex 
system of interactions, all of which to some extent contribute to the observed 
variation in health care utilisation and outcomes.    
 The aim of this study is to analyse the variation in the use of dental 
radiographs in Scotland.  This will be considered in the context of the factors 
determining variation listed in section 2.4.  The estimation approach and the level of 
analysis set this investigation apart from others.  This study gives particular attention 
to measuring the contribution of both individual dentist and patient heterogeneity to 
the variation in the provision of dental radiographs.      
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Chapter 3: Empirical Methods 
3.1 Introduction 
 Chapter 2 presented an overview of the literature on variations in health care 
and discussed a number of stylised facts about the types of variation that exist and its 
potential sources.  It presented a brief discussion on the methods and empirical 
frameworks that have been applied in the context of health care, highlighting that the 
existence of variation across many levels in the health care sector is well 
documented. It became clear, however, that what are less well documented are 
empirical studies that actually aim to measure and quantify the variation arising from 
its different sources.  This is a gap in the literature that this study will address by 
incorporating recent advances in micro-econometric modelling techniques into the 
analysis of variation in treatment decisions or outcomes, techniques that have mainly 
been used in the labour economics literature.   
 The chapter is not intended to provide a comprehensive review of all recent 
methods and modelling techniques that have been applied in the context of labour 
economics; it aims to provide the reader with information on relatively recent 
developments with regard to a specific type of data and corresponding econometric 
models, which have typically been applied to labour market studies.  In fact, many of 
the methods described in the previous chapter (see section 2.4) are equally applicable 
to labour market analyses.  The aim of this chapter is to discuss the origins and 
application of the particular models that will later be used in the empirical analysis of 
this study. 
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 Section 3.2 describes the datasets in question, namely linked employer-
employee data and discusses the rationale for and the creation of such datasets.  
Section 3.3 presents the general statistical model and discusses issues around 
identification and estimation.  A practical solution to the estimation problem is given 
in section 3.4 by way of a fixed effects framework.  Section 3.5 describes how such 
methods will be applied in the context of health care and provides a theoretical 
framework to motivate the empirical analysis in Chapter 5, and finally Section 3.6 
concludes. 
3.2 Linked Employer-Employee datasets 
  In the 1980s researchers in the field of labour economics recognised that the 
new types of data and econometric methods that were emerging would enable 
different types of research to be carried out; research that would be based on 
microdata and that could provide better answers to many questions concerning 
labour markets.  Rosen (1986) described how “.... the greatest potential for further 
progress rests in developing more suitable sources of data on the nature of selection 
and matching between workers and firms....”  His attention focused on how such 
data could produce better estimates in the context of the theory of compensating 
wage differentials (or equalising differences) but also recognised its potential in 
other aspects of labour market analysis.  Willis (1986) considered the role of better 
data in the context of the human capital model and the development of agency 
theories on the worker firm relationship.  He recognised that, “.... future progress in 
this area will hinge crucially on the development of data which links information on 
the individual characteristics of workers and their households with data on the firms 
who employ them...”  There was wide recognition that there were some key elements 
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missing in being able to fully understand firm performance and worker outcomes and 
at the same time the information gap required to do this was also recognised.  This 
resulted in a number of years that saw the creation and development of linked 
employer-employee datasets.  
 In May 1998, The International Symposium of Linked Employer-Employee 
Data was held in Washington DC, with its main aim being to address the benefits 
and challenges of constructing and making use of such datasets.  This conference 
brought together a number of statisticians and social scientists from around the 
world, representing 20 countries in all.  It provided a unique opportunity for 
researchers to learn from each other and to demonstrate the value of research based 
on data that links worker and firm characteristics.  It also facilitated a discussion 
around potential research that could provide international comparisons in this field. 
 The organisers of the event invited eight delegates to provide a summary of 
the papers presented in each session, which then later formed the basis of a 
Conference Report. (Haltiwanger et al. 1998)  This report identified eight main 
themes that were presented and discussed during the two day conference and are 
listed as follows: 
 Creating employer-employee datasets 
 Confidentiality of linked data 
 Econometric issues 
 Analysing training and productivity 
 Analysing firms, workers and wages 
 Analysing firms, jobs and turnover 
 Program development and policy analysis 
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 International comparisons 
 It became apparent from this group meeting that many other countries, 
particularly in Northern Europe, had made much more progress in constructing and 
using linked datasets, compared to the United States.  Prior to 1998, worker-firm 
linked datasets had been used to analyse data in Canada, France, Scandinavia, 
Netherlands and Belgium.
6
  At the time Sweden in particular had a large detailed 
dataset that linked information on workers and firms.  It not only contained detailed 
information on many firm and demographic characteristics, but also had detailed 
accurate job classifications.  Lazear & Oyer (2004) suggested that the lack of 
detailed job information was one of the weaknesses of the US datasets that were 
being constructed.  The inclusion of such information enables the empirical 
researcher to answer many more questions relating to the internal workings of the 
firm and to better follow employees as they change jobs.   This therefore provided a 
useful environment for lessons to be learned across countries and sparked the 
development of similar datasets in the US.  One such example is the Linked 
Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) dataset, which was set up within the US 
Census Bureau. It uses modern statistical and computing techniques to combine 
federal and state administrative data on employers and employees with core Census 
Bureau censuses and surveys.  Abowd et al. (2004) provide a description of the 
creation and contents of this dataset and set out plans for its future development.   
 In 1999, the same authors who provided the Conference report published the 
book, The Creation and Analysis of Employer-Employee Matched Data, 
(Haltiwanger et al. 1999).  This book provides an in depth detail of all the papers 
                                                 
6
 See, for example, Krebs et al. (1999); Abowd et al. (1994); Hassink (1999); Audenrode (1999) 
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presented and discussed at the symposium.  It divides the papers into sections that 
focus on the creation of matched employer-employee datasets, analyses using these 
datasets and any econometric issues involved with their use. 
 More recently, on 16
th
 September 2005, the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) and Policy Studies Institute (PSI) held a one day workshop in London 
that brought together some of the principal analysts of linked employer-employee 
data.  The main aim of the conference was to address the ways in which linked 
employer-employee datasets can make a contribution to policy analysis, an area that 
DTI felt had received less attention in the literature.  A detailed report on the 
workshop and the papers presented was published by Bryson et al. (2006). 
 Conferences like the two described above are not unique and many countries 
have held similar discussions (For example, Denmark, Finland, Germany, New 
Zealand and Austria).  This highlights the interest and the importance that has been 
given to both the creation and the use of such datasets.  They continue to be used 
extensively in the literature and continue to help advance the understanding of labour 
markets.  
3.2.1 The Rationale for Linked Data 
 As discussed in the section above, in the 1980s and 90s there was wide 
recognition of the importance of developing datasets to assist in empirical research 
of labour markets.  As the interest in the internal working of firms and organisation 
grew, it became clear that to fully answer many of the emerging questions it would 
be necessary to have data that links information on the individual characteristics of 
workers (and the households they belong) with data on the firms who employ them 
(Willis 1986).  Matching the data on workers, to data on the firms in which they 
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work, provided the empirical basis to revisit and refine some of the theories of the 
firm, for example, production, mobility and turnover of workers, industrial 
organisation and compensation design.  In the years that followed the papers by 
Rosen and Willis, economists and social scientists in general made huge progress in 
creating and using matched employer-employee datasets.  Abowd & Kramarz 
(1999a) documented two emerging themes: 
 The importance of person and firm variables in the determination of 
compensation. 
 The importance of individual mobility in relation to firm-specific 
employment adjustments. 
They recognised that the matching of the data is what would allow more precise 
measurement of both personal and job attributes, both of which are required for 
empirical calculations.   
 Typically analyses of the variations in labour market outcomes, for example, 
wages, were conducted using cross sectional data taken from household surveys.  
These traditional surveys of workers contained many individual characteristics (such 
as education, age, gender, occupation) and in some cases firm characteristics too.  
They allowed for one level of variation in wages to be measured i.e. that due to 
individual characteristics.  Although much can be learned from these studies, 
inference is often indirect and may suffer from inconsistent or inaccurate self-
reported data (Lazear & Oyer 2004).  By expanding the data to longitudinal datasets, 
this opens up the possibility of measuring the contribution to the observed total 
variation in earnings, of unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics (for 
example motivation, family characteristics).  Adding the link to information on 
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employers allows the separation of two more sources of variation, i.e. the 
proportions due to observed and unobserved employer characteristics.  Abowd et al. 
(2004) noted the importance of these types of new measures in terms of explanatory 
power.  They considered the case of analysing the impact of firm quality on worker 
outcomes as well as the impact of workforce quality on firm outcomes and found 
that analyses that rely on traditional cross sectional data can account for 
approximately 30% of earnings variation.  However, analyses that exploit the linked 
nature of the data and obtain new measures of worker and firm quality, can account 
for close to 90% of observed variation in earnings.  It became evident that linked 
employer-employee datasets would provide great research potential.  They would 
enable many labour market issues to be analysed from both the demand and the 
supply side, where previously, research relied heavily on supply side factors.  The 
conference report from the DTI workshop provided a succinct summary of the 
unique advantages of using linked employer-employee data and described the four 
ways in which such data can offer insights into processes within firms and in the 
labour market at large (Bryson et al, 2006).  The four points are summarised as 
follows
7
: 
 If there is something ‘specific’ to worker-firm matching which generates both 
costs and returns to both parties, then labour market dynamics can only be 
properly and fully understood by being able to observe that match.  
 The inclusion of data from both the employer and the employee allows for 
features that would otherwise be unobserved to be included in analyses.  This 
not only leads to enriched analyses, but also helps to overcome some of the 
                                                 
7
 For full details see Making Linked Employer-Employee Data Relevant to Policy, DTI Occasional 
Paper NO.4, 2006. 
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biases inherent in analyses that rely on data either solely on employers or 
employees. 
 Multiple observations of employees within multiple workplaces permit 
analyses of labour market issues that are attributable to within- and across- 
workplace dispersion e.g. distribution of pay 
 Longitudinal linked employer-employee data allow for a much more rigorous 
assessment of causal processes that might not otherwise be possible e.g. 
worker and employer selection processes 
3.2.2 The Creation of Linked Datasets 
 The types of conferences described above, led to an explosion of interest in 
these datasets and how they could be applied in a research setting.  The was a large 
increase in the number of empirical studies making use of matched datasets, in many 
different countries, though at the time not much in the literature about how to 
actually construct the data.  The Washington conference provided a useful forum for 
discussions on this and the book that followed devoted a section to this very issue 
(See Section 3, Haltiwanger et al 1999).  Abowd & Kramarz (1999a), in their chapter 
in the Handbook of Labor Economics, recognised that many economists would not 
actually be familiar with the methods used to construct matched employer-employer 
data and therefore provided a detailed discussion on how to do this and the types of 
issues involved.  According to the authors, it is necessary to select the data sources 
appropriate for answering the questions under investigation.  There are three 
different types of matching and two dimensions that distinguish the matched data.  
Data is matched by linking survey-survey, survey to administrative and 
administrative-administrative data.  Some datasets are cross sectional in nature, 
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others are longitudinal; and some frameworks focus on the employee, whilst others 
use the firm as the primary unit of analysis.   
 Abowd and Kramarz proposed that their chapter in the Handbook of Labor 
Economics (Chapter 40, 1999) could act as a reference for researchers using matched 
employer-employee data, to ensure they do choose the appropriate data sources.  
They go to great lengths to discuss the design of different types of data sets and 
divide them into categories according to their representativeness, for example 
representative cross section of firms with either representative or non-representative 
data on workers, representative cross section of workers matched with longitudinal 
data on firms, and representative matched worker-firm panels (from either 
administrative or statistical survey data).
8
   The authors also directed attention to the 
fact that not all matched data were designed with the intention of creating 
representative data on the set of workers or firms within a given region or country, 
and numerous studies of labour markets are conducted using this type of data. (For 
examples see Groshen (1996) and Brown & Medoff (2003))  
 Jensen (2010) provides an up to date summary of the major matched 
employer-employee datasets that are currently in use around the world.  This 
overview does not attempt to draw on any similarities or differences between the 
datasets, but merely sets out the broad characteristics of each and identifies some 
recent analyses that have been conducted using them.  A few examples are provided 
below: 
 US Worker Establishment Characteristics Database – This links data for a 
sample drawn from the 1990 Decennial Census of Population to employers’ 
                                                 
8
 For a complete discussion refer to the Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol 3B, Chapter 40, pp2629-
2710 
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data from the 1989 Longitudinal Research Database.  For an application see 
Hellerstein & Neumark (2008).  
 French Linked Employer-Employee database – Data are collated from four 
different sources: a longitudinal dataset of firms accounts, the Modification 
of Structure Database (contains all asset transfers between firms), the Annual 
Declarations of Social Data (longitudinal data on jobs held by every worker 
in France) and the Permanent Demographic Sample (other census based data 
on individuals).  With such rich matched data, the French dataset has been 
used in a number of studies, for example, Abowd Kramarz and Margolis 
(1999), Goux & Maurin (2000), and Margolis (2006).  
 British Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998 – This was the first 
example of a matched employer-employee dataset in Britain and included all 
workplaces with 10 or more employees across a range of industries.  It was 
repeated in 2004 and contained information on more than 3000 managers and 
20,000 employees.  For an application see Frijters et al. (2003). 
The paper by Jensen (2010) also provides information on datasets used in New 
Zealand, Japan, Canada, Denmark, Germany and Australia. 
3.3 The General Statistical Model 
 This section draws heavily on Andrews et al. (2006).  They describe the basic 
generic linear model that can be identified with matched employer-employee 
datasets.  Note that this model is analogous to the general specification described by 
Abowd & Kramarz (1999a). The vast majority of the analyses conducted using such 
data use a variant of the model given by Equation (3.3.1) below:   
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                                    (3.3.1) 
 
where     is some measured outcome for the individual          
workers are observed once per period          in firm         and can change 
firms over time 
    and    are vectors of observable  -level covariates 
    and    are vectors of observable  -level covariates 
It is assumed that workers will enter and exit the panel, resulting in an unbalanced 
panel with    observations per worker 
There are      
 
    observations (worker-periods) in total. 
The error components are    for the worker,   for the firm and the third component 
   represents the unobserved time effect. 
It is assumed that the error components (unobserved heterogeneities) can be 
correlated with each other and with any of the observable explanatory variables 
which means fixed effects estimation is required to estimate the parameters of 
(3.3.1).  
    is the stochastic disturbance term and is assumed to be strictly exogenous.  This 
implies that worker’s mobility decisions are independent of    (a requirement for 
identification – see section 3.3.2.1 below).  
 Equation (3.3.1) contains all four possible types of covariate that may be of 
interest to researchers;    and    are time-invariant variables for workers, whilst     
are variables that vary across individual workers and time.  Similarly    and    are 
variables that are fixed over time for firms, whilst     vary across firms and over 
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time.  Fixed effects estimation of the general model would result in the parameter 
vector       associated with the time-invariant variables not being identified.  Rather 
than dropping       , Andrews et al (2006) defines what Abowd & Kramarz (1999a) 
described as the pure person effect and pure firm effect.  The pure person effect is 
given by:  
            (3.3.2) 
 
It combines the effects of observable time-invariant personal characteristics and 
unobserved personal heterogeneity.  Similarly the pure firm effect is given by:  
            (3.3.3) 
 
It combines the effects of observable time-invariant characteristics of the firm and 
unobservable firm heterogeneity.  Hence equation (3.3.1) can be written as:  
                          (3.3.4) 
   
and in matrix notation, is given by:  
                  (3.3.5) 
 
where   is the      matrix of observable time-varying individual 
characteristics,  is the      matrix of observable time-varying firm 
characteristics,   is the      matrix of indicators for individual        ,   is 
the      matrix of indicators for the firm at which   works at date   (  firms in 
total),   is the    vector of outcomes,   is the vector of residuals, and     .   
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 The parameters of (3.3.5) are  , the vector of coefficients on the time-varying 
personal characteristics;    the vector of coefficients on time-varying firm 
characteristics;  , the     vector of individual effects;  , the     vector of firm 
effects; and the error variance,   
    The parameter   includes both the unobservable 
individual effect and time-invariant personal characteristics, as does   include both 
the unobservable and time-invariant firm effects.  Equations (3.3.1) and (3.3.5) are 
interpreted as the conditional expectation of individual outcomes given information 
on the observable characteristics, the identity of both the individual and the 
employing firm, and the time at which the observation occurred (Abowd & Kramarz, 
1999a). 
3.3.1 Interpretation Issues 
  Although the number of authors conducting analyses using linked employer-
employee data grew rapidly in the 1990s and beyond, and many did estimate models 
similar to (3.3.5), in most cases the full model was not estimated.  This led to 
considerable ambiguity about the precise interpretation of various combinations of 
the parameters of the model, which Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (AKM hereafter, 
1999) decided to address.  In this paper, they described the importance of 
recognising that the omission or aggregation of one or more of the effects in (3.3.5) 
can change the meaning of the other effects significantly.  Variations in the set of 
conditioning effects can lead to omitted-variable bias and the use of different linear 
combinations of the effects can lead to aggregation bias.  Sometimes this can be in a 
very subtle way that is not always clear from the specific equation being estimated.  
AKM (1999) investigated each of these variations in turn in the context of different 
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problems in the labour force, for example, inter-industry wage differentials, firm-size 
wage effects, and measuring internal and external wages.   
 To summarise, any analysis that estimates models (or variants) of the general 
form given by (3.3.5), will result in omitted variable bias, if either the person or firm 
effects are excluded from the analysis.  When the estimated version of (3.3.5) 
excludes the pure firm effects, the estimated person effects, are the sum of the pure 
person effects, and the employment duration weighted average of the firm effects for 
the firms in which the worker was employed, conditional on the individual time-
varying characteristics.  Similarly, in the case of omitting the pure person effects 
from the estimated version of (3.3.5), this results in estimates of the firm effects that 
can be interpreted as the sum of the pure firm effects, plus the employment-duration 
weighted average of the person effects of all the firm’s employees in the sample, 
conditional on the time-varying individual characteristics. The estimated coefficients 
on the time-varying characteristics in the case of either omitted firm or person effects 
will also be biased.    
 Prior to the work of AKM (1999), almost all of the analyses estimating 
equations like (3.3.5), produced estimated effects that confounded the pure person 
and pure firm effects, in the form of an omitted variable bias.  The possibility of 
being able to identify both person and firm effects, therefore allowed researchers 
using matched employer-employee data to re-examine many important topics in 
labour economics using estimates that properly allocated the statistical effects 
associated with workers and firms.  For example, Woodcock (2003) considers the 
role of heterogeneity and the worker firm match on wage dynamics and employment 
decisions.  Abowd et al. (2003; 2005), also consider the worker firm match and 
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examine whether ‘good’ workers are employed by ‘good’ firms.  The 2005 paper re-
visits one of the most debated issues in labour economics; inter-industry wage 
differentials. Dostie (2005) presents new evidence on returns to seniority using 
linked employer-employee data, looking particularly at the relation to worker 
turnover and Bryan (2007) uses matched Canadian data to examine the relationship 
between workers, workplaces and working time. 
3.3.2 Identification and Estimation 
 Section 3.3 above presented the general specification of the statistical model 
underlying the majority of analyses making use of linked employer-employee data 
and discussed some issues around interpretation of the parameters.  This section 
considers the identification of the model parameters and some early estimation 
methods. 
3.3.2.1 Identification of Person and Firm Effects 
 Identification of the model requires repeated observations (on the same 
workers and the same firms) and mobility in the sample.  Mobility is a necessary 
condition if one wants to separately identify person and firm effects in the general 
model.  The separate identification of these effects requires the presence of 
individuals who move from firm to firm.  Abowd and Kramarz (1999a), summarise 
this condition as follows, “...The individual and firm effects are both identified 
whenever an individual that appears in the sample works for a firm that employs at 
least one individual, also in the sample, who moves to another firm, which, 
necessarily, also appears in the sample.” (p. 2662) In order to highlight the 
complexities of identification in the model, it is useful to consider a very simple 
example.  Suppose there are only 3 individuals/workers (1, 2, and 3), two firms (  
40 
 
 
 
and  ) and two time periods (       ).  The necessary mobility condition 
required for all individual and firm effects to be identified can be shown by the 
following simple illustration: 
Figure 3.1: Mobility Condition for Identification of Person and Firm Effects 
          
1      
2      
3      
Individual 1 is continuously employed at firm  ; individual 2 is continuously 
employed at firm  , and individual 3 moves from being employed at firm   in the 
first period to being employed at firm   in the second period.  It is this movement of 
individual 3 that allows for all three individual effects to be identified and both firm 
effects to be identified.  Consider the situation where individual 3 isn’t mobile and 
stays employed at firm  , then firm   effect cannot be distinguished from individual 
2 effect and individual 1 and 3 effects will be entirely within firm   effect9.   
 Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (ACK hereafter, 2002), expand on the 
identification issue further and demonstrate how the problem can be solved by 
applying methods from graph theory to determine groups of connected individuals 
and firms.  Then, within a connected group of either individuals or firms, 
identification can be determined using conventional methods from the analysis of 
covariance.  For individuals and firms to be connected, it is necessary that some 
individuals in the sample are employed at multiple firms.  The authors state that, 
                                                 
9
 Both individual and firm effects are subject to the usual identification restriction that they sum to 
zero. 
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“When a group of persons and firms is connected, the group contains all the workers 
who ever worked for any of the firms in the group and all the firms at which any of 
the workers were ever employed.”(p. 3)   
 A recent study from the economics of education literature (Kramarz et al. 
2008) also considers mobility in the context of identifying their model.  This paper 
uses data from the National Pupil Database (NPD), which is a comprehensive 
administrative register of all pupils in state schools in England, and applies similar 
estimation methods to that in AKM.  The authors indicate that identification of the 
model specifications requires both sufficient and exogenous mobility. 
3.3.2.2 Estimation of the Model 
 The requirements for identification of the model i.e. repeated observations on 
workers, repeated observations on firms and sufficient mobility in the sample means 
that extremely large datasets are needed.  The creation of this type of dataset, 
although it solves the problem of identification, in doing so it creates a problem in 
terms of estimation.  The full least squares solution to the estimation problem given 
by Equation (3.3.1) solves the normal equations for all estimable effects: 
 
         
         
         
  
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
  
In typical applications, the cross product matrix on the left hand side of the equation 
is too high dimensional to solve using conventional algorithms, like those found in 
general linear modelling software such as SAS and Stata.  This is because the 
memory requirement is too great for packages like this (which store all data in 
memory).  Not only does the data matrix have to be stored, but also the created mean 
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deviations for all observations.  Consider the case of     1.2m;    3000;    
100.  The data matrix to be stored is            ; the data matrix for the   
mean deviations is       .  Assuming that everything is stored in double 
precision (8b per cell), the data requirement would be 60 GB, which is far beyond 
the capacity of most computers available to researchers.   
 Initial analyses using linked employer-employee data could therefore not 
provide the full least squares solution.  AKM showed that many common methods of 
approximating the solution can be derived by considering an augmented version of 
the equation.  This is whereby ancillary effects defined in conjunction with 
interactions of observable characteristics of persons and firms are inserted into the 
model. The technique produces consistent estimates of the time-varying personal 
characteristics, firm effects and functions of person effects.  Abowd, Finer and 
Kramarz (AFK hereafter, 1999) expand on the above by applying a technique that 
allows estimation of a large number of firm effects along with all of the person 
effects.   
 ACK (2002) provide new methods to obtain the exact solution to the 
estimation problem.  The same data is used and the exact results fully confirm the 
results found in AFK, but give slightly different results found by AKM.  It is 
believed that the explanation for the difference lies mainly in the limited capacity of 
the computers that were used in generating the approximations – hence the 
approximation in this instance was not sufficiently accurate.  The output provides a 
non-unique set of effects to which the identification procedure is then applied. In 
order to make the effects unique for each group, one person effect is eliminated by 
setting the group mean person effect equal to zero.  The overall mean person and 
43 
 
 
 
firm effects are also set to zero.  This then enables the grand mean of the dependent 
variable and a set of         person and firm effects to be identified.  The 
effects will be measured as deviations from the grand mean of the dependent 
variable.   
3.4 Practical Fixed Effects Estimation 
 Andrews et al (2006) propose a practical solution to the estimation problem 
and make the fixed effects methods described in AKM more accessible to the 
researcher by showing how they can be implemented in Stata.  Matched datasets that 
are panel in nature can be thought of as having three dimensions of variation.  This 
type of data are becoming increasingly available to researchers not only in the labour 
economics field, but in various other fields such as education and health, where the 
data may be on pupils in schools or patients in hospitals.  These datasets are often 
referred to as multilevel or hierarchical.  The approach by Andrews et al (2006) is 
slightly different to that applied in hierarchical models, as the data on workers, in 
this context, is not ‘nested’ within firms (as is often the case in these models).   
 The approach adopted is a familiar one though and they look to the 
econometrics literature on panel data methods, in particular the error components 
framework.  Linear error components models are used frequently in the literature to 
analyse panel data and can take different forms, depending on how the errors are 
treated.  In equation (3.2.1) the error component disturbances comprise   , the 
unobserved individual effect,   , the unobserved firm effect,   , the unobserved time 
effect and    , the remainder stochastic disturbance term. Models with error 
structures such as this are referred to as three-way error components models.  Central 
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to the estimation of these models is the concept of random and fixed effects.  
Andrews et al (2006) proceed to develop methods for fixed effects estimation.  This 
is due to the underlying assumption pertaining to the random effects models, in 
which it is assumed there is no correlation between the error components and any of 
the observed explanatory variables.  It is highly likely that this will not be the case 
and so fixed effects estimation is used.  The following sections provide a brief 
summary of the assumptions underlying the random and fixed effects models.  
3.4.1 Fixed Effects Models 
 Consider the basic one-way error components structure where           .  
In the fixed effects case    are assumed to be fixed parameters to be estimated and 
the remainder disturbances     are independent and identically distributed IID (0, 
  
  .  It is assumed that     are independent of the random error for all   and  , 
though can be correlated with   .  The fixed effects model is a suitable specification 
when the levels of an effect constitute the entire population of interest and inference 
is based only on this level.  For example, the study could be on a specific set of firms 
or countries where inferences would be based only on this set of firms or countries.  
Any inference will be conditional on the particular firms or countries observed. 
 One way to estimate the fixed effects model is to use the ‘within’ 
transformation.  This is a technique that uses a transformation matrix to ‘sweep out’ 
the individual effect    so that individual observations are measured as deviations 
from individual means over time (time de-meaning).  The transformed model can 
then be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).  The within estimator for fixed 
effects cannot estimate the effect of any time-invariant variables, including the 
unobserved individual effect, as they are wiped out by the transformation.  An 
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alternative to this approach is to use the least squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
method (Baltagi 2001; Hsiao 2003).  In this case the time-invariant variables are 
substituted with dummy variables and the model can be estimated using OLS.  An 
advantage of this method is that it is possible to recover estimates of the individual 
effects.  The downside, however comes when   (firms, schools etc.) is large.  The 
model relies on including dummy variables (   ), this is     extra parameters 
to be estimated and opens up the possibility of multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables.    
3.4.2  Random Effects Models 
 Random effects models treat    as a random variable.  In this case    IID 
(0,   
 ),     IID (0,   
 ), and    are independent of the    .  It is also assumed that the 
individual effects are uncorrelated with all explanatory variables, for all   and  .  
Random effects models are appropriate when making inferences on an entire 
population and usually the components being analysed represent only a sample from 
that population.  For example, analysis could be on   individuals randomly selected 
from a large household survey. 
 Estimation of the random effects model uses the generalised least squares 
(GLS) method.  This is a transformation that removes any serial correlation in the 
error term, i.e. between     and    .  The transformed data can then be estimated 
using OLS.  An advantage of the random effects model over the fixed effects model 
is that the data is only partially demeaned and therefore it is possible to obtain 
estimates of the effects of any time-invariant variables. 
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3.4.3 Spell Fixed Effects 
 Baltagi (2005) shows that algebraic solutions are available for the estimation 
of all parameters in a two-way error components model, however in the case of data 
with higher ordered dimensions there is no algebraic transformation which can 
sweep away all the fixed error components in one go and which allows for them to 
be recovered.  Many of the linked employer-employee datasets described in Abowd 
and Kramarz (1999a) and Jensen (2010) are panel in nature and therefore have three 
dimensions of variation i.e. across workers, firms and time.  They can therefore be 
considered in a three-way error components framework.  Andrews et al (2006) 
estimate equations of the form given by (3.3.4).  Note that the unobserved time effect 
   does not appear in this equation.  It is assumed to be fixed and estimated directly 
using time dummies, which are subsumed into one of the vectors of observable 
covariates.  This means that essentially they are analysing a two-way error 
components model.  A number of ways to estimate the parameters of (3.3.4) using 
fixed effects methods are described, two of which are considered here.  The first 
method is referred to as spell fixed effects. 
 Spell fixed effects is a useful method for estimating (3.3.4) if the only 
requirement is to obtain consistent estimates of       .  It is a relatively 
straightforward method that relies on the fact that          do not vary for each 
‘spell’ of a worker within a firm.  Spell level heterogeneity is defined as       
   to give:  
                       (3.4.1)   
 
The data is then transformed by subtracting averages at the spell level:  
47 
 
 
 
                                     (3.4.2) 
 
The effects of the time-invariant variables for worker and firm,           are not 
identified and any variable          that is constant within a spell will also not be 
identified.  This is a practical and simple solution that can easily be implemented in 
Stata using the xtreg, fe command.  The downside to this method is that not only are 
the time-invariant variables not identified, but it is not possible to separately identify 
the worker and firm heterogeneities either. 
3.4.4 Least Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) 
 If it is important to recover estimates of         , or of         using 
equations (3.3.2) and (3.3.3), an alternative is the least squares dummy variable 
method, mentioned in section 3.4.1 above.  However, as discussed, direct estimation 
of (3.3.4) using dummy variables when the dataset is large is not usually 
computationally feasible.  In this model there are       parameters to be 
estimated.  In the case of a two-way fixed effects model, this problem is overcome 
by using the within transformation which sweeps out the  -level heterogeneity.  
However in the case of the three-way model with both        -level heterogeneity, 
there is no algebraic transformation of the observables that sweeps out both 
heterogeneities and which allows them to be recovered.  One way to overcome this 
problem, is to include dummies for the firm heterogeneity, but sweep out the worker 
heterogeneity algebraically using the within transformation.  AKM noted that this 
method gives exactly the same solution as the LSDV estimator.
10
  
                                                 
10
 In linear models, there is no distinction between removing the heterogeneity algebraically or adding 
two full sets of dummy variables, for workers and firms, and so the terminology LSDV applies to 
both. 
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A dummy variable must be generated for each firm: 
   
                        
where             is the dummy variable indicator function and          maps 
worker   at time   to firm  .  Substitute 
              
 
 
   
 
into equation (3.3.4) and time demean over  :  
                                   
     
            (3.4.3) 
 
Andrews et al (2006) label this estimator FEiLSDVj to distinguish it from the full 
dummy variable estimator LSDV.  The two estimators are actually identical, just 
different in the way they are computed.  As discussed in section 3.3.2.1, 
identification of the firm effects is dependent on mobility.     
     
 
 will be zero for 
all   dummies for any worker who does not change firm and will only be non-zero 
for workers who change from one firm in the sample to another firm in the sample.  
Identification of    is driven by the total number of such movers in each firm. 
Once estimates of (     have been made, it is possible to recover estimates of the 
error components        .  First compute  
                 
  
     (3.4.4) 
and then  
           
 
            (3.4.5) 
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where      averages          over   for each  . 
 Identification of firm effects is only possible within a ‘group’ as discussed in 
section 3.3.2.1 above and it is not possible to compare firm effects across groups.  
This is because it is arbitrary which    is set equal to zero for normalisation in each 
group.  The same is true for the case of the worker effects   .  ACK suggested 
normalising estimates of   so they have the same mean across groups; Andrews et al 
adopt the same approach.  They also discuss how to identify the effects of the time-
invariant variables     and     by estimating equations (3.3.2) and (3.3.3).  It is then 
possible to analyse the distributions of the individual firm effects and worker effects, 
specifically to see if they are correlated. (See Andrews et al 2006, Section 3.4) 
 There are two potential computational problems with the FEiLSDVj 
estimator.  The first, as in the case of LSDV, is when the number of firms   is large.  
Identification of the model relies on repeated observations on employees and 
employers.  There also has to be sufficient mobility in the sample.  With a large 
number of firms, the data requirements become extremely demanding.   Software 
packages hoping to run this model will need to invert a matrix of dimension   
        .  The second issue is that   mean-deviations for   observations have to 
be created and stored.  In statistical packages such as Stata, all data is stored in 
memory so when the number of firms is large it may not be feasible to estimate the 
model using FEiLSDVj. 
 Cornelissen (2008a; 2008b) presented a memory saving way to estimate the 
three-way error components model described above and constructed the Stata 
module felsdvreg to do so.  A simple illustration can be used to highlight the 
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computational problems that may arise when trying to estimate the model when the 
number of panel units is high.  Consider a linked employer-employee dataset with   
= 10,000,    = 20 million person-years,   = 50 time-varying regressors and 4 bytes 
of memory is required per data cell.  Cornelissen (2008b) showed that for the 
transformed model              , the following memory would be required to 
store the data. 
Table 3.1: Data Storage Requirements 
Matrix Dimension Storage requirement 
                 800 GB 
                            0.4 GB 
  
Table 3.1 shows that the memory requirement for the cross product matrix is much 
smaller than for        .   
The system of normal equations to solve the model is: 
   
  
  
    
with  
                   
            
 The solution to the problem lies in the fact that each element of   and   is a 
cross product sum of no more than two regressors.  This means that only 2 regressors 
need to be stored in memory to compute one element of   and .  The  -part of the 
design matrix is provided as a dataset, whereas the  -part of the cross product matrix 
can be created during the estimation process without actually generating the  -part 
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of the design matrix.  The main idea behind the method is that only certain parts of 
the   matrix need to be created so time and memory can be saved.  Full details of the 
decomposition used are given in Cornelissen (section 4, 2008a).  The decomposition 
uses the fact that the   matrix is a sparse matrix i.e. parts of it are null sub-matrices 
which deliver no contribution to   or   and uses information on which firm a given 
worker is employed, which means only those elements of   and   that the worker 
contributes to have to be computed.  For example, for workers who don’t move 
between firms the firm dummy variables will be zero.  Even for some movers the 
cross product matrices will be zero because the workers are employed in very few 
firms.  Any zero elements of the sparse matrices involved are dropped from the 
computations.   
 The Stata program felsdvreg implements the ideas discussed above and 
produces results that are exactly the same as FEiLSDVj, so in other words it 
provides the full least squares solution that was missing in AKM (1999).  It also 
analyses the structure of the dataset and produces some summary information on the 
number of movers and stayers and the number of firms workers have been employed 
in.  This is important information for assessing the precision of the estimates.  The 
precision of the firm fixed effects is a function of the number of workers who move 
between firms.  The greater the mobility in the sample, the more precise the 
estimates will be.  A decomposition of the variance is also provided at the end of the 
output.  This provides an indication of how strongly each of the components 
(observed time-varying, firm effects, person effects and the residual) contributes to 
explaining the variance of the dependent variable.  The time and memory saving 
aspect of this method makes it an attractive option for analysing fixed effects three-
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way error components models, as will be shown by the empirical analysis in Chapter 
5.    
3.5 Application in Health Economics 
 The sections above discuss the development and use of integrated data; 
focusing mainly on linked employer-employee datasets, though many of the authors 
also point out that these particular methods could be adapted to most other fields in 
economics; education and health are often quoted as examples.  As discussed the key 
to the recent developments in labour market analyses was the availability of suitably 
linked datasets.  Hence the key to any crossover of the methods described above also 
depends on the availability of suitable datasets in these other fields of economics.   
 Abowd, Kramarz & Roux (2006), in particular show that the techniques they 
use in the analysis of wages, mobility and firm performance can have broad 
applicability and consider health economics as an example.  Consider first the labour 
economics framework. In this context ‘jobs’ are a key component, where a job 
consists of an association between an individual (worker) and an employing entity 
(firm).  The linked datasets are constructed by following jobs over time and by 
adding information from other sources on workers and firms.  This information on 
workers and firms is also longitudinal in nature and is integrated into the information 
on jobs (referred to as the job frame in Abowd et al 2006).  Any analysis can then be 
conducted by using samples based on individuals, employers or jobs, depending on 
the empirical question being investigated.  Successful integration of datasets depends 
upon the records in the job frame containing a unique individual and firm identifier, 
which must also be used in the other data sources with information on individuals 
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and employers.  It is the unique identifiers that enable the ‘match’ between worker 
and firm to be identified.   
3.5.1 Data Requirements 
 Now consider a similar framework applied to a health care setting.  In this 
context there are for example, patients and hospitals.  Abowd et al. (2008) describe a 
‘job’ in this framework as being the inpatient spell of a particular patient in a given 
hospital.  To create the types of integrated datasets described above, it would then be 
necessary to have data relating to patients and also data relating to hospitals.  This 
data would have to be integrated with the data that relates to the inpatient spell of the 
patient in a given hospital.  Then it would be possible to analyse a sample of patients 
over time as they are treated in different hospitals.  There are many interactions 
between patients and health care providers (patient and GP, patient and hospital 
doctor) and between health care providers and health care establishments (primary 
and secondary care) that these techniques described above could be applied to.  For 
some of the examples given here, particularly for analyses that exhibit variation at 
three levels and would require estimation by the three-way error components model, 
in practice the data requirement often does not match the data availability. 
 Consider the example of analysing patients in hospitals over time.  In order to 
separately identify patient and hospital effects there would have to be repeated 
observations on patients, repeated observations on the hospitals they are treated in 
and there would have to be information on patients being treated at different 
hospitals.  In reality, situations like this are very uncommon, verging on the non-
existent in the context of hospital care.  It is unlikely there would be enough data 
collected on patients receiving treatment (the same treatment) in different hospitals.  
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Primary care data may provide a better framework as it might be more feasible to 
have repeated data on patients and repeated data on GPs, so it could be possible to 
ask the questions, is it individual GP effects or is it practice effects that lead to a 
particular treatment outcome.  This type of analysis would require information on 
patients over time, information on GPs over time and instances when GPs change 
practice.  It becomes clear that in the health care context, although the amount of 
health care data collected is huge, it may be the linking of appropriate datasets or the 
instances that certain actions occur (for example how often are patients treated in 
different hospitals or how often do patients change their GP) that make analyses like 
the ones described above not possible.  It is, however, also clear that the collecting of 
such data and the subsequent creation of linked integrated datasets in health care will 
enhance the analyses that can be carried out and can provide better answers to many 
questions in the field, as was discovered in the labour economics literature.   
 The benefits of linked datasets have been recognised in the field of healthcare 
for many years.  In the UK, the Oxford Record Linkage Study led the way, with 
work beginning in the 1960s (Acheson 1964; Acheson & Evans 1964).  In Scotland, 
a similar programme started and has continued to grow and develop (Kendrick & 
Clarke 1993).  In the beginning many ad hoc linkages were completed for 
epidemiological purposes, but since 1989 the creation of permanently linked national 
datasets has been underway, with a view to creating a sophisticated system that can 
benefit health services research (see for example the work of the Medical Record 
Linkage Team at ISD Scotland)
11
.  Brameld et al. (2003) identified six 
comprehensive population based medical record linkage systems around the world 
                                                 
11
 Full details can be found at http://www.isdscotland.org/Products-and-Services/Medical-Record-
Linkage/  
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that routinely link health administrative data.  These included the Oxford and 
Scottish studies, but also systems from the US, Canada and Western Australia. 
 The Scottish dental data that is used in this study has many of the features 
necessary to carry out a three-way fixed effects analysis on the variation in the use of 
dental radiographs.  It is not a panel dataset as such in that it does not contain 
information collected at specific points in time.  It does however contain repeated 
observations on patients, repeated observations on dentists and there is mobility in 
the sample, i.e. there are a number of patients that change dentist over the sample 
period.  It is also true that patients receive similar treatment from different dentists.  
Patients and dentists are characterised by unique identifiers which allows for the 
possibility of tracking patients and dentists over time.  This means that using the 
three-way error components framework it is possible to fully analyse the variation in 
the provision of dental radiographs, in terms of considering both demand and supply 
factors, and more importantly in terms of observed and unobserved effects.  This 
estimation framework will enable the contributions of the unobserved individual 
patient and the unobserved individual dentist, to the overall observed variation to be 
not only controlled for but also measured.  An analysis of the variation in dental 
radiographs that makes use of this estimation framework is the first of its kind in the 
field of health economics, and in fact the use of this method in general in the health 
economics literature is not yet routine.  
3.5.2 Theoretical Framework 
The proposed estimation framework described above allows for the analysis 
of all possible covariates that a researcher might be interested in with regards to 
measuring variation.  These include both time variant and time invariant factors for 
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both dentists and patients.  Although, to my knowledge, there are no studies that 
consider the variation in the provision of dental services (and more specifically 
radiographs) in this way, there have been some studies in the field of dental service 
provision that have attempted to explain the variation in service patterns by 
modelling the potential influencing factors separately or have included only a limited 
subset (Grembowski et al. 1991; Bader & Shugars 2007).   
Brennan & Spencer (2005) recognised that more comprehensive models of 
the service provision process are required to improve our understanding of what is 
driving the pattern of care delivered.  They developed a simple schematic model (see 
Brennan & Spencer, p182) to illustrate the complexity of the dental service provision 
process and the range of different factors involved.  Figure 3.2 below presents a 
modified version of the model which has been adapted to reflect the provision of 
dental radiographs.  It identifies that there are potentially patient, dentist and practice 
factors that impact on the decision to provide a radiograph.  It is likely that dentists 
(given their individual characteristics) make their decisions about radiograph 
provision by taking patient and practice factors into account.  Factors relating to the 
patient oral health and the type of visit, combined with the patient demographic 
factors may all impact on the dentist’s decision to offer a radiograph.  In order to 
decide what variables should be included in the empirical analysis, it is useful to 
summarise the factors that are likely to be taken into account on whether a 
radiograph is provided.    
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Figure 3.2: Schematic Model of Dental Radiograph Provision Process 
 
3.5.2.1 Patient Characteristics 
The first and possibly most important factor to be taken into account when the 
decision to provide a radiograph is taken is whether the patient actually needs one or 
not.  Dentists use radiographs primarily as a diagnostic tool to determine the 
prevalence of common dental pathologies, with dental caries (decay) possibly being 
the most obvious one.  They are also used to help identify dental calculus and to 
demonstrate/investigate periodontal bone loss.  The decision to provide a radiograph 
will therefore be very much dependent on the underlying oral health of the patient.  It 
will be related to the dental history of the patient, particularly in terms of rates of 
decay, numbers of restorations and even numbers/positions of teeth (anecdotal 
evidence suggests that radiographs are more often provided when there is 
overcrowding or poor positioning of teeth in the mouth).   
Demographic and socioeconomic factors specific to a patient will also impact 
on the decision to provide a radiograph. These are factors such as the age of the 
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patient and whether or not they pay for their treatment.  Whether a person pays for 
their treatment or not is not only dependent on income levels but also other factors 
such as if the patient was pregnant or a nursing mother.  A dentist will be aware 
of/consider these when making the decision about whether to provide the radiograph 
or not.  Time factors may also play a role in the decision to provide a radiograph or 
not, for example, if a patient hasn’t been to the dentist for a long time, are they more 
likely to be given radiographs at their next visit?  Figure 3.2 above indicated that the 
type of visit is another characteristic that may influence the decision to provide a 
radiograph.  Routine check-ups, new patients and emergency appointments are 
examples of types of visits which may provoke different responses from the dentist 
regarding the decision to obtain a radiograph. 
Another group or class of patient characteristics that may be taken into account 
in the treatment decision are individual patient preferences.  In general these are 
characteristics that are not observable and therefore difficult to measure.  It might be 
the case, however, that although these preferences are unobservable to the researcher 
they very well may be observable to the dentist.  Dentists are likely to get to know 
their patients over time and build up an understanding of their preferences.  For 
example, if a patient has a strong aversion to receiving radiographs, it is likely that a 
dentist will know this.  Similarly, some patients might have worries about the 
consequences associated with not providing a radiograph when one should have been 
provided and therefore become more involved in the decision making process.  
Again a dentist may be able to observe these characteristics over time.  Even, the less 
well informed dentist, for example, when treating a new patient, can begin to learn 
this type of information by perhaps offering a radiograph at the first visit, again 
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highlighting how the dentist uses the information about patients to inform their 
treatment decision.   
3.5.2.2 Practice Characteristics 
Characteristics specific to the dental practice may also influence the treatment 
decision.  For example, the size, busyness, patient volume and location of the 
practice may all have a role in the decision making process.  As with the case of the 
patient characteristics, the dentist can observe and is aware of these factors and may 
incorporate them into the decision to provide a radiograph or not.  A busy waiting 
room may mean that there are time constraints, or in other words dentists face a 
higher opportunity cost of giving a radiograph, and so a dentist may decide not to do 
the radiograph; choosing to either do them at the next visit, or continuing a treatment 
plan without them.   
Quite often dental practices in high deprivation areas automatically place most 
of their patients at high risk for dental caries.  This practice characteristic could 
imply that dentists in these practices either don’t provide radiographs because they 
already expect a given level of caries, or alternatively, could provide more 
radiographs to patients because of the belief that patients are at high risk of 
developing problems.    
3.5.2.3 Dentist Characteristics 
From Figure 3.2 and the discussion above, it is clear that dentists use the 
information available on patients and their practice to inform the decision of whether 
to provide a radiograph or not.  The dentist themselves also have certain 
characteristics that are potentially important in making the treatment decision.  
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Dentists will most likely first determine the clinical need for a radiograph to be 
provided.  In doing so individual dentist specific characteristics may be important.    
For example, dentists may have varying beliefs and or knowledge about the 
diagnostic value of radiographs, some may find them particularly useful and are 
aware of their diagnostic properties so will provide them, whilst others may not.   
   The age of the dentist, which could imply level of experience, may be 
another factor in determining whether a radiograph will be provided.  It might be the 
case that a dentist instinctively knows if there is a problem or not and doesn’t require 
the diagnostic radiograph.  Perhaps it is the case that there is no real level of 
uncertainty surrounding the provision of radiographs and the circumstances in which 
they are required.  Physicians have been shown to be creatures of habit in making 
medical choices, and are slow to adopt new practices and technologies (Institute of 
Medicine, 2001).  Is it the case that dentists also exhibit this habitual nature and tend 
to just stick to providing treatment (or not) in a given way.  These factors relating to 
habits, knowledge and understanding of the benefits of radiographs as a diagnostic 
tool are all incorporated into ‘practice style’ effects.  Wennberg (2002) and others 
(Wennberg et al. 1982; Eisenberg 1985) proposed that these practice style effects 
particularly manifest when professional uncertainty exists.  Is this the case in relation 
to dental radiographs? 
 Training and skills may also be a factor that influences the decision to 
provide a radiograph.  Some dentists may not have had much training and therefore 
have not acquired the appropriate skills to carry out the procedure so we might 
expect the numbers of radiographs provided to be increasing in the level of training 
acquired.  Cost constraints at the dentist level may also influence the treatment 
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decision.  This may be linked to the remuneration contract under which the dentist is 
providing services.  In Scotland dentists can be self-employed independent 
contractors, or paid by Health Boards on a fixed salary basis.  Standard agency 
theory predicts that at least to some degree, health care providers are characterised 
by opportunistic behaviours motivated by financial gains (McGuire 2000).  Thus, the 
fee-for-service payment structure may motivate dentists to influence the quantity of 
services that are provided.  It might also be the case that this quantity differs from 
that of what a perfectly informed patient would wish.  
 For a fee-for-service contract dentist the opportunity cost in providing a 
radiograph is also likely to depend on if there are other possible treatments they 
could be doing that would be more valuable to them.  Dentists may also be 
concerned about the consequences of mistreatment by not providing a radiograph.  
The result could be that a patient develops problems in the future and requires more 
extensive treatment.  Dentists with these concerns may typically provide more 
radiographs to mitigate the risk of mistreatment and the potential damage to the 
dentist/patient relationship.   
3.5.2.4 Theoretical Model 
The discussion above highlights the complexity of the treatment decision and 
shows that many factors can influence the decision to provide a radiograph or not.  It 
is assumed that dentists, with a given set of characteristics and preferences, use the 
information they have on their patients and practice to make the decision.  Like in 
any physician/patient relationship the dentist and patient are jointly determining the 
treatment that is provided.  To help understand this relationship further and to 
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motivate the empirical analysis in Chapter 5, we can draw on principal agency theory 
and agency models.
12
   
In their most basic form, principal-agent models are concerned with 
contracting relationships and the optimal compensation rules between an ill informed 
principal and an informed agent.  These models have been applied in many different 
settings within the field of economics, but regardless of the context, the common 
theme is to provide optimal contracts in the presence of information asymmetry and 
uncertainty.  In this context, patients (principals) enter into a contractual relationship 
with their dentist (agents).  The information asymmetry that exists between the 
dentist and patient suggests that the dentist will have more influence in the treatment 
decision process.  Principal agent models have been used extensively in the health 
care sector to analyse the impact of incentives that are inherent in the contractual 
arrangements of health care providers.   
 Another strand of the literature suggests that there are features of the health 
care market that can either mitigate or enhance the opportunistic behaviour provided 
by the payment system in the presence of information asymmetry (Chalkley & 
Malcomson 2000).  For example in the presence of insurance, there is an incentive to 
exploit this behaviour even further, when physicians have an incentive to increase 
the volume of care provided until it leads to inappropriate levels of care (Barigozzi & 
Levaggi 2008).   
Following the principles set out in Dranove (1988), which explores these 
factors relating to physician induced demand and the physician/patient relationship, a 
                                                 
12
 For a detailed discussion on principal-agent theory refer to Laffont & Martimort (2002) 
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simple theoretical model is derived to motivate the empirical analysis.  Consider first 
the patient and the demand side:    
Demand (Patients) 
Just as health care can be considered an economic good where the demand is 
derived from the demand for good health (Grossman 1972), dental treatment can be 
thought of as an economic good derived from the demand for good oral health. 
Let           be a patient’s utility defined in terms of a composite of all 
other goods    and oral health     which is a function of dental treatment      – and 
in this case a specific dental treatment, i.e. radiographs.  The patient maximises 
utility subject to a budget constraint;           
and the usual first order conditions imply that         will satisfy: 
  
 
  
   
 
  
            
  
          
Patients can be exempt from charges which represents a situation of full insurance, 
where      is possible
13
.  In a normal model of demand with non-satiation, zero 
prices mean infinite demand but health care, and also particularly relevant for dental 
treatment, does not always have to be utility enhancing.  It is likely that even a 
moderately informed patient would not demand lots of radiographs. 
Demand for a health care intervention (in this case radiographs) depends on 
its price, the general price level, income and patient characteristics/preferences 
embedded in     , so for patient i,            .  Summarise the model by a 
                                                 
13
 Even though   is zero there may still be an opportunity cost of receiving a radiograph 
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radiograph demand function for patients such as    
           .  We might expect 
demand to be increasing in the degree of insurance.  Pauly (1986) describes the 
moral hazard problem and indicates that health insurance has the effect of reducing 
the price of treatment that the patient faces and leads to excessive demand because 
typically    will be less than the opportunity cost of resources required to produce 
the treatment.  However, it is important to remember that in the presence of 
information asymmetry, where the patient is less well informed about their clinical 
need for a radiograph, this might not be the case. 
Supply (Dentists) 
The supply side is based on the ideas of physician agency.  Consider a dentist 
choosing the number of radiographs   to perform on a particular patient.  His costs 
     increase in   but he also places a value      on the treatment.  In general terms 
the dentist will also face a payment function     .  For a salaried dentist this will 
just be a constant.  The dentist will choose   to satisfy the first order 
condition               .  It follows that the dentist’s supply of the treatment 
will be a function of the payment system, their preferences and cost and benefit 
functions.  If we index these functions   to reflect the individual elements to give a 
supply function for the dentist of    
      .  We would expect the supply of dental 
radiographs to be increasing in the fee for radiographs. 
Equilibrium 
We have indicated that the decision on treatment is a joint one between the 
dentist and the patient.  What would happen if the dentist and patient choices didn’t 
match?  In a conventional market setting, equilibrium would satisfy 
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This implies that sometimes we would observe dentist characteristics 
entering, sometimes patient characteristics, but seldom both together.  If the 
interaction really is one of physician agency alone, then      
      .  Only dentist 
characteristics and remuneration contract would matter.  If there is some degree of 
bargaining/joint decision between the dentist and patient (dentists can most likely 
‘persuade’ the patient though it may require some effort) then there would be some 
averaging of    
                  
       thus both patient and dentist 
characteristics and also patient insurance (exemption) and dentist remuneration is 
likely to affect the observed treatment. 
Given the complexity of the dentist/patient interaction and the number of 
factors that are likely to impact on the treatment decision, it is difficult to find a 
suitable theoretical construct that can account for all this.  The simple model 
presented above indicates how we would want to account for these factors but does 
not provide a model of all interactions.  It does provide a basis though for the 
empirical estimation strategy that is adopted in this study and discussed in more 
detail in the section below. 
3.5.3 Model Specification 
 This section presents the general model specification that will be used in the 
empirical analysis in Chapter 5.  It relies heavily on the general specification used by 
Andrews et al (2006) and presented in section (3.3.1), only adapted for the Scottish 
dental data and to include an interaction term:  
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                                                          ( 3.5.1) 
 
where 
                   
Patients are indexed           
They are observed once per course of treatment (CoT)         provided by 
dentist           
Patients can receive treatment from different dentists and the function J(i,k) maps 
patient i to dentist j for CoT k   
    is the probability of patient i  receiving a radiograph on their thk  course of 
treatment   
    is a set of observable explanatory variables that vary across patients and the 
patients different courses of treatment 
         is a set of observable explanatory variables that vary across dentists and 
different courses of treatment 
         is the remuneration contract of the dentist  
    is the exemption status of the patient  
             represents the interaction between the dentist contract and exemption 
status 
    is the unobserved patient specific effect 
        is the unobserved dentist specific effect  
    is the usual stochastic disturbance term. 
67 
 
 
 
The mapping function J(i,k) is used because patients can be seen by different 
dentists.  If Equation 3.5.1 above represents the probability that patient i will receive 
a radiograph in a given course of treatment k, the mapping function then tells us 
which dentist is providing the treatment, so we can think of     as being the 
probability that patient i will receive a radiograph from dentist j in course of 
treatment k.  Similarly, for the set of observable explanatory variables          that 
vary across dentists and course of treatment, the mapping function just identifies the 
particular dentist.  Andrews et al. (2006) did not use the mapping function to 
subscript the equation, instead preferred to use j only.  When this model specification 
is re-visited in the empirical analysis in Chapter 5, a similar approach is adopted. 
  Equation 3.5.1 is the general specification for the particular models to be 
estimated in the empirical analysis.  The structure of the data enables the three-way 
fixed effects estimation described by Andrews et al (2006) to be applied and 
implemented using the felsdvreg Stata program constructed by Cornelissen (2008a).  
3.6 Conclusion  
Empirical studies that assess variation in health care often fail to produce 
satisfactory measurements of the actual contributions from different sources.  This 
may be due to the fact that to actually achieve this, it requires a large amount of 
suitable data, with a particular structure, and estimation methods that can model the 
data in the correct way.  This chapter presents an empirical framework from which 
this can be achieved and shows the types of datasets that are required.  Much of the 
information has been borrowed from the field of labour economics where this type of 
framework has been developing over many years.  It makes use of recent advances in 
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micro-econometric modelling techniques and demonstrates how using such methods 
can lead to a better analysis of the variation in treatment decisions and/or outcomes 
in the field of health economics, by being able to control for and measure 
unobserved individual patient heterogeneity and unobserved individual provider 
heterogeneity at the same time. 
 The 1980s and 90s was a period where, in the field of labour economics there 
was much discussion around data, and the lack of suitable data required to fully 
answer some of the emerging questions on labour markets.  There became 
widespread recognition that data relating characteristics of firms to characteristics of 
their workers would allow researchers to begin to disentangle the effects of firm 
level decisions from the effects of choices made by workers (for example, see Rosen 
(1986) and Willis (1986)).  As Abowd & Kramarz (1999b) pointed out, “...two of the 
most pervasive and difficult to explain phenomena in economics are the persistence 
of inter-industry and firm-size wage differences”.  Some explanations predicted that 
most of the variation was due to the persons employed in the industry, whilst others 
predicted that the variation lies in the fact that firms or industries have different 
compensation policies.  It was clear that the ability to be able to distinguish between 
the two explanations would require data from both sides of the market. 
 This led to an explosion of interest around the creation and use of linked 
employer-employee datasets as described in section 3.2 above.  The benefits of such 
data are startlingly obvious and due to the matched longitudinal nature of the data, 
for the first time it became possible to conduct studies that could control for both 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity in workers and in the firms in which they 
were employed.  Empirically this meant that much more of the variation exhibited in 
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labour markets could be explained and it also allows the issue of omitted variable 
bias (as a result of not including both worker and firm effects) to be resolved.   
 The creation of this new type of dataset also brings with it new implications 
surrounding identification and estimation of the model. (See section 3.3.2)  
Identification requires repeated observations on workers, repeated observations on 
their employing firms and sufficient movement of workers between firms.  In 
solving the identification problem, by ensuring ‘enough; data, this in itself then 
presents a problem for the estimation of the model.  Initial studies relied on statistical 
approximations for estimation, whilst Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) first 
presented methods that could provide the exact solution to the estimation problem. 
 Estimation is possible using a fixed effects framework.  In its very basic form 
these models can be solved by inserting dummy variables for both workers and 
firms, and solved using OLS.  The actual estimation problem is essentially a 
computational one.  The datasets in question are typically very large and often 
contain hundreds of thousands of observations.  The full least squares dummy 
variable method is simply too computationally intensive in terms of time and 
memory constraints.  Andrews et al (2006) propose practical solutions to this 
problem using spell fixed effects (section 3.4.3) and a solution identical to the full 
least squares dummy variable method, although computed in a slightly different way 
(3.4.4).  Each method still has their related shortcomings i.e. spell fixed effects, 
although it can provide consistent estimates for coefficients on the observed 
explanatory variables, it cannot separately identify the unobserved individual worker 
and firm heterogeneity.  Their least squares dummy variable method (termed 
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FEiLSDVj) suffers from the same problems as the full dummy variable solution in 
that the computational constraints will simply be too great for most researchers. 
 Cornelissen (2008a; 2008b) provides a memory saving way in the form of a 
Stata module that can estimate the full least squares dummy variable method.  It 
provides a simple and effective way of estimating the model and obtaining estimates 
of all parameters of interest; including the contribution of the unobserved individual 
worker and firm effects. 
 The empirical framework presented for the analysis within a labour market 
context will be used to conduct an empirical analysis within the context of health 
care.  Scottish dental data will be used as it is similar in nature to the types of 
datasets described above; it is essentially is a matched patient provider dataset.  The 
fixed effects methods proposed by Andrews et al. (2006) and Cornelissen (2008a) 
will be adopted to analyse the variation in the use of dental radiographs across 
Scottish dental practitioners.  Having described the factors that are likely to impact 
on the provision of radiographs and presented these within a simple theoretical 
model (3.5.2), section 3.5.3 presents the general specification that will be estimated 
in the empirical analysis presented in Chapter 5.     
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Chapter 4: Dental Care Provision in Scotland 
4.1 Introduction 
 Knowledge of the institutional arrangements and policy context is essential 
to both interpreting and modelling data.  This is what this chapter provides.  Chapter 
2 discussed the importance of analysing variation in health care delivery from a 
theoretical and empirical perspective.  Recent developments in micro econometrics, 
in particular within the labour literature, have opened up the possibilities for 
empirical investigation.  There has been significant progress in data collection 
processes and analysis which have enabled the development of the matched data sets 
described in Chapter 3.  An aim of this study is to try and transfer the ideas from the 
labour literature to a health care setting in an attempt to provide further empirical 
analysis on health care variations.   
The discussions in Chapter 3 highlighted the importance of not only data 
quality, but also its structure, in being able to carry out critical empirical analyses.  In 
order to reproduce anything similar to the types of recent studies carried out in the 
labour market setting, it is necessary to have access to similar types of high quality 
health care data sets.  This study has the major advantage of having a wealth of 
health care data readily available here in Scotland.  The Information Services 
Division (ISD) is Scotland’s national organisation for health information, statistics 
and IT services, and even state on their website that, “...Scotland has some of the 
best health service data in the world.  Few other countries have information which 
combines high quality data, consistency, national coverage and the ability to link 
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data to allow patient based analysis and follow up”.14  ISD works in partnership 
with many health care organisations to build national databases of health care 
information.  One such organisation is The Health Informatics Centre (HIC) at the 
University of Dundee.  This is a purpose built research environment where 
information about health from different sources is linked.  Most of the data used here 
comes from NHS Tayside or ISD Scotland. 
One aim of this particular study was to exploit some of the data resources 
available within Scotland.  Dental data was the obvious starting point given that 
what is essentially a matched patient provider dataset is already available.  The data 
set in question is taken from the Management Information and Dental Accounting 
System (MIDAS).  This is an administrative database used mainly to process 
payments made to dentists and contains details of all NHS dental treatment carried 
out in Scotland.  The MIDAS data is described in detail in the next chapter (section 
5.2) but in order to fully understand and appreciate the data it is first necessary to 
consider the framework that exists in Scotland for the provision of dental care.  The 
remainder of this chapter will help to provide some insight into the market for dental 
care and the institutional structure (section 4.2) in which this service is provided.  
Section 4.3 provides a brief overview of the current uptake of services in Scotland. 
In section 4.4 the Scottish system is compared to other dental care systems in the rest 
of the UK and finally section 4.5 concludes.  
4.2 Institutional Structure of NHS Dental Services 
 Patients in Scotland can receive dental care from a variety of providers in 
both the public and private sector.  There is evidence that private sector dentistry is 
                                                 
14
 http://www.isdscotland.org/  
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on the increase, however it remains small in comparison to the level of dental care 
provided in the public sector
15
.  Given that the vast majority of dental care is 
undertaken by the public sector, this section describes only the organisational 
structure for dental services provided in NHS Scotland. 
4.2.1 Dental Care Providers 
 (NHS) dental care providers operate in 3 categories; in the primary care 
setting, General Dental Services (GDS) and Community Dental Services (CDS), and 
in the secondary care sector Hospital Dental Services (HDS). 
4.2.1.1 General Dental Services 
 GDS is by far the biggest provider of dental care and the majority of general 
dental practitioners in Scotland are employed within this service.  This is usually the 
first point of contact that patients have with dental treatment.  The dentists are in 
effect ‘high street’ dentists and are independent contractors working on behalf of 
NHS Boards, with which their contracts are held.  In most cases they provide the full 
range of NHS treatments, which patients can register to receive.  There is no 
minimum NHS commitment required and in fact they do not have to provide NHS 
treatment at all.  It is becoming increasingly common to find that most will work 
both for the NHS and privately.  In a report produced by The NHS Information 
Centre (2010), it is estimated that on average dentists in Scotland spend 76.6% of 
their working week on NHS care and 23.4% on private care.
16
   
                                                 
15
 More Details can be found in An Analysis of Dental Workforce in Scotland: A Strategic Review, 
2010.  This describes in detail the recent trends in the numbers registered with Denplan.   
16
 The report finds regional variation for the proportion of time spent on NHS dentistry.  Dentists in 
the West spend, on average, 86.2% of their time on NHS care, whilst those in the North spend only 
54.9% of their time on NHS care. 
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The independent contractor dentists are responsible for providing the staff, 
premises and equipment required to deliver services.  There is no restriction on 
where to practise so provision is quite varied across Scotland, which is increasingly 
becoming the point of a lot of policy discussion in this area.  In March 2009 2,204 of 
GDS dentists were principal independent self employed contractors.  Figures 4.1 and 
4.2 below show the breakdown by gender, and by age and gender.
17
  Latest figures 
from ISD Scotland report that as of 31 March 2010, the number of principal non-
salaried GDS dentists had risen to 2,313.
18
 
 
Figure 4.1: Number of Principal Non-Salaried GDS Dentists by Gender, 31 
March 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Source: Scottish Dental Practice Board, Annual Report, (SDPB 2009) 
18
 http://www.isdscotland.org/isd/5898.html 
75 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Number of Principal Non-Salaried GDS Dentists by Age and 
Gender, 31 March 2009 
  
 The GDS is also made up of a number of salaried dentists.  Salaried dentists 
have the same remit as self employed dentists and provide the same range of NHS 
services; however they are remunerated differently to their independently contracted 
counterparts.  The introduction and expansion of these posts in the GDS is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in Scotland, mainly created to provide services in 
areas where NHS Boards felt there was some degree of unmet need.  Salaried 
dentists are quite often recruited to areas where access is limited, for example, due to 
retiring practitioners not being able to sell their practice or because dentists have 
moved into the private sector (Scottish Executive 2006).  Currently there are 424 
salaried dentists, a figure that is up 9.6% on the previous year (March 2009).
19
  
Figure 4.3 below shows the trend in headcount of GDS dentists over the last 10 
years. 
 
                                                 
19
 Latest figures from ISD Scotland, 31 March 2010  
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Figure 4.3: Trend in GDS Headcount (at 31 March) in Scotland, 2000-2010
20
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 Table 4.1 presents the number of practices for salaried and non salaried 
dentists in Scotland. 
 Table 4.1: The Number of NHS GDS Practices by NHS Board; 31 March 
2009
21
 
NHS Board
Non-salaried 
Practices
Salaried 
Practices
Combined non-
salaried/salaried Practices Total
Scotland 903 57 16 976
Ayrshire & Arran 63 1 - 64
Borders 16 6 - 22
Dumfries & Galloway 26 4 - 30
Fife 54 3 - 57
Forth Valley 45 4 2 51
Grampian 71 1 - 72
Greater Glasgow & Clyde 259 6 2 267
Highland 47 16 4 67
Lanarkshire 89 1 - 90
Lothian 151 3 - 154
Orkney 1 1 - 2
Shetland 2 5 2 9
Tayside 76 - - 76
Western Isles 3 6 6 15  
                                                 
20
 Source: ISD data.  Please note that due to recent changes and improvements in measuring salaried 
dentists, significant increases are seen in the data from 2005 onwards. 
21
 Source: Scottish Dental Practice Board, 2009  
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4.2.1.2 Community Dental Services 
 The CDS is made up of approximately 400 staff that are directly employed 
and managed by NHS Boards.  Their remit is essentially two fold; the first is in 
providing a complementary service to the GDS by identifying and treating special 
needs groups or those resident in long-stay care.  In recent years there has become an 
increased commitment to act as a ‘safety net’ for those patients who do not obtain 
treatment from GDS.  CDS are also known to play a significant role in service 
delivery in remote and rural areas across Scotland.  Their services are provided at 
over 300 locations, in fixed or mobile clinics.  The second aspect of the remit is the 
role in dental health promotion and preventative public health programmes for 
children.  The service undertakes annual inspections of children’s oral health via the 
National Dental Inspection Programme in primary schools.  In addition to dentists, 
CDS employs a wider team of dental nurses, hygienists, therapists and admin staff.  
Within this service sector, children are not charged for treatment and adults who 
would normally be eligible to pay under GDS pay charges on a very limited basis, 
for example, when bridges/dentures etc. are required.  Data on the treatment carried 
out in the CDS is collected via the Scottish Morbidity Record (SMR13), in a similar 
way to the data collected in a hospital setting. 
 A Review of NHS Primary Care Salaried Dental Services was published by 
the Scottish Executive in 2006.  This review recommended that the current salaried 
GDS and CDS should combine to form a new Scottish Public Dental Service, with a 
remit that would combine that of both sectors, i.e. provision of care for people with 
special needs, complement the current GDS particularly in remote and rural areas 
and continue to be involved in a public health and promotion role.  Reporting 
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arrangements for this group of dentists have often varied between boards in the way 
dentists are classified, but, in light of this review, from April 2008 the primary care 
salaried dental practitioner classification has gradually been phased in to cover the 
activities of both groups.  Since April 2008, the previous data collection scheme for 
NHS community dental services ceased and a new system was set up to collect data 
uniformly across the two groups.  The process of forming a completely merged 
sector is still ongoing. 
4.2.1.3 Hospital Dental Services 
 Finally, HDS are consultant-led services that treat patients on referral from, 
mostly medical and dental practitioners, but also from consultants in other 
disciplines, and from emergency dental services.  As of September 2009, HDS 
contained 376 dentists, a figure that is up 31% on the previous year.
22
  Through the 
hospital dental service, patients are admitted either as inpatients or day cases to 
hospitals, but can also be treated at outpatient clinics.  Data relating to dental care in 
HDS is collected in two ways.  One is via the Scottish Morbidity Record (SMR01) 
which contains information on inpatients and day cases, and the other is via an 
aggregate that provides information on all attendances at hospital (ISD(S)1).  One in 
18 new attendances to outpatient clinics is to a dental specialty and 1 in 72 hospital 
discharges are from a dental specialty.
23
  The service is not only provided in the 
dental hospitals in Dundee and Glasgow and the dental institute in Edinburgh, but 
also in many general hospitals across Scotland.  Hospital Dental Services are usually 
provided when more specialist treatment is required, for example, orthodontics, 
surgical and paediatric dentistry.  The most common reason for planned hospital 
                                                 
22
 ISD Scotland - http://www.isdscotland.org/isd/5345.html  
23
 Data taken from ISD Scotland - http://www.isdscotland.org/isd/4669.html  
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admission to a dental specialty is for the extraction of multiple teeth, particularly for 
children and among those from the most deprived areas of Scotland.  This procedure 
accounts for 42% of all admissions where a procedure took place, with 61% of these 
were on patients residing in SIMD 1 and 2 (most deprived).  Figure 4.4 below 
highlights this aspect further by showing the total number of inpatient and day case 
discharges from having had this procedure carried out.  
Figure 4.4: Total Discharges (inpatients and day cases) for Procedure 
'Extraction of Multiple Teeth' by Age Group; 31 March 2009 
    
4.2.2 Dentist Remuneration 
 As outlined above, General Dental Services comprises the largest sector 
where NHS dental care in Scotland is undertaken.  In the majority of cases, and 
certainly during the time period that the empirical analysis will cover, a patient will 
be treated in a practice by either a self-employed GDS dentist or a salaried GDS 
dentist.  The system of recording and collecting data on the treatment carried out by, 
either a non-salaried or salaried GDS dentist is the same.  This process is different to 
that found in the community and hospital services.  It is for these reasons that the 
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focus group of this study is GDS dentists.  As mentioned above, the remit of salaried 
and self employed dentists is exactly the same and, the NHS procedures offered by 
both types of dentist will be the same.  The difference between the two practitioners 
comes in the form of their remuneration contract. 
4.2.2.1 Statement of Dental Remuneration (SDR)  
 Regulation 22 of the Scottish Legislation: The National Health Service 
(General Dental Services) Regulations 2010 requires that Ministers clearly provide 
and set out information on remuneration for dentists in Scotland.  They are required 
to do this in the form of ‘Determinations’ which are detailed and published in a 
statement known as the Statement of Dental Remuneration (SDR).  Amendments to 
this statement are permitted, though only after consultation with the relevant people 
and/or groups from within the profession, and any agreed change must be published.   
 The latest amendment to the SDR is amendment 116, which was announced 
in March 2010 and has been in effect since April 2010.
24
  In this latest version, there 
are a total of 15 Determinations, providing detailed guidance on all aspects of 
remuneration for both self-employed and salaried dentists in Scotland.  The main 
purpose of amendment 116 is to inform NHS Boards, Practitioner Services and 
dental practitioners themselves of the introduction of non-time limited registration 
for both children and patients.  This means that from 1 April 2010 all existing and 
new patients registered with a dentist under a continuing care and capitation 
arrangement will be registered for life. Registration arrangements will no longer 
                                                 
24
 There have now been five further ammendments to the SDR, with the latest being announced  on 
7th September 2011.  The main purpose of these further ammendments were to announce a change in 
the scale of fees, to provide information on the change in the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation 
(SIMD) Classification, changes to recruitment and retention allowances, and the introduction of 
Childsmile Practice and the new Index of Orthodontic Treatment Need into the SDR. 
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lapse after a set period.  Prior to April of this year, the time period was 36 months, 
and until April 2006 the time was 15 months.  A registration arrangement will, 
however, come to an end, and continuing care or capitation payments cease, where 
Practitioner Services have determined that a patient has died, moved out of the 
country or registered with another dentist in Scotland.
25
  A further memorandum 
produced by The Scottish Government Primary and Community Care Directorate 
(2010), states that amendment 116 to the SDR inserts new provisos in Determination 
I, to the items relating to capitation and continuing care payments.  It advises that 
where a patient has not attended the dentist for 3 years or more, then the payments 
will be reduced to 20% of the relevant fee.  The other change to the SDR as 
announced by the memorandum is a change to Determination XII, i.e. a change to 
the remote areas allowance.
26
  
4.2.2.2 Salaried Remuneration 
 The remuneration of salaried dentists is relatively straight-forward, guidelines 
for which are detailed in Determination II of the SDR.  These dentists are employed 
by NHS Boards throughout Scotland and simply receive a fixed salary.  They may 
also be part of the salary plus bonus scheme.  Salaried dentists on this scheme 
receive an annual rate plus a bonus which is related to gross fee income.  From April 
2009, this was 37.1% of gross fee income in excess of £59,304.  The SDR outlines 
the pay scales and terms for all full and part time salaried dentists.  On top of the 
fixed income, salaried dentists can also receive a range of allowances.  What these 
allowances are and the conditions of their entitlement are also listed in the SDR.  
                                                 
25
 See Memorandum PCA(D)(2010)1,  http://www.sehd.scot.nhs.uk/pca/PCA2010%28D%2901.pdf  
26
 For more details on amendment 116 to the SDR, refer to 
http://www.sehd.scot.nhs.uk/pca/PCA2010(D)03.pdf  
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They range from recruitment payments to payments for out of hours emergency 
provision.  Payments are also made to dentists working in remote and deprived areas.  
Alongside the SDR, summary leaflets on grants and allowances for salaried GDS 
dentists are also provided by The Primary Care Division of The Scottish 
Government.  These were first introduced in 2003 and help to raise awareness of the 
various grants and allowances salaried dentists can claim.
27
   
4.2.2.3 Self-employed Remuneration 
 The remuneration of self-employed GDS dentists is more complex.  These 
dentists are remunerated under a hybrid system where a capitation and continuing 
care arrangement is supported by an item of fee structure.  This type of system for 
remunerating non salaried GDS dentists has broadly been in operation for many 
years in one form or other.   The decision for remuneration to be based on a scale of 
fees for each individual treatment carried out dates back to the beginning of the UK 
National Health Service in 1948.  The fee scale was developed to reflect the time 
taken to carry out a given treatment.  The belief was that more complex procedures 
will take longer and therefore warrant a higher payment.  Like today, the original 
GDS dentists had a right to accept or refuse any patient, establish a practice in any 
location and could also continue to treat privately if they wished.  In the years 
following the creation of a GDS in Scotland, there were many problems with the 
remuneration system.  Firstly the levels of demand for dental care were hugely 
underestimated, this coupled with the fact that the fee scale meant dental earnings, 
and in turn government expenditure far outweighed what was predicted.  A number 
of measures were taken to try and control this.  Dental earnings were capped; the fee 
                                                 
27
The latest leaflet for salaried dentists can be found in Annex B of Government memorandum 
PCA(D)(2009)6   http://www.sehd.scot.nhs.uk/pca/PCA2009(D)06.pdf  
83 
 
 
 
scale was reduced, and in 1951 patient cost sharing was introduced, through the 
patient charge. For more information on the patient charge refer to section 4.2.3.    
 Despite the ongoing criticisms of the system, there were no real changes to 
remuneration until the new Dental Contract was introduced in October 1990.  With 
the new contract came the introduction of the continuing care and capitation fees.  
GDS dentists now entered into an ongoing contractual arrangement with patients and 
received additional payments on a monthly basis, dependent on the number of adults 
(continuing care) and children (capitation) they had registered.  Essentially this 
structure still forms the basis of the system that exists in Scotland today.  As in the 
case of salaried dentists, the SDR provides all information relevant to remuneration 
for self-employed dentists.  Determination I lists the scale of fees for a given year.  
This section is sub divided into a further 15 sections referring to all the different 
areas/types of dental treatment that is provided, for example Diagnosis, Preventative 
Care and Surgical Treatment.  Guidance relating to the conditions of payment of 
remuneration and information relating to any additional payments is also 
documented.  In relative terms the fees have remained unchanged and still aim to 
reflect the time taken to carry out a given treatment/procedure.  They are reviewed 
annually by the Doctors’ & Dentists’ Review Board (DDRB), who often agree to a 
uniform % increase across the scale.  In September 2009, the fee scale was increases 
by 0.21% on the previous year.    
 The item of service fee structure has led to a very complicated dental care 
system where there are over 400 individual treatments, each with their own 
individual fee attached.  The complexity of the system, particularly for patients, has 
often been a major criticism and there is now a Scottish Government commitment to 
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review and simplify the system.  Discussions around implementing a new SDR, 
however, are still ongoing.  The remaining determinations in the SDR document the 
allowances applicable to self-employed dental practitioners.  There are many ‘top-
up’ payments made similar to those for salaried dentists, like the remote areas 
allowance and recruitment and retention allowances.  There are the additional 
continuing care and capitation payments, but also seniority payments and practice 
allowances.
28
  
4.2.3 Patient Charges 
 When introduced in Scotland, NHS dental care, like most other health care 
services, was free at the point of use.  However, it quickly became apparent that this 
could not be sustained and so a system of patient cost sharing was put in place to 
help cover the fee component of self-employed remuneration.  The patient charge 
was not applicable for everyone and a set of exemption and remission categories 
exist for those in society who might find it difficult to pay.  These are usually on the 
grounds of age and/or income.  Full details of these can be found in Table 4.2 below.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28
 Full details can be found in the SDR or the grants and allowances leaflet, see 
http://www.psd.scot.nhs.uk/professionals/dental/docs/Dental_Allowance_Guide_2009-2010_v2.pdf  
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Table 4.2: NHS Exemption & Remission Categories for Dental Treatment 
 
 
 
 
  
Exemptions
1
           
 
Under 18       
18 and in full time education     
Pregnant       
Nursing mother (had a baby in the last 12 months)   
       
Remissions
2
           
       
Patient or partner receives income support    
Named on a valid NHS tax credit exemption certificate   
Receiving pension credit guarantee credit    
Receiving income based job seekers allowance   
Named on a HC2 certificate (entitled to full help with costs)  
Named on a HC3 certificate (entitled to partial help with costs)   
1 No charge, fees paid by NHS boards on behalf of patient     
2 Charges exist but patient is entitled to help with paying it     
 
Currently non-exempt patients pay 80% of the cost of treatment up to a 
maximum limit of £384.  Charges are paid directly to dentists by patients.  In 
2009/10, this amounted to £52.2 million
29
.  NHS Boards fund the difference between 
the patient charge and self-employed item of service remuneration, and cover the 
costs of any exemptions and/or remissions.  Latest figures from SDPB (2010) show 
that £32.3 million was paid by local Boards in remissions, and £29.9 million in 
exemptions. 
4.2.4 Cost of Provision 
 The cost to the Scottish Government and NHS Boards of providing GDS 
dental services is made up of a number of elements.  Child fees are paid to dentists 
by local NHS Boards and consist of item of service and capitation fees.  In the case 
of children, the fees paid for item of service treatments are much less that capitation 
fees.  During 2009/10, item of services represented approximately 44% of fees; 
whilst capitation fees were 56%.  The current cost to the GDS of treating a child in 
                                                 
29
 Scottish Dental Practice Board  Annual Report, 2009/10 
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Scotland is £58, down from £59 in the previous year.  The total cost of child dental 
care for the year ending March 2010 was £60.0m.  Adult fees consist of item of 
service and continuing care fees, where the majority is item of service (87% in 
2009/10).  The current cost of treating an adult in the GDS has increased from £37 in 
2008/09 to £41 in 2009/10, with the total cost of adult dental care for the year ending 
March 2010 being £154m. (SDPB 2010)   
 Table 4.3 below summarises the last three years of authorised fees of dental 
practitioners working in NHS general dental services.  It contains information on the 
patient charge and the amount paid by NHS Boards to cover exemptions and 
remissions.  Gross fees include any adjustments and referrals. The table can be used 
to assess changes in clinical activity for salaried dentists across Scotland, compared 
to non-salaried dentists.  The numbers in the table for salaried are purely notional, 
based on the information collected on GP17 forms; salaried dentists do not actually 
claim item of service or registration fees, but since details of the treatment carried 
out is collected in the same way, suitable comparisons can be made.     
Table 4.3: Fees Authorised (£000s); Year ending 31 March
30
 
  
Non-Salaried Dentists Salaried Dentists1 
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
Gross Fees 188,320 198,724 219,804 5,308 7,025 9,385 
              
Net Fees paid by NHS 
Boards (including 
exemptions and remissions 
142,272 152,214 169,932 3,826 5,209 7,212 
              
Capitation 29,499 31,953 36,043 845 1,324 2,016 
Continuing Care 20,513 23,274 28,330 645 766 1,162 
Item of Service 137,054 140,831 150,991 3,883 4,895 6,146 
Patient Charge 46,048 46,509 49,872 1,483 1,735 2,173 
Remissions 25,614 25,790 27,942 749 949 1,133 
Exemptions 27,488 28,274 29,878 590 781 1,071 
1Notional Fees associated with salaried dentist activity; salaried dentists do not claim item of service or registration fees 
                                                 
30
 Source: SDPB Annual Report, (SDPB 2009) 
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 It is clear from Table 4.3 that the proportion of general dental services 
activity by salaried dentists is very small relative to non-salaried dentists, and in 
2009 activity would have amounted to only 4% of total fees.  It is however a 
growing sector and in the space of two years, activity has increased significantly, 
shown by an 88% increase in the level of net fees, from £3.8m in 2007 to over £7.2m 
in 2009. 
 The level of fees paid to non-salaried dentists has increased by approximately 
20% in the 2 years from March 2007 to March 2009.  Much of the increase can be 
explained by increases in the capitation and continuing care payments which have 
increased by 22 and 38%, respectively, as a result of increasing numbers of both 
adults and patients registered with a GDS dentist.  The proportion of gross fees 
attributed to remissions and exemptions has declined slightly over the period.  In 
2007, exemptions and remissions accounted for 28% of all fees, but this had fallen to 
26% by 2009.  A similar trend is observed with the salaried fees.    
4.3 Utilisation of NHS Dental Services in Scotland 
 This section presents a brief overview of the current uptake of NHS dental 
care in Scotland.  It uses information on registration rates to show the percentage of 
the population that are registered with an NHS dentist, hence providing some 
indication of those accessing dental services.  The latest information on registration 
rates, published by ISD in July 2010, provides data as at 31 March 2010 and, in line 
with a new rolling timetable for publications, also as at 30 June 2010.  Figure 4.5 
shows the percentage of the population, by age group, currently registered with an 
NHS dentist.   
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Figure 4.5: Percentage of Population Registered; 30 June 2010 
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 The latest figures show that 82.4% of children and 67% of adults are 
registered with a dentist.  Figure 4.6 shows the trend in adult and child registration 
rates over the period from March 2000 to March 2010.    Between 2000 and 2007, 
registration rates for children remained fairly constant, however rates for adults 
steadily declined from 49.6% in 2000 to 46.2 % in 2007.  In 2008, however, there 
was a large increase in registration rates for both adults and children.  This increase 
has continued for both populations, but more so in the case of adult registrations. 
 The significant increase in 2008 and the continued trend may in part be 
explained by changes made to registration policy.  Prior to April 2006 registrations 
would lapse after 15 months if patients did not visit their dentist.  From April 2006, 
this time limited increased to 36 months, which means patients would remain 
registered for longer, unless de-registered.  This is likely to be a contributing factor 
in the recent rise in registration rates and the trend may be set to continue as the 
current registration period is now non-time limited – a policy which came in to effect 
on 1 April 2010.  
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Figure 4.6: NHS Registration Rates at 31 March 2000-2010 
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 Changes are currently underway in the way registration data will be analysed 
in Scotland.  Up until March 2010, analysis has been based on the postcode of the 
practice where the patient was registered.  However, this has now changed and 
registration data will be based on the postcode of the registered patient.  This will 
provide more accurate and meaningful data.  There have also been quality 
improvements in the data collection process facilitated by the inclusion of the 
Community Health Index (CHI) number to the patient registration dataset.  This has 
enabled duplicate registration records and records of deceased patients to be 
removed from the data. 
 ISD also plan to introduce a ‘participation’ measure to supplement 
registration data.  The aim of this is to provide more information on actual activity 
patterns of dentists and utilisation of services by patients.  It will show information 
on the number of times a patient visits their dentist and has treatment over a one or 
two year period.  Registration data alone cannot provide such information.  Tilley & 
Chalkley (2005) suggested that analysing participation patterns in GDS dentistry 
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could provide a better way of gaining information on overall utilisation and access to 
dental services, than simply looking at registration data on its own.  They analysed 
individual level data on dental courses of treatment for over 35,000 patients in a six 
year period.  The results showed that almost 80% of the adult population in Scotland 
did access dental care in that period, which was in contrast to the rates provided by 
registration data – which at the time suggested approximately 50% of the population 
had access to a GDS dentist.  Chalkley & Tilley (2008) extended this analysis and 
looked at similar data over a longer time frame, 1998-2006, and found a similar 
result i.e. 79% of the adult population in Scotland accessed dental services in that 9 
year period.  The results from both analyses indicate that large numbers of adults do 
access dental care in Scotland, however do so quite infrequently.  Looking at 
registration rates alone and participation rates over short intervals will not give a true 
indication of utilisation and access to dental care. 
4.4 Dental Care Provision in the Rest of the UK 
 Prior to April 2006, dental care provision was similar throughout the whole 
of the UK, and described in detail above.  The majority of dentists were independent 
contractors working on behalf of the NHS, via a national contract.  Scotland also had 
an increasing number of salaried dentists and England and Wales had what are 
known as Personal Dental Services (PDS).  PDS were introduced to tackle some of 
the major problems facing NHS dentistry at the time, namely access issues and poor 
levels of oral health.  The National Health Service (Primary Care) Act 1997 provided 
the new arrangements in relation to the provision of dental services.  This legislation 
saw the creation of the PDS and enabled local commissioning of general dental 
services by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) in England and Wales.  As a result, in 1998 
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a number of voluntary PDS pilot schemes were established to test alternative 
methods for both the provision of services, but also remuneration methods.  Two 
main remuneration models were adopted; a salaried model and a capitation payment 
system.  In 2003, The School of Dentistry and Health Services Management at The 
University of Birmingham carried out a national evaluation of the PDS pilots.  In a 
paper that summarised the findings, Goodwin et al. (2003), found that the pilots 
appeared to encourage a new skill-mix, provide job satisfaction and improve 
working conditions.  They appeared to provide the opportunity to change the culture 
of primary care dental provision from one based on activity and cost to one based on 
quality of care.  The success of the pilots provided the foundation for the national 
introduction of local commissioning and the New Dental Contract was introduced in 
England and Wales on April 1 2006. 
 In December 2008, Alan Johnson, the Health Secretary at the time, 
commissioned an independent review of NHS dentistry.  Professor Jimmy Steele 
was selected to chair the review and published the findings in June 2009 (Professor 
Jimmy Steele for Department of Health 2009).  The report summarised the reforms 
of 2006 and highlighted the three key issues as follows: 
 Responsibility for planning and servicing NHS dental services was 
devolved to local PCTs 
 The system of patient charges was changed, resulting in a reduction in the 
possible number of charges from around 400 to just 3 
 The mechanism by which dentists are paid to deliver services changed from 
one based on item-of service fees to one where providers are paid an annual 
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sum in return for delivering an agreed number of courses of treatment, 
which were weighted by complexity.  
 Dental procedures in England and Wales are now categorised according to 
the level of complexity and are converted into what are known as units of dental 
activity (UDA).  These units of activity are provided under the contract in ‘banded 
courses of treatment’.  A national reference period was set which ran from 1st 
October 2004 until 30
th
 September 2005.  The activity undertaken by dentists in 
terms of UDAs and childhood capitation was then converted to an overall financial 
contract value and dentists were then offered the contract for a minimum three year 
period, with this guaranteed three years protection of earnings.  In return dental 
practitioners contract to provide an agreed annual level of NHS commitment – which 
is based on the number and complexity of the courses of treatment provided in the 
reference period. 
 Patients in England and Wales now face a much simplified charging system.  
There are 3 bands of co-payment and payment is fixed regardless of the number of 
treatments carried out.  Table 4.4 below provides a summary of the classification 
system for the new dental contract.  It shows the different treatment bands, along 
with the types if treatment items covered in each band.  It also shows the 
corresponding UDA for each band and the current patient charge for patients in 
England and Wales (Department of Health 2010).    
Table 4.4: Treatment Bands, Treatment Items, UDAs and Patient Charges 
England Wales
1 examination, diagnosis, preventative advice, scale & polish if needed 1 £16.50 £12.00
2 Band 1 plus fillings, root canal and extractions 3 £45.60 £39.00
3 Bands 1 & 2 plus any laboratory work such as crowns dentures and bridges 12 £198.00 £177.00
Patient Charge
Treatment Band Treatment Items UDA
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 There has been widespread criticism of the new contract and initial reaction 
by the dental profession was somewhat negative, with a number of dental 
practitioners opting not to sign the new contract (Carvel 2006).  A number of 
assessments and reviews have been undertaken in recent years that suggest there are 
still many problems within NHS dentistry and the new contract has not achieved 
what it set out to do.   
 In July 2008, The House of Commons Health Select Committee published a 
report on dental services (Health Select Committee 2008).  They agreed to assess the 
impact of the new contract against four main criteria issued by the Department of 
Health, on which they claimed its policies should be judged (Department of Health 
2007).  These criteria were patient experience, clinical quality, PCT commissions 
and dentists’ working lives.  The report concluded that the new contract was “......in 
fact so far failing to improve dental services measured by any of the criteria.” (p.49)  
The Independent Review of NHS Dentistry (Professor Jimmy Steele for Department 
of Health 2009) followed shortly after and made a number of recommendations on 
how the service could be improved, and specifically recommended introducing an 
annual per person registration payment to dentists within the contract.  The NHS 
White Paper, Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS (Department of Health 
2010a) set out the government’s long term vision for the future of the NHS.  With 
respect to dental services, it sets out ways to improve quality of care and improve 
access to services.  There is an additional focus on improving the oral health of 
school children.  In light of Steele’s independent review of dentistry, this report 
proposes the introduction of a new dentistry contract following a period of 
consultation and piloting.  As a result, on 16 September 2010, the government 
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announced that a national steering group would be set up with the aim of publishing 
proposals for piloting a new dentistry contract by the end of 2010.  In a statement to 
the press Lord Howe said “.....As set out in the White Paper – we intend to bring a 
new dental contract based on registration, capitation and quality.”(Department of 
Health 2010b)
31
  
 It is clear from above that the process of finding the best system for the 
provision of dental services in the UK is an ongoing and complex one.  Currently all 
four nations are reviewing the way dental services are provided, although the 
timetable for any changes to the contract in Scotland or Northern Ireland is not 
certain.  Northern Ireland is closer to implementing a change than Scotland and 
negotiations on a new contract between the Department of Health, Social Services 
and Public Safety (DHSSPS) and the Dental Practice Committee of the British 
Dental Association (BDA), have been underway since November 2006.  Professor 
Ciaran O’Neill, a health economist, from Queens University Belfast was tasked to 
conduct a review of existing dental remuneration systems from across the world, and 
then recommend a suitable model for Northern Ireland.  A framework for the new 
contract is now in place and is based on a blended system of remuneration 
comprising payment through a block component alongside a limited item of service 
component (DHSSPS 2009).  The DHSSPS and BDA are currently working towards 
setting up pilot sites to test the new contract, with a view to rolling it out across 
Northern Ireland in the near future. 
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 The government in England are currently piloting three different contract models in 62 sites across 
the country, to inform the development of a new national dental contract.  More details can be found 
at http://www.pcc.nhs.uk/dentalpilots  
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4.5 Conclusion 
 This study makes use of Scottish Dental Care data and will investigate the 
determinants of and variation in the use of dental radiographs across dental 
practitioners in Scotland.  This chapter describes the institutional framework within 
which dental services are provided in Scotland, in order to inform the development 
and interpretation of the following empirical analysis.  
 Scotland has a poor record when it comes to oral health and it is widely 
acknowledged that compared to other European countries, oral health standards are 
much lower in Scotland.  This has led to huge investment being poured into dental 
services by the Scottish Government, in an effort to combat this problem.  A number 
of oral health and dental service targets have been set by the Government and a 
range of initiatives have been introduced, with the specific aim of improving the oral 
health of the Scottish population.  For children such initiatives include the 
Childsmile programme and initiatives such as the introduction of free dental check-
ups for all since April 2006 and non-time limited registrations since April 2010 
should further help to improve access to dental care and in turn lead to better oral 
health.  Registration rates have been increasing in recent years and currently 82.4% 
of children and 67% of adults are registered with an NHS dentist.   
 Dental care is provided in both the public and private sectors, although the 
private sector remains very small in comparison.  Data from Denplan suggests that 
there is an increasing trend in the use of private dental care in Scotland and data from 
the BHPS also shows an increase in the number of reported private check-ups.  Since 
2006 this trend has started to decline, though has been matched with an increase in 
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the percentage of the population reporting an NHS check-up
32
.  This observation is 
possibly linked to a policy change at that time, which saw the introduction of free 
dental check-ups for all in Scotland.   
 Analysis in this study is restricted to general dental services (GDS), whereby 
dentists work in one of two settings; either as an independent self-employed 
contractor (‘high street’ dentist) or as one directly employed by NHS Boards and 
paid a fixed salary.  The remit of both non-salaried and salaried dentists and the 
system of recording and collecting data on the treatment carried out by either type of 
dentist is the same; the only difference between the two practitioners comes in the 
form of their remuneration contract.  These factors are central to the empirical 
analysis presented in Chapter 5 as there is evidence that the remuneration structure 
and patient cost sharing have an impact on the amount of treatment provided by 
dentists (Chalkley & Tilley 2006; Chalkley et al. 2010). 
 Section 4.4 discussed the institutional framework in which dental services are 
provided in the rest of the UK.  The recent changes to the payment structure in 
England and Wales means that replicating a similar study for these countries may be 
difficult.  Although N. Ireland has a system that closely mirrors the Scottish system, 
the need for change is also on the agenda, again making it difficult to assume similar 
results may be achieved in other areas.  The differences that exist between Scotland 
and the other UK nations, however may present an opportunity to conduct a natural 
experiment, perhaps similar to that conducted by Chalkley et al. (2010).   
  
                                                 
32
 More Details can be found in An Analysis of Dental Workforce in Scotland: A Strategic Review, 
2010 
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Chapter 5: Data and Empirical Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
 Chapter 4 described the institutional framework in which dentistry is carried 
out within Scotland, with particular emphasis on dentistry within the NHS setting.  It 
also provided policy background and an insight into contractual arrangements and 
how interventions have been targeted.  The aim of this study is to use matched data 
to identify and measure sources of variation in dental health care across Scotland.  
There have been previous studies that focus on dental health care as a whole, for 
example, Chalkley & Tilley (2006) and Young (2009) consider overall dental 
treatment intensity, however this study aims to consider a specific aspect or 
intervention by dental practitioners.  From the data available the chosen application 
to consider for further analysis was dental radiographs, which this chapter addresses.   
The review of the literature on variation presented in Chapter 2 identified a 
number of potential sources or determinants of variation that can arise in any health 
care setting.  Many of the studies described focussed solely on how economic 
incentives may impact on treatment outcomes.  This is an area that this thesis will 
also address; given that the Scottish dental care system means that potentially 
economic incentives, financial or otherwise, may play a part in explaining the 
variation in dental treatment.  However, the discussion in Chapter 3 illustrates that 
potentially a much greater range of factors than economic incentives are likely to 
have an impact on the treatment decision of whether to provide a dental radiograph 
or not.  Patient, dentist and practice characteristics all potentially influence this 
decision.    
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The empirical analysis that follows uses the theoretical framework set out in 
Chapter 3 (section 3.5.2) and draws on principal agent theory and agency models.
33
   
    Using this simple framework it is possible to identify a number of hypotheses 
to test in the empirical analysis:  
H1: Dentists on a Fee-for-Service contract are more likely to provide a 
radiograph, relative to those on a fixed salary (provided the fee exceeds the marginal 
cost) 
H2:   Patients who are exempt from the patient charge (fully insured from the cost) 
are more likely to demand a radiograph or acquiesce to receiving a radiograph, 
relative to those who pay for treatment 
Interactions between the contract of the dentist and the exemption status of the 
patient will also be taken into account.  This suggests a further two hypotheses can 
be tested: 
H3: Dentists on a Fee-for-Service contract will provide more radiographs when 
the patient is exempt, relative to a fixed salary dentist 
H4: Dentist specific effects contribute more to the observed total variation in the 
provision of radiographs relative to patient specific effects. 
These hypotheses have not been identified from the theoretical model per se; 
rather they have been identified using the model and by considering in detail the 
factors that are likely to impact on the decision to provide a radiograph.   This, along 
with the estimation strategy proposed for dealing with matched data; inform the 
empirical analysis of what could be considered a complex economic process.  On the 
demand side we consider the moral hazard issue in health care markets and consider 
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 For a detailed discussion on principal-agent theory refer to Laffont & Martimort (2002) 
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the fact that health insurance has the effect of reducing the price of treatment that the 
patient faces, hence leading to excess demand (Pauly 1986; Zweifel & Manning 
2000).  We therefore might expect that demand for dental radiographs to be 
increasing in the degree of insurance (patient co-payment).  On the supply side we 
consider the dental physician agency effects identified in Chalkley & Tilley (2006).  
If the world is really one of physician agency, only dentist characteristics and 
remuneration contract would matter.  However, if the world is one of bargaining 
between dentist and patient, both patient and dentist characteristics, patient insurance 
and dentist remuneration will affect observed treatment.  These theories help 
motivate the empirical equation that follows and allows the testing of hypotheses 1-4 
above. 
 Of equal importance to what can be observed and measured, are the 
unobservable characteristics of both the dentist and patient, which will also be 
addressed in the empirical analysis.  These factors have been identified in the 
theoretical literature mainly in the context of possible mitigating factors for the 
potential opportunistic behaviour of physicians.  For example, Gravelle (1999) 
recognised that the fact patients can choose their GP; means there is an incentive to 
increase both the quality of care and the effort put into providing care.  Physicians 
have to compete for patients and so some of their market power is reduced.  Another 
suggestion is that physicians’ to a certain extent will show some degree of 
benevolence towards their patients.  There is also a growing literature on the impact 
of the patient-doctor relationship (Vick & Scott 1998) and patient preferences in 
analysing the behaviour of physicians.   
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Chapter 5 is essentially the empirical component of the thesis and is 
organised as follows.   Section 5.2 describes in detail the data to be used in the 
analysis.  The data collection and processing is discussed as well as detailed 
descriptive statistics for the sample.  Section 5.3 contains the empirical analysis. 
Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 use the framework developed in Chapter 3 to present the 
models to be estimated and section 5.3.4 reports the results.  Finally section 5.4 
discusses the results and concludes.   
5.2 Data 
5.2.1 Data Collection 
 The process of recording and collecting data on dental care and treatment 
within the Scottish General Dental Services (GDS) begins primarily at the dental 
practice level.  Any patient receiving NHS treatment will have it detailed in what is 
known as a treatment plan.  This plan provides an outline and complete breakdown 
of all the work/treatments required to address the particular problem and restore 
satisfactory levels of dental health.  The plan may be as simple as a routine 
examination or scale and polish, however in many cases it will be more complex and 
will contain a range of different treatments, for example examination, radiograph, 
filling and scale and polish.  The details of the plan and the treatment required 
collectively represent a full course of treatment, which may be completed at one visit 
but can also be over the course of a number of visits. 
 All details of the treatment provided are recorded in the dental practice on 
GP17 forms.  These forms consist of a number of different parts, where Part 3 is 
where all information relating to the treatment is recorded.  Parts 1 and 2 contain 
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information relating to the patient and dentist respectively.  Part 4 provides 
information on the patients’ acceptance of the treatment and details of how payment 
will be made.  Parts 5 and 6 can be used by the dentist to provide any further 
information relating to the treatment, and finally parts 7 and 8 are declarations made 
by both the patient and dentist on completion of treatment.  A similar form, 
GP17(O), exists when the treatment in question is orthodontic.
34
  It contains similar 
information to the GP17, with the only difference being the inclusion of more 
detailed information on specific treatments relating to orthodontics.  The information 
on these forms therefore provides a major source of dental treatment data collected 
in NHS Scotland. 
 As discussed in chapter 4, section 4.3.2, the remuneration for self-employed 
dentists working in the GDS sector is a hybrid system where a capitation and 
continuing care arrangement is supported by an item-of-service fee structure.  This 
fee component is financed in part by patients through the 80% patient charge, whilst 
NHS Boards fund the difference and cover the cost of any exemptions and 
remissions.  The GP17 and GP17(O) forms by way of design therefore help facilitate 
the fee-for-service component of dentist remuneration.  Importantly, it should be 
noted that although Scotland’s second type of GDS dentist i.e. those on fixed 
salaries, are remunerated differently, all the information relating to their work is 
recorded and collected in exactly the same way as for the fee-for-service self-
employed dentists.  This allows for a direct comparison between the two types of 
dental remuneration contracts to be made. 
                                                 
34
 Copies of the GP17 and GP17(O) forms have been provided by NHS Tayside and have been 
included in the Appendices (Appendix 1) 
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5.2.2 Data Processing 
 The processing of the data collected on the GP17 and GP17(O) is the 
responsibility of the Practitioner Services Division(PSD)
35
 in Edinburgh.  The forms 
themselves can be submitted, or the information can now be submitted electronically 
through the Electronic Data Interchange (EDI).  This system was introduced in 
November 2000, and now over 400 practices use EDI to submit treatment details to 
be processed for payment.  This represents approximately 2.5 million item-of-service 
claims per year for 1.5 million patients registered for NHS general dental services.
36
    
All of the information collected in Edinburgh is entered into a large database known 
as The Management Information and Dental Accounting System (MIDAS).  This is 
an administrative database operated solely by PSD and used primarily to process the 
payments made to dentists.  It contains details of all NHS courses of treatment 
carried out and paid for in Scotland – approximately 4 million courses per year.   
 Within MIDAS each course of treatment (represented by each individual 
form) is referred to as a ‘claim’, given the use of the database for dentists to claim 
payment.  Each new claim entered into the system is given a unique number or 
identifier, which is simply incremental to the previous claim.  The database also 
contains information on each NHS dentist, again with each dentist having their own 
unique number.  This includes the dentists’ list number(s) and details about their 
practice.  Finally all the information relating to patients is recorded.  In the same way 
each dentist and each claim have unique identifiers each patient registered to receive 
                                                 
35
 Practitioner Services is one of the 11 divisions within NHS National Services Scotland (NNS).  
They provide patient focused services such as the transfer of medical records between GP practices, 
assisting patients to access GP and dental practices, as well as assisting practitioners to maintain 
accurate and up-to-date patient registers. Practitioner Services (Dental) pay dentists, on behalf of the 
NHS Boards, for the NHS work they carry out. They also monitor and verify payments made to dental 
practices. 
36
 For more information see http://www.psd.scot.nhs.uk/professionals/dental/edi.html  
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NHS dental care is also given a unique identifier.  For any new claim submitted to 
PSD, within MIDAS it is possible to use the information on the forms to run what is 
known as a matching algorithm.  This will enable the linkage of a given claim to any 
existing claims for that individual.  If, however, no existing claims are found, then a 
new unique patient identifier is created.  Again this number is simply incremental to 
the last patient number created.   
 The nature of the data held within MIDAS allows for all the information 
relating to patients, dentists and claims to be linked.  In this case this linkage is 
established through the dentist list number, which is recorded on each treatment 
form.  The result is that MIDAS provides a rich dataset with the opportunity to 
follow both patients and dentists over time.  In other words it is analogous to a 
matched patient provider dataset similar to the matched employer-employee dataset 
described in Chapter 3. 
5.2.3 Data Extraction 
 For the purpose of this analysis, a random sample was extracted from the 
MIDAS database.  Given its use in the process of paying dentists the data contained 
in MIDAS is not available to the public, however for research purposes, at the time 
of this study an anonymised version was held at the University of Dundee within the 
Dental Health Services Research Unit.  By all accounts it was a complete replica of 
that held in Edinburgh, however with all personal information that could identify any 
given dentist or patient removed.   
 The extraction of the sample is facilitated by being able to ‘query’ MIDAS to 
do different things.  For example MIDAS can be queried to obtain details of all 
courses of treatment over a given time period.  Constraints can also be placed on 
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queries and essentially you can ‘ask’ MIDAS for the exact data you require, with 
very little manipulation required afterwards to construct a complete dataset.  In this 
case the random sample was generated by first identifying patients with the unique 
identifier ending in 000 – 029 during the relevant time period i.e. from 1st April 2000 
to 31
st
 March 2005.  MIDAS could then be queried to extract all claims relating to 
these patients made by both self-employed and salaried dentists. Patients with 
identifiers ending in 025 and 026 were excluded from the sample due to an 
idiosyncratic problem where the query kept failing whist trying to extract the data.  
All claims associated with ‘non-standard’ list numbers were also removed from the 
extraction.  Dentists in Scotland can provide care under different list types, for 
example assistant lists, trainer lists, emergency and temporary lists.  This means that 
sometimes claims made under these types of list numbers may contain treatments 
performed by another dentist.  It was therefore decided to exclude them from the 
analysis.   
 Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below provide an illustrative guide as to what the data 
extracted from MIDAS looks like and highlights the linkage that exists in the data.  
The first table combines the patient information with the course of treatment 
information.  For simplicity the detail relates to one patient only, with unique 
identifier (pid) 1. 
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Table 5.1: MIDAS: Patient and Course of Treatment Extract 
lnum pid clid trid fee (£) item_code sd_sdr pcy er age sex
1 1 1 1 5.95 1(A) SDR74 Jul-99 FULL 38 1
1 1 1 2 37.5 14(C)(1)(1) SDR74 Jul-99 FULL 38 1
2 1 2 3 7.5 1(A) SDR101 Nov-06 FULL 45 1
2 1 2 4 15.6 14(A)(3) SDR101 Nov-06 FULL 45 1
2 1 2 5 45.3 14(C)(1)(1) SDR101 Nov-06 FULL 45 1
3 1 3 6 16.25 27(E) Upper SDR101 Dec-06 FULL 45 1
3 1 3 7 101.6 27(B)(2) Upper SDR101 Dec-06 FULL 45 1
3 1 4 8 15.35 28(A)(1) Upper SDR101A Jan-07 FULL 45 1
1(A) is exam, 14(C) is filling (composite resin), 14(A) is filling (amalgam), 27(E) is impression tray, 27(B) is 
denture, 28(A) is repair or alteration to denture 
 
The example above shows that for this given male patient (in the data sex=1 
is male), the courses of treatment recorded cover a period between July 1999 and 
January 2007.  The column headed er refers to the exemption or remission from the 
patient charges that may be applicable.  In this case the patient pays the full charge 
i.e. they are non-exempt.  The table also provides details about the actual items of 
treatment that were given and the corresponding fee paid to the dentist.  In all, 9 
treatments were provided over a series of 4 different courses of treatment (shown 
from unique claim identifier, clid).  The patient was treated under 3 different list 
numbers, which may or may not indicate three different dentists as dentists may have 
more than 1 list.  The real benefit to the researcher of MIDAS is how this 
information can then be linked back to individual dentists, thus allowing complete 
information for each and every course of treatment carried out in Scotland.  The key 
to this is provided through the dentist list number, lnum.  Table 5.2 below illustrates 
the type of information that can be extracted from MIDAS relating to dentists. 
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Table 5.2: MIDAS: Dentist Extract 
did lnum sal NHS Board depcat sex dage
1 1 0 1 1 F 62
2 2 0 2 6 M 58
2 3 0 1 2 M 58
3 4 0 1 2 M 56
3 5 0 2 6 M 56
4 6 0 1 5 M 51
4 7 0 1 6 M 51
4 8 1 3 3 M 51  
The unique dentist identifier, did, shows that this table provides information 
on 4 different dentists, all, apart from dentist 4, working solely on a self-employed 
contract (sal=0).  Dentist 4 provides treatment under 3 different list numbers, one of 
which is under a salaried contract.  Information is also provided on the age and 
gender of the dentists and details relating to the practice they work in i.e. the health 
board it is situated in and the corresponding deprivation category.  As already 
mentioned, it is the list number that enables the linkage of this information back to 
each individual patient and course of treatment.  By combining this table with the 
previous through lnum, it is possible to establish that the patient in fact only saw two 
different dentists over the period as the work carried out on lists 2 and 3 was by the 
same dentist, i.e. did equal to 2. 
 The above tables show a simple example of how the data extracted from 
MIDAS can provide a rich dataset for further analysis.  To complete the process, the 
data was merged in Stata where all the linked information remained.  The individual 
treatment items in any course of treatment were combined in such a way that each 
line in the dataset now represented an individual claim, complete with its own unique 
identifier.  The items were also converted to dummies representing broad treatment 
categories, for example examination and radiograph items were classified as 
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diagnosis, fillings and crowns were termed conservative etc.
37
  The result gave a 
unique ‘matched’ patient provider dataset that could readily be used to analyse not 
only the variation in the provision of dental radiographs, but many other 
questions/hypotheses about dental care provision in the Scottish NHS. 
The nature of the data processing stage in MIDAS, with its allocation of 
incremental unique identifiers to both dentists and patients, ensures as representative 
a sample as possible.  Not only is the data found to be representative of the 
population, but it can confidently be used as a reliable data source given its role in 
the paying of dentists.  Practitioner Services (Dental) also undertake extensive pre-
payment validation on dental payment claims, and there is an element of ex-post 
validation carried out through the Scottish Dental Reference Service (SDRS) who 
monitor the quality and probity of dental treatment in Scotland by examining a 
sample of patients each year. 
5.2.4 Data Description 
 The random sample extracted from MIDAS contained a total of 453,751 
claims made by 2,419 distinct dentists for 103,757 distinct patients.  Close inspection 
of the data revealed minor coding errors that required correction and new variables 
were created for the age of the dentist (at the time of treatment as opposed to the 
time of data extraction) and to include an interaction term between the dentist 
contract type and patient exemption status.  The sample was further reduced to 
remove any claims for patients under the age of 18 (63,470 claims) and over the age 
of 75 (15,693 claims).  The under 18s were removed as the data collected for them is 
not directly comparable with the rest of the sample due to the fact the dentists are not 
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 The broad treatment categories relating to each treatment item are in line with that set out in the 
Statement of Dental Remuneration (SDR).   
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remunerated in the same way for this age group.  Although in many cases data for 
certain treatments are recorded, it may not reflect the true number of treatments 
carried out.  With regard to the over 75 age group, the data revealed a number of 
observations for patients over the age of 90 and in some cases over the age of 100.  It 
was not possible to check if indeed these reflect the true ages of individuals or was 
perhaps the result of human error in the data collection and recording process.  It was 
therefore decided that there should be a cut off point to ensure the reliability of the 
data.  This cut off age of 75 was chosen in line with Chalkley & Tilley (2006), in 
which a similar dataset was used.  This left a sample for analysis consisting of 
364,729 claims made by 2,377 distinct dentists for a total of 80,234 different 
patients.  In the sections that follow, the regression variables are described and 
discussed. 
5.2.4.1 Dependent Variable 
 In the regression analysis presented in section 5.3, the aim is to analyse and 
account for the variation in the use of dental radiographs across GDS dentists in 
Scotland.  The variable of interest in the data is code2a1 and refers to a given type of 
dental radiograph.  This is a binary variable that indicates whether or not a given 
course of treatment contained at least one of these radiographs.    This name is in line 
with the code used in the SDR, where radiograph 2a1 refers to a small film 
radiograph.  Other radiograph codes in the data refer to medium and large films, 
along with more complex radiographs that tend to be used in orthodontic treatment.  
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The small film radiograph (code2a1) is by far the most common radiograph given 
and is therefore the focus of the analysis.
38
   
 Of the 364,729 claims in the sample, 69,987 (19.2%) contained at least one 
of these radiographs.  Figure 5.1 below shows the distribution in the provision of 
radiographs across dentists in Scotland and shows the likelihood that each dentist 
will provide a radiograph in any given course of treatment
39
.  It is clear that there is 
quite a wide spread in this probability.  The majority of dentists will radiograph 
anywhere between 10 and 40% of the time, whilst almost 4% of dentists almost 
never provide them.  However there are small proportions that tend to use 
radiographs much more often, with some dentists having almost all their courses of 
treatment containing one of these small films.  There are 5 dentists in the sample that 
provide a radiograph in more than 70% of their courses of treatment.  It is also worth 
noting that the number of observations that each of these dentists had ranged from 
144 to over 400, so there is some confidence that these dentists really are much more 
likely to provide radiographs when compared to most other dentists in the sample.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
                                                 
38
 Figures from the Scottish Dental Practice Board Annual Reviews show that each year 
approximately 95% of all radiographs carried out in Scotland are small film radiographs. 
39
 Please note that any dentists with less than 6 observations have been removed from the sample so as 
not to skew the distribution 
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 Given that dentists within the General Dental Services (GDS) in Scotland can 
provide treatment under two types of contract, it is of interest to examine if there are 
any obvious differences in the relevant radiograph distributions.  Figures 5.2 and 5.3 
illustrate these for self-employed and salaried dentists respectively
40
.  The 
distribution for self-employed dentists is very similar to that of the overall 
distribution.  There are still dentists (61, with observations ranging from 6 to over 
200) that appear to never provide a radiograph and in contrast also a small proportion 
that have a tendency to provide radiographs about 80% of the time.   
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 As in Figure 5.1, all dentists with less than 6 observations have been removed from the sample. 
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Figure 5.1: Variation in the Provision of Radiographs across GDS Dentists in 
Scotland, April 2000 - March 2005 
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Figure 5.2: Variation in the Provision of Radiographs across GDS Self-Employed 
Dentists in Scotland, April 2000 -  March 2005 
Figure 5.3: Variation in the Provision of Radiographs across GDS 
Salaried Dentists in Scotland, April 2000 - March 2005 
112 
 
 
 
 Although Figure 5.3 shows there is still variation in the provision of 
radiographs across salaried dentists, the distribution is quite different from that for 
all dentists and the self-employed dentists on their own.  It is clear that there are no 
salaried dentists with a high propensity to provide a radiograph, with the highest 
probability being a little over 50% of the time.    
Not only is the contract of the dentist a point of interest in this study as a 
potential source of variation in the provision of radiographs, but so too is a key 
characteristic of the patients, namely whether or not they contribute to the cost of 
their treatment.  This is captured in the data using the exempt variable.  It therefore is 
also useful to consider the distribution in the provision of radiographs across the two 
patient types, i.e. exempt and non-exempt.  Figures 5.4 and 5.5 illustrate this, 
respectively
41
. 
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Figure 5.4: Variation in the Provision of Radiographs to Exempt Patients 
across GDS Dentists in Scotland, April 2000 - March 2005 
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 Similarly, the above figures show little deviation from the overall distribution 
of radiographs across all patients.  If anything, the ‘spread’ in the distribution may be 
even greater when broken down by patient type.  In particular, there are a number of 
dentists (14, with the number of observations ranging from 6-62) that provide a 
radiograph in every claim when the patient is exempt from paying the patient charge.  
The data presented in Figures 5.1 to 5.5 reveal that firstly there appears to be 
a large variability in the distribution of radiographs across dentists in Scotland, 
regardless of the contract type of the dentist or if a patient pays for treatment or not.  
Secondly the general pattern of the distribution is similar across the different 
specifications with the most obvious difference being for the salaried dentists, where 
in general they have a lower likelihood of providing radiographs.  There is 
potentially a subtle difference between exempt and non-exempt patients, where there 
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Figure 5.5: Variation in the Provision of Radiographs to Non-Exempt Patients 
across GDS Dentists in Scotland, April 2000 - March 2005 
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are a greater proportion of dentists that tend to always provide a radiograph when the 
patient does not pay for treatment.  Certainly based on this information alone, it is 
difficult to conclude one way or another, the impact of contract or demand side cost 
sharing on the variation in the provision of radiographs. 
5.2.4.2 Treatment Variables 
A number of treatment variables prev, perio, cons…..trauma etc. are included 
in the analysis in an attempt to identify and take account of overall dental condition.  
Each refers to a broad treatment category as defined in the SDR and is represented 
by a dummy variable.  They are equal to 1 if the course of treatment included any 
form of the given treatment and 0 otherwise.  For example, in the case of prev, this 
would equal 1 if the course of treatment included advice on oral hygiene techniques 
or surface applications, such as fissure sealants.  In the case of surg, this would be 
equal to 1 if the course of treatment contained any form of surgical procedure, e.g. 
extractions or any post operative care required. 
19.2% of all claims in the sample contained at least one small film radiograph 
(code2a1).  In broad treatment terms they come under the dummy variable for 
diagnostic treatment.  In studying the possible sources of variation in the use of 
radiographs it is useful to consider how overall dental condition or need might 
impact on this.  To do this it is useful to consider what other treatments are 
commonly found alongside radiographs.  Does it follow that given one type of 
treatment, a radiograph may be required or given their diagnostic nature, is it more 
common to find radiographs being used for diagnoses in certain types of treatment, 
for example, a logical case might be when surgical treatment is required.   
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The data does in fact reveal that the most common treatments found 
alongside radiographs are conservative, periodontal and surgical.  64% of all claims 
containing a radiograph will also have some form of conservative treatment, for 
example a filling.  59% of claims with radiographs contain periodontal treatment and 
17% contain surgical treatment.  40% of claims with radiographs will have both 
periodontal and conservative treatment, and 6.7% will contain all three alongside the 
radiographs.  This certainly suggests that there may be some link between certain 
treatment groups and the likelihood of being given a radiograph.  Is it the case that 
treatments from these groups represent poorer oral health and if so, is radiograph 
provision therefore a function of dental need?  These factors have to be taken into 
account and controlled for in the regression analysis.  
5.2.4.3 Dentist Characteristics 
A number of variables are included in the regression to account for dentist 
specific characteristics.  These consist of the standard age and gender variables, but 
also the contract type of the dentist i.e. whether the dentist is self-employed or 
salaried.  Figure 5.6 illustrates the age distribution of the 2377 dentists in the sample.   
Figure 5.6: Age Distribution of Dentists at Time of First Claim 
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 The majority of dentists in the sample are between the ages of 30 and 39 
(32%), although a similar percentage (approx 30%) of the sample are below the age 
of 30, with the youngest dentist being 22.  1% of the sample is over the age of 60, 
with the oldest dentist being 66.  
 The sample of dentists is made up of 1508 males (63%), accounting for 73% 
of all claims and 869 females (37%), and accounting for 27% of all claims.  When 
the gender split is considered by contract type of the dentist, the result is quite 
similar.  In total 2238 dentists are always self-employed, with 1428 being male 
(64%).  100 dentists in the sample work only on a salaried contract, with 60% of this 
group being male.  There is a slight change to the pattern when the group of dentists 
that work as both self-employed and salaried is considered.  In total there are 39 
dentists in the sample that do this, with approximately an even split between males 
and females. (20 of the 39 dentists are male.)   
5.2.4.4 Patient Characteristics 
 As in the case for dentists, the regression models also include a number of 
variables to control for individual patient characteristics.  Again age and gender is 
included, but a further important variable is added, one that can take into account 
whether the patient pays for their dental treatment or not.  The dummy variable 
exempt is used to indicate if a patient has to contribute to the cost of treatment or not, 
and is a good way to help control for different ‘types’ of patients in the sample.  
Figure 5.7 shows the age distribution of the 80,234 patients in the sample. 
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Figure 5.7: Age Distribution of Patients at Time of First Course of Treatment 
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 In terms of the gender breakdown, in the case of non-exempt patients, there 
is almost a 50:50 split, with 50.5% of non-exempt patients being male and 49.5% 
being female.  However, when it comes to patients who are always exempt, and have 
changed between paying and not paying for treatment, in both categories the 
percentage of the sample that are female is higher, 60% of exempt patients are 
female and 65% of those that have been both are female, thus suggesting that 
females are more likely to be exempt from charges that males. 
5.2.4.5 Further Controls 
 A number of other variables are entered into the regression models to try and 
further control for different types of patients and dentists, and also any regional or 
time effects.  The dummy variable depcat represents the deprivation category 
associated with the dental practice location.  This is because, at least during the 
sample period, dentist’s capitation and continuing care payments were weighted 
according to the deprivation category of the practice.  Deprivation is measured on a 
scale that runs from 1 to 7, where 1 represents the least deprived and 7 represents the 
most deprived.  This variable is used as an additional proxy for patient ‘type’.  
Although it is linked to the postcode of the dental practice, and a better measure 
would take into account the patient postcode, this information was not available in 
the data at the time the analysis was conducted.  The data shows that the majority of 
claims made are on behalf of patients attending dental practices within depcat 4, 
whilst the fewest claims were made on behalf of patients from practices in the most 
and least deprived areas, 6% in each.  
 The variable lastvisit is another variable that may define a particular type of 
patient and be linked to the probability of receiving an radiograph.  It is a measure in 
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months of how long it has been between treatments.  The data shows that the average 
time for patients between visits was 7.6 months.  It is important to note that the 
inclusion of this variable removes all patients’ first visits from the sample and 
therefore excludes those with only one visit.  This reduces the number of 
observations (claims) in the regression models from 364 729 to 286 843. 
 Twelve dummy variables termed sdr are included to control for any changes 
that might occur over time as the statement of dental remuneration (SDR) fee scale is 
revised.  There is no set time at which these changes occur but in this sample they 
are at approximately 6 monthly intervals.  The omitted category, sdr1 represents the 
fee scale in operation at the beginning of the sample period and all effects are 
relative to this, thus effectively controlling for changes to the nominal fees.   
 Finally dummy variables are included to indicate the health board of the 
practice.  This is to try and account for any regional differences that might exist. 
5.2.4.6 Descriptive Statistics 
 Descriptive statistics of the dataset described above are presented in the 
following tables.  Table 5.3 gives a breakdown by contract of the dentist and Table 
5.4 a breakdown by exempt and non-exempt patients.  From Table 5.3, the data 
suggests that self-employed dentists are more likely to provide radiographs than 
salaried dentists, with 19.2% of claims made by self-employed dentists containing at 
least one radiograph, compared to 17.9% of claims for salaried dentists.   
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics by Dental Contract 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
x-ray 
(code2a1)
Equals 1 if radiographic examination 
carried out
358406 0.192 0.394 6323 0.179 0.383
prev
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved preventive care
358406 0.001 0.023 6323 0.002 0.042
perio
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved peridontal treatment
358406 0.546 0.498 6323 0.367 0.482
cons
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved conservative treatment
358406 0.419 0.493 6323 0.362 0.481
surg
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved surgical treatment
358406 0.087 0.281 6323 0.109 0.312
prosth
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved prostheses, obturators and 
other (non-orthodontic) appliances
358406 0.079 0.269 6323 0.081 0.273
ortho
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved orthodontic treatment (major 
corrective work)
358406 0.001 0.031 6323 0.000 0.000
incomplete
dummy variable = 1 if this course of 
treatment was not completed prior to 
the claim being made
358406 0.007 0.081 6323 0.002 0.044
trauma
dummy variable = 1 if the claim is 
characterised by trauma
358406 0.001 0.024 6323 0.001 0.025
depcat Deprivation category of the practice 358406 3.849 1.539 6323 3.645 0.941
dage Dentist age 358406 40.189 9.724 6323 43.737 8.414
dsex Dentist sex (male=1) 358406 0.733 0.442 6323 0.705 0.456
clpery Claims per dentist per year 358406 68.793 32.129 6323 34.385 19.212
page Patient age 358406 44.305 14.473 6323 44.595 14.542
psex Patient sex (male=1) 358406 0.431 0.495 6323 0.451 0.498
exempt Equals 1 if patient is exempt 358406 0.262 0.440 6323 0.237 0.425
lastvisit Time since last visit (months) 282555 7.548 6.237 4288 10.017 8.334
Self-employed Salaried
DescriptionVariable
 
It appears that in general this pattern is true for most other treatment types, 
with self-employed dentists having higher proportions of claims with the given 
treatment compared to salaried dentists.  In most cases, however, the difference is 
very small.  The most common types of treatment found in claims for both dental 
contracts are for periodontal, for example scale and polish, and conservative 
treatment, for example fillings and crowns.  This is also where the biggest difference 
between the two types of dentist can be found.  54.6% of claims made by self-
employed dentists contained some form of periodontal treatment, compared to 36.7% 
of claims made by salaried dentists.  Similarly 41.9% of claims for self-employed 
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dentists contained conservative treatment, compared to 36.2% of claims made by 
their salaried counterparts.  Very few claims contain orthodontic treatment (possibly 
due to the specialist nature of orthodontics), preventive, incomplete or treatment as a 
result of trauma, with all found in less than 1% of claims by either self-employed or 
salaried dentists. 
The data also suggests that there is a difference in the ‘type’ of patients 
treated by self-employed and salaried dentists.  It appears that self-employed dentists 
treat more exempt patients.  The figures here show that 26.2% of the claims for self-
employed dentists were for exempt patients, compared to 23.7% of claims made by 
salaried dentists.  Self-employed dentists also seem to treat patients that attend the 
dentist more regularly, given that on average the length of time since last visit was 
7.5 months, compared to over 10 months for claims made by salaried dentists. 
The descriptive statistics presented in Table 5.4 are separated by exempt and 
non-exempt patients.  Based on this information alone, it appears that exempt 
patients receive more radiographs than non-exempt patients, with 22.5% of claims 
for exempt patients containing at least one radiograph, compared to only 18% of 
claims for fee paying patients.  Again the most common treatments found in claims, 
regardless of the patient are periodontal and conservative.  For all types of treatment, 
there were more claims for exempt patients than non-exempt patients.  For example, 
44.6% had conservative compared to 40.8%, and 12.8% contain prosthetic compared 
to 6.1%. 
 The majority of claims (98%) for both patient groups were made by self-
employed dentists, thus reflecting the ratio of self-employed to salaried dentists in 
the sample.  On average, there is no difference between exempt and non-exempt 
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patients in terms of the time between visits, with the time being approximately 7.5 
months.   
Table 5.4: Descriptive Statistics by Exemption Status 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
x-ray 
(code2a1)
Equals 1 if radiographic examination 
carried out
95542 0.225 0.418 269187 0.180 0.384
prev
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved preventive care
95542 0.001 0.035 269187 0.000 0.017
perio
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved peridontal treatment
95542 0.577 0.494 269187 0.531 0.499
cons
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved conservative treatment
95542 0.446 0.497 269187 0.408 0.491
surg
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved surgical treatment
95542 0.130 0.336 269187 0.072 0.258
prosth
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved prostheses, obturators and 
other (non-orthodontic) appliances
95542 0.128 0.334 269187 0.061 0.240
ortho
dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved orthodontic treatment (major 
corrective work)
95542 0.000 0.019 269187 0.001 0.034
incomplete
dummy variable = 1 if this course of 
treatment was not completed prior to 
the claim being made
95542 0.014 0.118 269187 0.004 0.062
trauma
dummy variable = 1 if the claim is 
characterised by trauma
95542 0.001 0.029 269187 0.000 0.022
depcat Deprivation category of the practice 95542 4.345 1.576 269187 3.668 1.475
dage Dentist age 95542 39.272 9.598 269187 40.597 9.732
dsex Dentist sex (male=1) 95542 0.714 0.452 269187 0.739 0.439
se Contract type of Dentist (= 1 if self-
employed,0 if salaried
95542 0.984 0.124 269187 0.982 0.133
clpery Claims per dentist per year 95542 61.494 30.992 269187 70.576 32.371
page Patient age 95542 39.806 14.242 269187 45.908 14.217
psex Patient sex (male=1) 95542 0.347 0.476 269187 0.462 0.499
lastvisit Time since last visit (months) 71971 7.632 7.144 214872 7.569 5.963
Exempt Non Exempt
DescriptionVariable
 
 
    Tables 5.3 and 5.4 above present descriptives for the data broken down by 
the contract type of the dentist and the exemption status of the patient.  Although 
important, these are only two of the factors that are considered in this analysis.  
Before moving on to the main empirical component, it is also useful to consider 
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some further descriptive analysis of the data.  Consider first a brief exploration that 
looks at the number of courses of treatment that each patient has in the sample.  This 
is presented in Table 5.5 below, with the distribution plotted in Figure 5.8 which 
follows. 
Table 5.5: The Number of Courses of Treatment per Patient 
Courses of 
Treatment 
per Patient 
Number 
of 
Patients 
% 
Probability 
of 
Radiograph 
1 20,841 25.98 0.305 
2 10,971 13.67 0.284 
3 8,204 10.23 0.256 
4 6,888 8.58 0.228 
5 6,164 7.68 0.213 
6 5,488 6.84 0.192 
7 5,041 6.28 0.176 
8 4,585 5.71 0.159 
9 3,869 4.82 0.148 
10 2,757 3.44 0.147 
11 1,807 2.25 0.155 
12 1,141 1.42 0.154 
13 729 0.91 0.144 
14 537 0.67 0.150 
15 356 0.44 0.150 
16 255 0.32 0.149 
17 158 0.20 0.134 
18 126 0.16 0.142 
19 101 0.13 0.132 
20 72 0.09 0.119 
21 42 0.05 0.118 
22 30 0.04 0.095 
23 20 0.02 0.126 
24 18 0.02 0.137 
25 11 0.01 0.182 
26 5 0.01 0.215 
27 3 0.00 0.148 
28 6 0.01 0.244 
29 2 0.00 0.224 
30 1 0.00 0.133 
31 2 0.00 0.032 
32 1 0.00 0.156 
35 1 0.00 0.000 
36 1 0.00 0.028 
38 1 0.00 0.342 
Total 80,234 100.00 
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Figure 5.8: The Number of Courses of Treatment per Patient 
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reverses.  This could imply that if a patient is visiting a dentist often, there may be 
some clinical need for this which may warrant more radiographs.  It is important to 
note that in some cases the low probabilities are due to the fact there is only 1 patient 
in the group. 
 Once the decision has been taken to attend a dentist, the next step is then to 
determine how many of these courses of treatment are likely to contain a radiograph.  
This information can be found in Table 5.6 and shows that the number of courses of 
treatment per patient containing a radiograph ranges from zero (for almost 50% of 
patients) to thirteen (for 2 patients in the sample).   
Table 5.6: Courses of Treatment per Patient that Contained at Least One 
Radiograph 
Courses of 
Treatment with 
Radiograph 
Patients % 
0 37,897 47.23 
1 25,490 31.77 
2 10,263 12.79 
3 4,006 4.99 
4 1,581 1.97 
5 611 0.76 
6 248 0.31 
7 76 0.09 
8 36 0.04 
9 10 0.01 
10 9 0.01 
12 5 0.01 
13 2 0.00 
Total 80,234 100.00 
 
 In order to look more closely at the factors that might influence a) the number 
of CoTs per patient (another way of thinking about it is number of visits to the 
dentist) and b) once at the dentist, the chances of being given a radiograph, methods 
which can model counts have to be used.  Typically Poisson models are used to 
model count data, but here, negative binomial regressions are used.  This is an 
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extension to Poisson regression.  It is less restrictive and can account for greater 
variation than Poisson variation as it does not rely on the assumption that every 
subject within a covariate has the same underlying rate of outcome.  Two simple 
models are estimated.  The first considers the factors that may influence the number 
of times a patient visits the dentist, the second then determines the factors that 
influence the number of treatments that contain at least one radiograph, whilst 
controlling for total number of visits.  The results from both regressions are given in 
Table 5.7 below. 
 
Table 5.7: Negative Binomial Regression Results  
 
 
 
 The results from the first model (number of courses of treatment per patient) 
show that all coefficients are significant and suggest that older people are slightly 
more likely to have more visits to the dentist.  Males and those who are exempt from 
the patient charge are less likely to have visits to the dentist, as are those patients 
who attend dental practices in areas of higher deprivation. 
The results from the second regression (number of courses of treatment 
containing a radiograph) show that older patients are less likely to receive a 
radiograph.  Males are more likely to be given them and those patients who are 
Variable Description b se b se
page Patient age 0.0096** 0.0002 -0.0153** 0.0003
psex Patient sex (male=1) -0.1428** 0.0055 0.4491** 0.0083
exempt Equals 1 if patient is exempt -0.1732** 0.0067 0.0119 0.0101
depcat Deprivation category of the practice -0.0303** 0.0018 0.0233** 0.0028
numobsp Number of observations per patient - - 0.1339** 0.0010
cons Regression Constant 1.3309 0.0115 -0.3504 0.0179
 
* Sig at 5% level; ** Sig at 1% level
No. of Visits CoTs with Radiographs
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exempt from charges are also more likely to be given a radiograph, though the 
coefficient is not significant at the 5% level.  The more courses of treatment that a 
patient has also increases their chance of being given a radiograph and patients who 
attend dental practices in more deprived areas are also more likely to receive 
radiographs. 
The short descriptive analysis given above helps to gain a broad overview of 
some of the factors that might have an impact on the likelihood of receiving a 
radiograph, particularly at the very beginning of the decision process.  It is useful to 
have some insight into the factors that actually impact on whether the patient visits 
their dentist often or not and to this to keep in mind when progressing to the much 
more complex empirical specifications presented in the next section. 
 
5.3  Empirical Analysis 
5.3.1 Regression Methods 
 As discussed in detail in the Introduction Chapter, the aim of this study is to 
investigate the variation in, and the determinates of the provision of dental 
radiographs across GDS dentists in the Scottish NHS, with a view to being able to 
identify and quantify the sources of this variation.  Empirically this means estimating 
models that can account and control for factors that may influence the likelihood of a 
patient receiving a radiograph.  These factors are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 
(section 3.5.2) and show that it will depend on the individual characteristics and 
circumstances of the patient and the dentist.  Practice characteristics may also be 
important. Many of these factors will be observable and can be estimated quite 
easily, for example standard age and gender controls, the contract of the dentist and 
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the cost sharing element for patients through the exemption state category. There 
will, however, also be the unobservable characteristics that are important and need to 
be considered, but may not be as easily estimated.  Unobserved patient heterogeneity 
exists because patients can be seen as being of different ‘types’.  Some may have 
aversions to going to the dentist and may be more cautious about being exposed to 
radiation.  On the other hand, some patients may be of the belief that radiographs are 
a good way of ensuring they are getting the best possible treatment and therefore 
expect a radiograph.  In the case of the dentist the unobserved heterogeneity may 
come down to what is known as ‘practice style’, which simply means that different 
dentists have different inherent preferences in their methods of treatment.  This could 
be as a result of where/how they trained, due to habit, or the influence of a particular 
working environment.    
 The decision as to which empirical methods should be adopted to aid 
answering the empirical question is usually highly dependent upon the data 
available.  In this case the available data is a rich, highly functional, individual level 
dataset considered to be analogous to a matched patient provider dataset, similar to 
those described back in Chapter 3.  Following on from this discussion, it should 
therefore be possible to apply similar methods and techniques.  The structure of the 
dataset allows the application of panel data methods, where it should be possible to 
control for both patient and dentist unobserved heterogeneity.  A key factor in this 
investigation is to be able to consider the variation at the dentist and patient levels, 
and where possible, both levels combined. 
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5.3.2 Model Specifications 
 The discussion presented in Chapter 3 described the development of a model 
by Andrews et al (2006) that could be used with matched data, and could incorporate 
both dentist and patient unobserved individual characteristics.  Following this 
method, a general model of the following form is estimated:  
                                                    (5.3.1) 
 
where 
              
Patients are indexed i = 1,...., N.  They are observed once per course of treatment 
(CoT) k = 1,…, Ki provided by dentist j = 1,…, J.  Patients can receive treatment 
from different dentists and the function J(i,k) maps patient i to dentist j for CoT k.
42
  
In equation (5.3.1)     is the probability of patient i  receiving a radiograph on their 
thk  course of treatment;      is a set of observable explanatory variables that vary 
across patients and the patients different courses of treatment;     is a set of 
observable explanatory variables that vary across dentists and different courses of 
treatment;      is the remuneration contract of the dentist (which varies across 
observations for 39 dentists who switch contracts);     is the exemption status of the 
patient (which varies for 10,119 patients who switch between exempt and non-
exempt); and         represents the interaction between dentist contract and 
exemption status. This term has been included to infer how the effect of the contract 
type on the probability of getting a radiograph might depend on the exemption status 
                                                 
42
 Rather than use the mapping function in the equation subscripts, the same approach as Andrews et 
al. (2006) is adopted.  For more information refer back to section 3.5.3. 
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of the patient.  It should help identify the true/full impact of dentist contract on    .  
The error term,     is made up of a patient specific effect ( i ), a dentist specific 
effect (  ) and the usual random error (   ). 
 It is useful to highlight the difference between this specification and that used 
by Andrews et al. (2006).  In the Andrews model the estimation was on workers in 
firms at different points in time.  In this model dentists replace firms, patients replace 
workers and course of treatment replaces time.  Whilst the Andrews model had 
workers in firms over time, this specification has patients receiving radiographs from 
dentists over a number of courses of treatment (which are occurring over time).  
Although a time variable as such is not included in this model specification, in order 
to take account of the influence of time on the probability of providing a radiograph, 
a variable that measures the time that has elapsed from a patient’s last visit is 
included.  It is believed that this should help capture any influence that time may 
have, for example is it more likely for a patient to receive a radiograph if it has been 
a long time since their last visit to the dentist?  A further variable, sdr, has also been 
included in the regression model to try and capture any time effects.  This is a 
dummy variable that represents a change to the Statement of Dental Remuneration, 
in relation to the fees that dentists can claim for any given item of treatment.  It may 
be the case that an increase in the fee for a radiograph may result in a change in the 
likelihood that a dentist will provide one.  The inclusion of the sdr variable should 
help control for these factors.    
 To consider fully the determinants of the provision of dental radiographs and 
the potential sources of variation in their use, it is necessary to estimate a range of 
specifications of the general model depicted in Equation (5.3.1).  In order to make an 
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informed decision about these particular specifications and what they can and should 
look like, a number of key questions need to be addressed. One of the most 
important will be the choice between linear and non-linear specifications, but also 
the way in which to account and control for the unobserved factors (both dentist and 
patient) needs to be considered.  In order to conduct as complete a study as possible, 
both linear and non-linear models were considered (and estimated where possible), 
as were both random and fixed effects models, where the unobserved heterogeneity 
could be treated differently.     
 After careful consideration and a review of the literature it was decided that 
the model specifications to be estimated would take the linear form.  There are a 
number of reasons for this decision, but the overwhelming one was due to the fact 
that it would not be possible to construct a non-linear model that could account for 
both dentist and patient unobserved heterogeneity simultaneously.  It is possible to 
estimate non-linear models that could account for either dentist characteristics alone 
or patient characteristics alone, however not both together.  There would then be a 
choice between random and fixed effects models, both of which present their own 
problems.  There has been much debate about this choice, and it is clear there are 
advantages and disadvantages associated with both methods.  Often the choice is 
based on how the researcher views the individual time-invariant components i.e. are 
they best viewed as being outcomes of a random variable or best viewed as 
parameters to be estimated.  If the observations cannot be considered to be random 
draws from a large population, it might make more sense to think of the error 
components as parameters to be estimated and hence fixed effects estimation.  The 
data and the particular empirical questions being addressed may also influence the 
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decision on which might be the preferred model.  For example, if it can be assumed 
that the unobserved individual effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, 
fixed effects estimation is required.  Random effects estimation in this situation 
would result in inconsistent estimates.  Fixed effects however may not be the most 
appropriate method if the aim of an analysis is to recover estimates of coefficients on 
time-invariant variables, both observed and unobserved.  One aspect of this 
particular study is to address this shortcoming of the fixed effects model, and the 
methods described in section 3.2.4.4 do enable a fixed effects framework to be used 
and for all estimates of interest to be recovered in the process. 
 In making the choice between either fixed or random effects models, the 
Hausman test can be used to test for correlation between the random effects and the 
explanatory variables.  The test is based on the idea that under the hypothesis of no 
correlation, both random and fixed effects models will give consistent estimates, 
however fixed effects estimation will be inefficient.  Alternatively, when there is 
correlation, fixed effects models remain consistent, however random effects models 
will be inconsistent.  This means that under the null hypothesis of no correlation, the 
two estimates would not be systematically different.(Greene 2002)  The Hausman 
test essentially is based on any difference between the two estimators and if the null 
hypothesis can be rejected (i.e. reject the fact there is no correlation), then the fixed 
effects approach is preferred.   
 The underlying assumptions associated with random effects models, with 
regard to the correlation of unobserved heterogeneities with explanatory variables, 
represents a very strong assumption for the scenario being addressed here.  In the 
case of fixed effects non-linear models, although estimable, the results are 
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inconsistent.  There is scope for further problems with non-linear models when it 
comes to the interpretation of coefficient results on interaction terms (Ai & Norton 
2003). 
In light of these factors, this study concentrates on a linear approach.  
However it is important to remember that there are a number of problems, well 
documented in the literature
43
, with estimating linear probability models.  Predicted 
probabilities can lie outside the unit interval and the model violates one of the Gauss-
Markov (GM) assumptions.  Gauss Markov theory states that under 5 certain 
assumptions, the OLS estimators are BLUE i.e. the best linear unbiased estimators, 
however if any of these assumptions do not hold the estimator may not be the most 
appropriate.
44
  In the case of the linear probability model the GM assumption 
concerning the variance of the disturbance term is violated i.e. the variance of the 
disturbance/random component is not constant.  This is referred to as 
heteroskedasticity and although it does not impact on the parameter estimates, it will 
bias the variance of the estimated parameters and thus affect the standard errors. It 
has however been shown that the linear probability model can still be useful and 
works well for values of the independent variables that are near the averages in the 
sample (see Wooldridge, 2002a).  In this analysis prediction is not central; we are 
more concerned with the ceteris paribus effect of key variables on the probability of 
getting a radiograph.  The standard errors can also be corrected to account for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the dentist and patient levels.  It is important to 
remember that the main focus of the analysis is to be able to account in a general 
                                                 
43
 See for example Greene (2002); Johnston & Dinardo (1996); Wooldridge (2002b)  
44
 For more detail on Gauss Markov theory, refer to Wooldridge (2002a), pp103-105 
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way for both patient and dentist individual effects, thus making the linear approach, 
despite its problems, the more favourable option.   
For all specifications that follow, the interpretation of the coefficients on the 
regression variables is the same i.e. [β,γ] is a vector of parameter estimates for 
observable dentist and patient characteristics, η is the effect of exemption status on 
the probability of getting a radiograph or not, for salaried dentists, ρ is the effect of 
contract type on the likelihood of a patient receiving a radiograph for non-exempt 
patients.  δ is a difference in difference estimator and captures the difference in the 
impact on the probability of getting a radiograph due to exemption status for self 
employed dentists, compared to the impact due to exemption status for salaried 
dentists.  Alternatively it could also be viewed as the change in the probability of 
getting a radiograph due to contract type for exempt patients compared to the 
probability due to contract type for non-exempt patients.  If positive, this would 
mean that the impact of contract type on the probability of giving a radiograph is 
greater if patients are exempt, compared to non-exempt patients.  Similarly it could 
also mean that the impact of exemption status on the chances of getting a radiograph 
is greater for self employed dentists, compared to salaried dentists, which might 
suggest that self employed dentists may be more likely to give exempt patients a 
radiograph than their salaried counterparts. 
To begin, a simple OLS estimate of equation (5.3.1) provides a useful 
benchmark.  A non-linear equivalent (probit) is also estimated for comparison.  
These specifications do not explicitly control for the individual patient and dentist 
specific effects; they are subsumed within the error term.  It is assumed that this is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables of the model.  A series of models that 
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consider the dentist and patient specific effects separately are then estimated.  In this 
analysis it is likely that the dentist (  ) and patient ( i ) specific effects will be 
correlated with some of the explanatory variables, and therefore fixed effects models 
are considered first.  These treat both (  ) and i  as separate parameters to be 
estimated.  The following versions of equation (5.3.1) are estimated: 
                                            (5.3.2) 
 
                                            (5.3.3) 
 
 It is also assumed that the unobserved dentist characteristics affect the 
likelihood of giving a radiograph in the same way across all patients.  Similarly it is 
assumed that the unobserved patient effect is the same across dentists and courses of 
treatment.  This is essentially assuming that both dentists and patients are of a 
particular ‘type’.  The fixed effects are identified because we have multiple 
observations on both dentists and patients.
45
 
Random effects models assume that the unobserved heterogeneities are 
uncorrelated with all explanatory variables.  This is a strong assumption, however 
given that they do provide more efficient estimates; models of this type are also 
estimated.  These specifications treat    and i  as part of the error term.  A 
Hausman test can then be run to compare with the fixed effects models.
46
   
Finally, and the main focus of the analysis, a series of multi-level or 3-way 
error component models are estimated.  These are models that can estimate the 
average effect associated with any dentist/patient characteristic, or any interaction of 
                                                 
45
 Although the multiple observations enable these effects to be identified from this data, it should be 
noted that in the case of patients they may not be well determined.  This is due to the limited sample 
size for each patient. 
46
 For more details of the Hausman specification test see J. A. Hausman (1978)  
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these characteristics, in the presence of, and accounting for, unobservable dentist and 
patient heterogeneity.  Abowd & Kramarz (1999a) and Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis 
(AKM) (1999), discuss the potential biases that can arise from ignoring, in their case, 
either personal or firm heterogeneity.  They propose that omitting either of these 
effects will result in an omitted variable bias equal to what they term the person-
average firm effect and firm-average person effect, respectively.  Applying the same 
logic to this analysis and considering dentist and patient effects, this means that 
omitting the patient effect would give a dentist effect that was made up of the pure 
dentist effect, but also an effect that measures the extent to which the average patient 
of a dentist deviates from the population of potential patients.  In other words, what 
is the effect of heterogeneous patients on the composition of dentists’ patient lists?  
Do some dentists simply end up with sets of patients that are just very different from 
the average patient?  Abowd et al (1999b) propose that this effect will not be picked 
up unless the patient effects are also included in the analysis.  Similarly, the same is 
true in the case of the patient effects when dentist effects are not included.  A further 
aim of this analysis is therefore to investigate the existence and extent (if any) of 
such bias. 
Three different multilevel specifications are estimated.  Firstly a model that 
treats both the dentist and patient heterogeneity as random effects is considered.  
Then a model that treats both effects as fixed is estimated and finally a model that 
treats the dentist heterogeneity as fixed and the patient heterogeneity as random is 
considered.  The specification that includes both heterogeneities as fixed effects 
presents some complications in estimation, much of which is discussed in AKM 
(1999) and Andrews et al (2006).  AKM show that there are many common methods 
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of approximating the solution, whilst Andrews et al (2006) present a more practical 
paper and show how the methods discussed in AKM can be implemented.
47
  This 
study adopts the approach set out by Andrews et al (2006) and Cornelissen (2008a; 
2008b) to estimate the 3-way error components model, where both the unobserved 
dentist and patient effects are treated as fixed effects. 
5.3.3 Identification 
Given the types of models being applied in this study, a key phenomenon to 
consider is that of identification.  The overall focus of this particular investigation is 
to try and identify potential sources to explain the variation exhibited in the use of 
dental radiographs.  These sources can stem from the usual economic incentives that 
often exist in a health care setting, e.g. the impact of dentist remuneration contracts 
and demand side cost sharing, but could also be the result of individual 
characteristics of either dentists or patients or potentially dentists and patients.  In the 
latter case, in order to fully capture this, there has to be mobility in the sample.  For 
example, if all patients received treatment from the same dentist each time over the 
sample period, the patient and dentist effects could not be identified separately.  
Thus in this case identification will only be possible if there is movement of patients 
between providers
48
.  Table 5.8 below presents data on the mobility of patients in the 
sample period. Of the 80,234 distinct patients in the sample, just fewer than 70% 
were treated by one dentist; therefore about 30% (approx 25,000 patients) of the 
patients in the sample are mobile.  Although the majority of patients don’t switch 
between dentists, the key is that ‘some’ do.  
                                                 
47
 For full details refer to Chapter 3 - Empirical Methods 
48
 For more information on identification see Abowd et al. (2002), Computing person and firm effects 
using linked longitudinal employer-employee data.  
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Table 5.8: The Number of Dentists per Patient 
Dentist per patient CoTs % Patients % 
1 201979 55.38 54581 68.03 
2 102415 28.08 17818 22.21 
3 41163 11.29 5711 7.12 
4 13323 3.65 1569 1.96 
5 4360 1.20 434 0.54 
6 992 0.27 85 0.11 
7 294 0.08 24 0.03 
8 137 0.04 9 0.01 
9 28 0.01 1 0.00 
10 38 0.01 2 0.00 
Total 364729 100 80234 100 
  
 At this point, it is useful to consider the group of patients who are classified 
as movers (i.e. they are treated by at least two dentists over the sample period) and 
see if they are any different from those who don’t move (i.e. those treated by the 
same dentist throughout).  Table 5.9 below presents the descriptives for these two 
groups of patients. 
These stats alone suggest that there is no real difference between those patients who 
change dentists in the sample and those who have been seen by the same dentist.  
Consider some of the key variables; movers are more likely to be exempt from the 
patient charge and are more likely to receive a radiograph that non movers. 
In particular, movers are more likely to receive a radiograph straight after a move 
(27% change of receiving a radiograph) compared to those patients who saw the 
same dentist as the previous visit (15% chance of being given a radiograph).  In 
general most other variables are similar across the two groups of patients.   
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   I calculated simple t-tests to compare the means across groups.  These 
implied that the means of all variables (with the exception of orthodontic and trauma 
treatment) were statistically different between movers and non movers.  Given the 
similarities of the means, these tests are most likely being pushed to statistical 
significance by the large sample size.  However, I would be reluctant to conclude 
that there are economically significant differences between patients who move and 
those who don’t given the very small differences in means.  
Table 5.9: Descriptive Statistics for Movers & Non Movers 
 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. Dev Obs Mean Std. Dev
radiographs 
(code2a1)
Equals 1 if radiographic examination 
carried out
162750 0.21 0.41 201979 0.18 0.38
prev dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved preventative care
162750 0.00 0.02 201979 0.00 0.02
perio dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved peridontal treatment
162750 0.52 0.50 201979 0.56 0.5
cons dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved conservative treatment
162750 0.45 0.50 201979 0.39 0.49
surg dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved surgical treatment
162750 0.09 0.29 201979 0.08 0.27
prosth dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved prostheses, obturators and 
other (non-orthodontic) appliances
162750 0.08 0.26 201979 0.08 0.27
ortho dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved orthodontic treatment (major 
corrective work)
162750 0.00 0.04 201979 0.00 0.02
incomplete dummy variable = 1 if this course of 
treatment was not completed prior to 
the claim being made
162750 0.01 0.09 201979 0.00 0.07
trauma dummy variable = 1 if the claim is 
characterised by trauma
162750 0.00 0.02 201979 0.00 0.02
depcat Deprivation category of the practice 
(1=least deprived, 7=most deprived)
162750 3.87 1.57 201979 3.82 1.49
dage Dentist age 162750 38.16 10.12 201979 41.94 9.02
dsex Dentist sex (male=1) 162750 0.67 0.47 201979 0.78 0.41
se Contract type of Dentist (=1if self-
employed, 0 if salaried)
162750 0.98 0.14 201979 0.99 0.12
clpery Claims per dentist per year 162750 63.18 31.32 201979 72.24 32.44
page Patient age 162750 43.93 14.17 201979 44.61 14.71
psex Patient sex (male=1) 162750 0.42 0.49 201979 0.44 0.5
exempt Equals 1 if patient is exempt 162750 0.28 0.45 201979 0.24 0.42
numobsp Number of observations per patient 162750 8.44 4.30 201979 6.66 4.02
lastvisit Time since last visit (months) 137552 7.42 6.77 149291 7.73 5.78
Mover Non-Mover
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  Similarly for contract effects to be separately identified from individual 
effects there has to be mobility of both dentists and patients between contract types.  
In other words some dentists will have to have worked as both self employed and 
salaried dentists at some point during the sample period.  Likewise some patients 
will also have to have moved between dentists working under different contractual 
arrangements, if the impact of the contract per patient is to be identified. 
 Table 5.10 reports that of the 2377 distinct dentists in the dataset, 2238 
(94.15%) are always self employed, with only 39 (1.6%) having worked under both 
contracts.   
Table 5.10: The Number of Dentists by Contract Type over the Sample Period 
Contract Type CoTs % Dentists % 
self employed only 355564 97.49 2238 94.15 
salaried only 4717 1.29 100 4.21 
self employed & salaried 4448 1.22 39 1.64 
Total 364729 100 2377 100 
 
  Given that the contract effects are identified in the model through those who 
change contracts, it is also worth investigating whether there is some difference 
between dentists who switch contract and dentists who remain on the same payment 
contract during the course of the sample period.  Table 5.11 below presents some 
descriptive stats, for each dentist group, i.e. always self-employed, always salaried, 
and then those who have worked as both. 
 The descriptives for dentists who change contract versus those who haven’t, 
like the movers versus non movers, suggest there is little difference between them.  
Again consider some of the key variables of interest.  Dentists who switch contract 
may be slightly less likely to provide a radiograph compared to those who are always 
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salaried and always self employed as 17% of their claims contained a radiograph, 
compared to 19% of claims by self employed and salaried dentists.  They also appear 
to treat less exempt patients, 23% of claims were for those who were exempt, 
compared to 25 and 26% of claims for salaried and self employed dentists 
respectively. 
Table 5.11: Descriptive Stats for Dental Contracts 
 
 There was little difference across demographic variables and treatment 
category variables, perhaps with the exception of the provision of periodontal 
treatment (where salaried dentists and those who switch contract have less claims 
Variable Description Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
radiographs 
(code2a1)
Equals 1 if radiographic examination 
carried out
355564 0.19 4717 0.19 4448 0.17
prev dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved preventative care
355564 0.00 4717 0.00 4448 0.00
perio dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved peridontal treatment
355564 0.55 4717 0.39 4448 0.39
cons dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved conservative treatment
355564 0.42 4717 0.36 4448 0.41
surg dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved surgical treatment
355564 0.87 4717 0.12 4448 0.08
prosth dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved prostheses, obturators and 
other (non-orthodontic) appliances
355564 0.08 4717 0.08 4448 0.07
ortho dummy variable = 1 if this course 
involved orthodontic treatment (major 
corrective work)
355564 0.00 4717 0.00 4448 0.00
incomplete dummy variable = 1 if this course of 
treatment was not completed prior to 
the claim being made
355564 0.01 4717 0.00 4448 0.01
trauma dummy variable = 1 if the claim is 
characterised by trauma
355564 0.00 4717 0.00 4448 0.00
depcat Deprivation category of the practice 
(1=least deprived, 7=most deprived)
355564 3.85 4717 3.77 4448 3.40
dage Dentist age 355564 40.22 4717 44.94 4448 37.94
dsex Dentist sex (male=1) 355564 0.73 4717 0..71 4448 0.63
se Contract type of Dentist (=1if self-
employed, 0 if salaried)
355564 1.00 4717 0.00 4448 0.64
clpery Claims per dentist per year 355564 68.94 4717 31.73 4448 47.47
page Patient age 355564 44.33 4717 44.47 4448 42.72
psex Patient sex (male=1) 355564 0.43 4717 0.44 4448 0.44
exempt Equals 1 if patient is exempt 355564 0.26 4717 0.25 4448 0.24
numobs Number of observations per dentist 355564 266.74 4717 112.86 4448 161.29
lastvisit Time since last visit (months) 280637 7.55 3088 9.94 3118 8.14
Always self-
employed
Always salaried Switch Contract
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with this type of treatment in it) and surgical treatment (where those who were 
always salaried have more claims with surgical treatment than the other groups). 
 Salaried dentists also appear to treat patients that attend the dentist less often 
given that on average the length of time between visits is 10 months for claims made 
by salaried dentists, compared to approximately 8 months for the other groups of 
dentists. 
 I performed a similar comparison to that of the movers and non movers and 
used a one way anova to compare the means of the variables across the three 
different groups.  This also produced similar results, suggesting that the means 
across groups are statistically different from one another.  However, again, given the 
small differences in magnitude of the means, I think it is likely that there will be 
little difference between the different groups of dentists in terms of the impact of 
changing contracts. 
Table 5.12 below shows that only 820 (1%) patients were treated by both self 
employed and salaried dentists. 
 
Table 5.12: The Number of Patients Treated by Dentists with a Given Contract 
Contract Type CoTs % Patients % 
self employed only 355845 97.56 77570 96.68 
salaried only 4582 1.26 1844 2.30 
self employed & salaried 4302 1.18 820 1.02 
Total 364729 100 80234 100 
 
  Finally, the impact of the demand side cost sharing (exemption) effects can 
only be identified if there is patients in the sample that switch between exemption 
states throughout the period.  If not, it would not be possible to separate them from 
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individual patient specific effects.  Table 5.13 shows that 12.61% of patients were 
both exempt and non-exempt at times throughout the sample period. 
 
Table 5.13: The Number of Patients by Exemption Status 
Exemption Status CoTs % Patients % 
Non exempt only 237015 64.98 50502 62.94 
exempt only 67181 18.42 19613 24.44 
exempt & non exempt 60533 16.60 10119 12.61 
Total 364729 100 80234 100 
 
  The issues regarding identification discussed here relate to the models in 
which both individual patient and dentist heterogeneity is being controlled for.  It is 
also worth noting the impact of mobility on the precision of the estimates of the 
dentist effects
49
.  The estimates are more precise the more movers there are per 
dentist in the sample.  The estimates of the patient effects are a function of the 
number of observations per patient.  This is similar to the case when only one level 
of heterogeneity is being considered.  In this instance the effects are identified due to 
the panel nature of the data, where there are multiple observations on both dentists 
and patients, thus making the precision of the estimated effects dependent on the 
number of observations per patient or dentist. 
5.3.4 Empirical Results 
 The subsections that follow present and discuss the results from the empirical 
analysis. 
                                                 
49
 For further discussion of the accuracy of the results please see pages 165-167  
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5.3.4.1 General  
The results of estimating 9 specifications of Equation 5.3.1 are given in Table 
5.14
50
.  The sets of results that have been highlighted will be discussed in greater 
detail in the next section (5.3.4.2).  All model specifications are estimated with 
robust standard errors to take account of any heteroskedasticity and to account for 
any clustering at the patient and dentist levels.  Models 1 and 2 are the simplest form 
and do not explicitly control for the unobserved heterogeneity. The OLS estimate is 
used only to provide a benchmark for the models that follow.  The adjusted R
2
 from 
the OLS estimate suggests that approximately 9% of the variation in radiograph use 
across GDS dentists is explained by the model.  The probit model (column 2 in 
Table 5.14) is estimated to provide a non-linear comparison to the general OLS, in 
attempt to gauge the extent of any difference between the two.  It is useful to point 
out that relatively little difference exists.  The direction of all variables in each model 
are the same, as to is the level of significance, with the exception of a couple of 
deprivation category dummies (depcat_5 and _6 are significant in the probit model 
but not in the OLS) and one sdr dummy (sdr_7 is significant under OLS, but not in 
the probit model).  The magnitude of the coefficients and standard errors are also 
very similar.     
                                                 
50
 Standard errors in parentheses; * denotes significant at the 5% level and 
+
 denotes significant at the 
10% level. 
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Table 5.14: Regression Results 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Variable  OLS Prob FE j  RE j FE i RE i RE i RE j FE i FE j RE i FE j 
  b/se (dF/dX)/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
prev 0.0801* 0.0717* 0.0564 0.057 0.0658 0.0748* 0.0556+ 0.0581 0.0554 
  [0.0358] [0.0372] [0.0369] [0.0366] [0.0439] [0.0366] [0.0324] [0.0448] [0.0356] 
perio 0.0150* 0.0099* 0.0035+ 0.0048* 0.0098* 0.0143* 0.0055* 0.0060* 0.0050* 
  [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0020] [0.0016] 
cons 0.1570* 0.1576* 0.1555* 0.1559* 0.1330* 0.1509* 0.1543* 0.1320* 0.1511* 
  [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0014] [0.0019] [0.0016] 
surg 0.2091* 0.2322* 0.2098* 0.2096* 0.2050* 0.2066* 0.2088* 0.2052* 0.2080* 
  [0.0034] [0.0040] [0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0040] [0.0034] [0.0026] [0.0039] [0.0034] 
prosth -0.0354* -0.0471* -0.0401* -0.0396* -0.0009 -0.0274* -0.0374* -0.0025 -0.0326* 
  [0.0027] [0.0141] [0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0036] [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0036] [0.0028] 
ortho -0.0933* -0.1283* -0.0158 -0.0839* -0.0474* -0.0887* -0.0885* -0.0106 -0.0169 
  [0.0079] [0.1967] [0.0174] [0.0101] [0.0215] [0.0085] [0.0237] [0.0303] [0.0164] 
incomplete 0.2358* 0.2380* 0.2169* 0.2188* 0.1694* 0.2144* 0.2152* 0.1582* 0.2032* 
  [0.0121] [0.0340] [0.0128] [0.0128] [0.0137] [0.0119] [0.0090] [0.0136] [0.0118] 
trauma 0.1032* 0.1058* 0.1003* 0.0987* 0.1135* 0.1078* 0.1009* 0.1098* 0.1030* 
  [0.0346] [0.1086] [0.0328] [0.0328] [0.0377] [0.0346] [0.0270] [0.0372] [0.0338] 
caid_1 -0.0837* -0.0674* -0.6868* -0.0493+ -0.1264 -0.0773* -0.0509 -0.8364* -0.7101* 
  [0.0141] [0.0530] [0.0438] [0.0255] [0.1025] [0.0143] [0.0321] [0.2019] [0.0496] 
caid_2 -0.0755* -0.0624* -0.6299* -0.0314 -0.2367* -0.0691* -0.034 -0.8726* -0.6517* 
  [0.0145] [0.0561] [0.0899] [0.0304] [0.1041] [0.0147] [0.0340] [0.2153] [0.0613] 
caid_3 -0.0742* -0.0612* -0.7065* -0.0463+ -0.1009 -0.0663* -0.0459 -0.8674* -0.7329* 
  [0.0141] [0.0529] [0.0438] [0.0259] [0.1013] [0.0143] [0.0320] [0.2001] [0.0488] 
caid_4 -0.0906* -0.0739* -0.7033* -0.0625* -0.12 -0.0840* -0.0632* -0.8375* -0.7253* 
  [0.0141] [0.0530] [0.0418] [0.0258] [0.1026] [0.0142] [0.0322] [0.2019] [0.0492] 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Variable OLS Prob FEj  REj FEi REi REiREj FEiFEj REiFEj 
caid_5 -0.0476* -0.0423* -0.6719* -0.0188 -0.0907 -0.0400* -0.0185 -0.8042* -0.6953* 
  [0.0141] [0.0526] [0.0421] [0.0255] [0.0999] [0.0142] [0.0319] [0.1989] [0.0481] 
caid_6 -0.0717* -0.0574* -0.7003* -0.0516* -0.1399 -0.0636* -0.0516 -0.8288* -0.7222* 
  [0.0147] [0.0555] [0.0060] [0.0259] [0.1089] [0.0148] [0.0325] [0.1931] [0.0295] 
caid_7 -0.0771* -0.0634* -0.6766* -0.0398 -0.0977 -0.0679* -0.0413 -0.8032* -0.6992* 
  [0.0141] [0.0527] [0.0433] [0.0257] [0.1004] [0.0142] [0.0320] [0.1993] [0.0487] 
caid_8 -0.0819* -0.0679* -0.6755* -0.0471+ -0.133 -0.0760* -0.0483 -0.8481* -0.7012* 
  [0.0141] [0.0526] [0.0436] [0.0256] [0.1018] [0.0142] [0.0321] [0.2008] [0.0451] 
caid_9 -0.1459* -0.1017* -0.7385* -0.1210* -0.0443 -0.1447* -0.1223* -0.6033* -0.7635* 
  [0.0202] [0.1002] [0.0441] [0.0259] [0.1436] [0.0196] [0.0418] [0.2326] [0.0555] 
caid_10 -0.0614* -0.0522* -0.6906* -0.0335 -0.1018 -0.0532* -0.0333 -0.8216* -0.7122* 
  [0.0140] [0.0522] [0.0413] [0.0253] [0.1007] [0.0141] [0.0318] [0.1994] [0.0478] 
caid_11 -0.0706* -0.0585* -0.6483* -0.0299 -0.1305 -0.0634* -0.0322 -0.8268* -0.6742* 
  [0.0141] [0.0527] [0.0433] [0.0256] [0.1020] [0.0142] [0.0321] [0.2010] [0.0485] 
caid_12 -0.0519* -0.0436* -0.6598* -0.0172 0.0189 -0.0439* -0.018 -0.7556* -0.6860* 
  [0.0143] [0.0533] [0.0456] [0.0265] [0.1027] [0.0144] [0.0325] [0.2017] [0.0503] 
caid_13 -0.0636* -0.0517* -0.6849* -0.0379 -0.1226 -0.0607* -0.0393 -0.9725* -0.7181* 
  [0.0186] [0.0713] [0.0437] [0.0311] [0.1415] [0.0190] [0.0399] [0.2400] [0.0673] 
caid_14 -0.1019* -0.0818* -0.7839* -0.0891* -0.1522 -0.0966* -0.0889* -0.8026* -0.7843* 
  [0.0146] [0.0571] [0.2204] [0.0280] [0.1075] [0.0147] [0.0342] [0.2768] [0.1454] 
depcat_2 0.0056 0.0043 -0.0164 -0.0009 0.0453* 0.0096* 0.0013 0.0256 -0.0141 
  [0.0037] [0.0157] [0.0159] [0.0089] [0.0164] [0.0038] [0.0074] [0.0235] [0.0123] 
depcat_3 -0.0029 -0.0046 -0.0217 -0.0062 0.0147 -0.0001 -0.0041 -0.0026 -0.0204+ 
  [0.0036] [0.0155] [0.0169] [0.0094] [0.0169] [0.0038] [0.0072] [0.0237] [0.0122] 
depcat_4 -0.0008 -0.0031 -0.0254 -0.0069 0.0277+ 0.003 -0.0043 0.0022 -0.0216+ 
  [0.0034] [0.0147] [0.0161] [0.0088] [0.0156] [0.0035] [0.0069] [0.0228] [0.0120] 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Variable  OLS Prob FEj  REj FEi REi REiREj FEiFEj REiFEj 
depcat_5 -0.0047 
-
0.0066+ -0.0321+ -0.0146 0.0227 -0.0029 -0.0127+ -0.021 -0.0301* 
  [0.0037] [0.0157] [0.0168] [0.0093] [0.0167] [0.0038] [0.0075] [0.0241] [0.0129] 
depcat_6 -0.0062 -0.0081* -0.0372* -0.0157 0.003 -0.0052 -0.0132+ -0.0101 -0.0352* 
  [0.0042] [0.0172] [0.0173] [0.0099] [0.0183] [0.0043] [0.0079] [0.0273] [0.0135] 
depcat_7 -0.0099+ -0.0114* -0.0264 -0.013 0.0465* -0.0053 -0.0115 -0.0114 -0.0208 
  [0.0051] [0.0203] [0.0226] [0.0127] [0.0235] [0.0053] [0.0091] [0.0354] [0.0163] 
sdr_2 -0.0019 -0.0024 -0.0033 -0.0032 -0.0051 -0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0063 -0.0039 
  [0.0047] [0.0210] [0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0051] [0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0051] [0.0047] 
sdr_3 0.0025 0.0027 0.0016 0.0025 0.0024 0.0029 0.0026 0.0002 0.0014 
  [0.0029] [0.0127] [0.0031] [0.0030] [0.0031] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0032] [0.0030] 
sdr_4 0.0035 0.0034 -0.0004 0.0023 0.0045 0.0043 0.0024 -0.0002 -0.0001 
  [0.0043] [0.0185] [0.0047] [0.0044] [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0042] [0.0050] [0.0046] 
sdr_5 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.005 -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.006 -0.0051 
  [0.0043] [0.0189] [0.0049] [0.0046] [0.0047] [0.0043] [0.0043] [0.0050] [0.0046] 
sdr_6 0.0061 0.0061 0.0032 0.006 0.0102* 0.0079+ 0.0062 0.0046 0.0038 
  [0.0043] [0.0184] [0.0048] [0.0045] [0.0047] [0.0043] [0.0042] [0.0050] [0.0046] 
sdr_7 0.0072* 0.0069 0.0019 0.0063+ 0.0064+ 0.0079* 0.0062* -0.0007 0.0018 
  [0.0032] [0.0137] [0.0044] [0.0034] [0.0036] [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0047] [0.0043] 
sdr_8 0.0063 0.0068 0.0005 0.0057 0.0068 0.0074 0.0057 -0.0008 0.0006 
  [0.0055] [0.0235] [0.0067] [0.0057] [0.0061] [0.0055] [0.0054] [0.0071] [0.0065] 
sdr_9 0.0043 0.0041 -0.0053 0.0014 0.0013 0.0048+ 0.0013 -0.0091 -0.0055 
  [0.0029] [0.0125] [0.0052] [0.0031] [0.0035] [0.0029] [0.0029] [0.0056] [0.0050] 
sdr_10 0.0068* 0.0065+ 0.0115* 0.0080* 0.0034 0.0055+ 0.0077* 0.0063 0.0104* 
  [0.0033] [0.0144] [0.0043] [0.0034] [0.0036] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0044] [0.0041] 
sdr_11 -0.0047 -0.0049 -0.0002 -0.0029 -0.0037 -0.0048 -0.0029 -0.0011 -0.0005 
  [0.0036] [0.0157] [0.0041] [0.0036] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0042] [0.0039] 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Variable  OLS Prob FEj  REj FEi REi REiREj FEiFEj REiFEj 
sdr_12 -0.005 -0.0051 -0.0014 -0.0039 -0.0056 -0.0051 -0.0039 -0.0035 -0.0017 
  [0.0036] [0.0157] [0.0039] [0.0035] [0.0038] [0.0036] [0.0036] [0.0043] [0.0039] 
dage -0.0018* -0.0011+ 0.0067+ -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0019* -0.0008 0.0003 0.0058+ 
  [0.0006] [0.0028] [0.0035] [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0007] [0.0013] [0.0034] [0.0030] 
dage2 0 -2.75e-06 -0.0001* 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0001* 
  [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
dsex -0.0084* -0.0076* 0 -0.0129* -0.0099* -0.0093* -0.0123* 0.9914 -0.3071* 
  [0.0019] [0.0077] . [0.0045] [0.0041] [0.0020] [0.0043] [72.4363] [0.1285] 
psex -0.0039* -0.0038* -0.0042* -0.0041* 0 -0.0027+ -0.0040* 0 -0.0036* 
  [0.0016] [0.0068] [0.0015] [0.0015] . [0.0016] [0.0015] . [0.0015] 
exempt -0.0146 -0.0146 0.0054 0.0003 0.0151 -0.0121 -0.0016 0.0102 0.0048 
  [0.0143] [0.0603] [0.0160] [0.0158] [0.0284] [0.0145] [0.0137] [0.0292] [0.0145] 
se 0.0047 0.0060 -0.0009 0.0023 0.0225 0.0092 0.0042 -0.0178 -0.0071 
  [0.0068] [0.0298] [0.0189] [0.0109] [0.0179] [0.0070] [0.0108] [0.0369] [0.0180] 
seexempt 0.0225 0.0208 0.0048 0.0098 0.0075 0.0204 0.0115 0.0144 0.0056 
  [0.0144] [0.0608] [0.0161] [0.0159] [0.0285] [0.0146] [0.0138] [0.0293] [0.0146] 
lastvisit 0.0041* 0.0033* 0.0042* 0.0042* 0.0033* 0.0040* 0.0041* 0.0032* 0.0040* 
  [0.0001] [0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] 
clpery -0.0004* -0.0005* -0.0002* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0004* -0.0003* -0.0003* -0.0002* 
  [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
page 0.0007* 0.0019* 0.0013* 0.0012* 0.0057* 0.0011* 0.0013* 0.0038* 0.0014* 
  [0.0003] [0.0014] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0018] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0018] [0.0003] 
page2 -0.0000* -4.39e-05* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0001* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* -0.0000* 
  [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0000] 
_cons 0.2493* -0.7864* 0.6551* 0.2011* 0.0873 0.2412* 0.2080* 0.6298* 0.8006* 
  [0.0218] [0.0868] [0.1044] [0.0403] [0.1130] [0.0224] [0.0424] [0.2626] [0.1622] 
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Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
  OLS Prob FEj  REj FEi REi REiREj FEiFEj REiFEj 
F 419.773   1.39E+11   168.247     325.479   
r2_o     0.069376 0.085056 0.069407 0.085663   0.061851 0.129037 
r2_w     0.07489 0.074768 0.046 0.045012   0.069975 0.059777 
r2_b     0.067921 0.217904 0.120537 0.165528   0.093857 0.252472 
N 286843 286843 286843 286843 286843 286843 286843 286843 286843 
N_g     2335 2335 60370 60370   60370 60370 
g_avg     122.845 122.845 4.751416 4.751416   4.751416 4.751416 
sigma_u     0.145385 0.088804 0.25675 0.125088   0.276972 0.102012 
sigma_e     0.352358 0.352359 0.346194 0.346195   0.343566 0.343565 
rho     0.145477 0.059724 0.354849 0.115477   0.393906 0.081019 
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Models 3 (FEj) and 4 (REj) are specifications that attempt to control for only 
unobserved dentist heterogeneity.  Model 3 results are from the fixed effects 
specification and an F test that all dentist specific effects are 0 is rejected i.e. ( , )j i k  
= 0: F (2334, 284459) = 6.13  Prob>F = 0.000.  An F test that all explanatory 
variables are jointly equal to zero is also rejected.  Model 4 treats the dentist specific 
effects as random.  A 2  test shows that the coefficients are jointly significant i.e. 
2  (50) = 8347.8 Prob> 2  = 0.000.  This model is more efficient, though possibly 
inconsistent given the underlying assumptions about the error term and explanatory 
variables. 
Rho (ρ) is a measure of the fraction of the variation in the error term that is 
due to the individual effects.  In random effects models, these individual effects are 
estimated as  part of the error term and can therefore give some indication of the 
proportion of the variation in radiographs that can be attributed to, in this case, the 
dentist effects.  It shows that approximately 6% (ρ = 0.06) of the variation in the 
likelihood of getting a radiograph is accounted for by the dentist specific time 
invariant effects, say for example practice style.  The interpretation of ρ in fixed 
effects models is more complicated as the estimates of the variance in individual 
effects can also be picking up the effects of any time invariant variables, so the ρ 
reported in the dentist fixed effects model cannot give a similar indication of the 
influence of individual effects on the overall variation.     
A Hausman test is performed to compare the two specifications.  This is a 
specification test that tests the difference in coefficients between the fixed and 
random effects models.  In this case the hypothesis that coefficients are the same is 
rejected and the fixed effects model is preferred.  If the no correlation assumption 
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did hold then the subset of coefficients that are estimated by the fixed effects 
estimator and the same coefficients estimated by the random effects estimator would 
not statistically differ.
51
 
Models 5 (FEi) and 6 (REi) are similar to models 3 and 4, with the difference 
being that these specifications now consider and control for only the unobserved 
patient heterogeneity.  An F test that all patient fixed effects are equal to zero is 
rejected
52
, as is an F test that all explanatory variables are equal to zero (F = 222.81).  
The random effects specification, model 6 shows that almost 12% of the variation in 
the chances of getting a radiograph can be accounted for by unobserved patient 
heterogeneity ( ρ = 0.115).  Again a Hausman test of the two specifications suggests 
that fixed effects are preferred.
53
  
The multilevel or 3-way error components specifications, models 7-9 attempt 
to control for both unobserved dentist and patient heterogeneity.  Model 7 (REiREj) 
treats both effects as random and includes them as part of the error term.  The 
variance terms associated with both the dentist and patient random-effects 
parameters are significantly different from zero and suggest that dentist specific 
effects account for 7.8% of the variance in the error term and patient specific effects 
account for 6.2% of the variance.   The remaining two specifications are estimated 
using the FEiLSDVj method, where dummy variables are included for each dentist.  
Model 8 (FEiFEj) treats the individual characteristics as fixed effects.  F tests show 
the dentist and patient specific effects are both individually and jointly significantly 
                                                 
51
 For more information on the Hausman specification test refer to Baltagi (2001) pp65-72 
52
 i =0: F(60369, 226424) = 1.38  Prob>F = 0.000 
53
 H0: difference in coefficients is not systematic, 
2  (45) = 768.15  Prob> 2  = 0.0000.   
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different from zero.
54
  The results also give an indication of their importance in 
explaining the overall variation in the use of radiographs.  They suggest that as much 
as 22.5% can be attributed to the patient fixed effects, whilst only 5.2% of the 
variation in radiograph provision is due to individual dentist fixed effects.
55
  The 
final model also includes dummy variables for the dentists but treats the patient 
effects as random (REiFEj).  It suggests that approximately 7% of the variation in 
the use of radiographs is accounted for by patient effects (ρ = 0.069).   
This study aims to account for the variation in and the determinants of the 
use of radiographs across dentists in Scotland by trying to control for both observed 
and unobserved factors.  There are two key observable factors to be considered, 
namely the contract type of the dentist and the exemption status of the patient at the 
time of treatment.  The interaction between these two variables is also of interest.  A 
summary of the remaining coefficients across the different model specifications is 
provided before considering these in more detail.  
A number of broad treatment categories have been included in the 
regressions in order to try and take account of a patients underlying need for dental 
treatment or overall dental condition.  They help to capture the influence of other 
treatments on the probability of getting a radiograph.  It might be the case that 
patients with a greater need receive lots of different treatments and so are more likely 
to receive a radiograph.  These variables in a sense try to control for different types 
of patients.  The results show that on the whole, coefficients for the majority of the 
                                                 
54
 F-test that patient and dentist effects are equal to zero: F(62669, 224125) = 1.44 Prob> F = 0.000 
    F-test that patient effects are equal to zero: F(60368, 224125) = 1.24 Prob> F = 0.000 
    F-test that dentist effects are equal to zero: F(2300, 224125) = 2.51 Prob> F = 0.000 
55
 These figures are obtained from estimating model 8 using Stata’s felsdvreg command.  This is 
simply a memory saving way to compute the FEiLSDVj estimates and give equivalent results.  For 
more information see Cornelissen (2008a). 
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treatment categories, across all model specifications are significant.  The main 
exception to this is in the case of preventative care, which although has the same sign 
and magnitude across models, the significance varies in no apparent pattern.  
Coefficient estimates on prosthetic and orthodontic are not significant in fixed 
effects models.  Patients receiving these types of treatment are also less likely to 
receive a radiograph.  Although this may at first sight seem odd, it could be that for 
these types of treatment, radiographs of a different/more complicated nature are 
required and not the most basic small film radiograph (code2a1), considered in this 
study.   
The variables, caid1-caid14 are dummy variable indicators that give an 
indication as to the particular Health Board the dental practice belongs to, and hence 
can act as some geographical indicator.  The coefficients on these give a measure of 
the probability of getting a radiograph in a practice within a particular health board, 
compared to being treated in a practice in health board 15 (the omitted category).  
The results show that in all models, patients treated in a practice residing in health 
board 15 are more likely to receive a radiograph than patients treated in practices in 
all other health boards, with the only single exception being in model 5 (FEi), where 
patients treated in health board 15 are less likely to receive a radiograph than patients 
being treated in health board 12.  The magnitudes of the coefficients are larger in 
models that control for dentist and patient specific effects, with significantly larger 
estimates in model FEiFEj that controls for both.  The estimates are mostly 
significant, though the standard errors are relatively large.  It is difficult to draw any 
firm conclusions about this impact as the health boards are anonymous in the data 
sample, although given the trend that patients are always less likely to receive a 
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radiograph compared to the reference group (health board 15), perhaps this could 
indicate that the reference is one of the larger boards with potentially more deprived 
areas.   
The coefficients on the deprivation categories follow no obvious pattern 
across models.  In most cases the results suggest that as the level of deprivation 
increases (moving from depcat 2-7) patients are less likely to receive a radiograph 
than those patients treated in practices residing in the least deprived area.  However, 
the coefficients are small in magnitude and are in the most part not significant.  The 
coefficient estimates change sign from being negative when dentist fixed effects are 
controlled for alone, to positive when just patient fixed effects are controlled.  In 
other words once unobserved patient heterogeneity has been accounted for; patients 
treated in more deprived areas are more likely to receive a radiograph than those 
treated in the least deprived area.  However when both patient and dentist fixed 
effects are included in the model (FEiFEj), the sign reverts back to negative.  
The sdr dummies are included to capture changes that might occur over time 
as the statement of dental remuneration is revised, for example dentists’ decisions 
may be influenced if the revisions impact on the magnitude of net marginal benefits.  
There is no set time at which these changes occur but in this sample they are at 
approximately 6 monthly intervals.  The omitted category, sdr1 represents the fee 
scale in operation at the beginning of the sample period and all effects are relative to 
this.  The coefficients on all sdr variables across all specifications are small and not 
significantly different from sdr1.  The only exception to this is sdr10 where the 
coefficients are mostly significant across models, but still relatively small in 
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magnitude.  This might suggest that changes in the fee scale over time have had little 
impact on the likelihood of dentists giving and patients receiving radiographs. 
Standard age and gender controls are also included to further account for 
different types of dentist and patient.  In the case of patients, across all specifications 
that can estimate these
56
, the age and gender controls (page, psex) are both 
significant and of similar magnitudes and directions.  The results suggest that in 
general female patients are slightly more likely to receive a radiograph than their 
male counterparts.  The chances of getting a radiograph increase with patient age, 
although at a decreasing rate.  This chance will continue to increase up to around the 
age of 40-50 (dependent on the model specification), then decreases.  The magnitude 
of this effect is greater in models that control for patient specific effects.   
For dentists, again the results relating to gender are significant and suggest 
that female dentists are slightly more likely (approx 1%) to give radiographs than 
males.  The results relating to dentist age suggest that the likelihood of giving 
radiographs is decreasing with age; however the results are not significant. 
  A final variable included in the regression model, believed to perhaps impact 
on the chances of receiving a radiograph, is the time that has passed from a patient’s 
last visit to a dentist, lastvisit.  The estimated models show a consistent and 
significant result across all model specifications and indicate that as the length of 
time between dental visits increases, so too does the likelihood that a radiograph will 
be given.  As already noted earlier, the nature of this variable means that all patients’ 
first visits are excluded from the sample and therefore those with only one visit are 
excluded.  By design, these patients would have been excluded anyway in the fixed 
                                                 
56
 Note that psex will be dropped in models 5 and 8 due to the fixed effects transformation 
 156 
 
 
 
effects models; however it is important to point out that, given the nature of the fixed 
effects transformation, those patients with only two visits are completely identified 
by their fixed effect.  This means that it is not possible to separate out the 
relationship between other patient characteristics and radiograph behaviour, thus it is 
not possible to learn very much about the group of patients that tend to visit the 
dentist less often.  The fixed effects estimates relate only to those patients with 3 or 
more courses of treatment in the sample.    
5.3.4.2 Key Coefficients 
In trying to account for the variation in the use of dental radiographs, one of 
the main concerns is the impact of the contract structure of the dentist. Another is the 
impact of demand side cost sharing i.e. whether a patient pays for their treatment or 
not.  These effects can be estimated directly using the se and exempt variables, 
respectively.  These will indicate if patients are more or less likely to receive 
radiographs if they are treated by a self employed dentist as opposed to a salaried 
dentist and if the fact that they pay (or not) for their treatment has any bearing on the 
treatment they receive.  The inclusion of the interaction variable se*exempt in the 
model specifications means that a difference-in-difference estimator is also 
considered to assess the indirect impact of contract type, given exemption status.  
Before considering these key results, it is useful to recall the general model 
specification presented in section 5.3.2 above i.e.   
                                                      (5.3.4)  
  The inclusion of the interaction term in the model means that the 
interpretation of the coefficient estimates on the se and exempt variables i.e. ρ and η 
respectively is not one of the overall impact of dental contract and exemption status 
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on the likelihood of receiving a radiograph.  Essentially this only illustrates part of 
the overall picture.  The coefficient estimates ρ, for example, show the impact of the 
dental contract for non-exempt patients only.  Similarly the estimates η show the 
impact of exemption status for salaried dentists only   In order to obtain the true 
impact of dental contract and patient exemption status, it is necessary to combine the 
estimates of ρ and η with δ (the coefficient of the interaction variable seexempt).  
ρ+δ is therefore the impact of the dental contract for exempt patients, and η+δ is the 
impact of exemption status for self-employed dentists.   
  Delta (δ) on its own can be classified as a difference-in-difference estimator 
and can be interpreted in two ways.  It can either been seen as capturing the 
difference in the impact of contract type on the probability of getting a radiograph 
for exempt patients compared to non-exempt patients, or as capturing the difference 
in the impact of exemption status on the chances of giving a radiograph for self-
employed dentists compared to salaried dentists.  The latter of the two may be more 
relevant or intuitive than the first.  It suggests that a positive δ implies that self-
employed dentists are more sensitive to whether or not the patient pays for treatment 
or not i.e. they may give more radiographs to exempt patients than salaried dentists 
would.   
Table 5.15 below presents a summary of the coefficient estimates across the model 
specifications of interest.
57
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 The results from the fixed effects specifications only are given, since they were always preferred 
over the random effects models  
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Table 5.15: Key Coefficient Results 
η (exempt) (η+δ) ρ (se) (ρ+δ) δ (se*exempt)
OLS -0.0146 0.0079** 0.0047 0.0272* 0.0225
FEj 0.0054 0.0102** -0.0009 0.0039 0.0048
FEi 0.0151 0.0227** 0.0225 0.0300 0.0075
FEiFEj 0.0102 0.0247** -0.0178 -0.0034 0.0144
* Significance at the 5% level
** Significance at the 1% level
 
 The results in Table 5.15 show a positive impact of exemption status on the 
likelihood of giving a radiograph for both self-employed and salaried dentists.  The 
figures suggest that when a patient changes from being non-exempt and therefore 
paying for treatment, to being exempt and no longer having to pay, they are more 
likely to be given a radiograph (as indicated by estimates of η and η+δ).  A self-
employed dentist will be between 1 and 2.5% more likely to give a radiograph, 
whereas a salaried dentist will be between 0.5 and 1.5% more likely to provide a 
radiograph, although in the case of a salaried dentist, the estimates are not 
significant.  The magnitudes of the coefficients across model specifications also 
suggest that the patient fixed effects are important and should be considered.  Models 
that control only for individual dentist specific effects are likely to result in 
coefficient estimates that are biased downward. 
  The results to analyse the impact of the dental contract on patients, captured 
by the estimates of ρ and ρ+δ, do not give a clear message across the different 
specifications, and none are in fact significant.  Some models show a positive 
relationship, whilst others show a negative relationship.  The magnitudes of the 
coefficients across specifications, however, do again show the importance of 
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controlling for both dentist and patient individual effects.  In this case the importance 
of the dentist fixed effects is highlighted, as by not including them and modelling 
only patient effects, would give coefficient estimates that are likely to be biased 
upwards.   
  If it is assumed that the 3-way fixed effects error components model is to be 
‘preferred’, then these results would indicate that when a dentist changes from being 
on a salaried contract to being self-employed, they are less likely to provide 
radiographs, regardless of whether or not the patient pays for their treatment or not.  
However, if the patient was exempt, they would be only 0.03% less likely to receive 
a radiograph, compared to being almost 2% less likely to receive a radiograph if they 
were a fee paying patient.  This could again suggest that it is the self-employed 
dentists that are more influenced by whether or not a patient pays for treatment.  This 
point is reiterated with the positive values of the difference-in-difference estimator, 
δ.   
 This interpretation does have to be treated with some caution given the 
insignificance of the estimates.  It is very possible that the estimates are not well 
defined due to the lack of mobility in the sample.  For the contract effects to be 
separately identified there has to be movement in the sample and a number of 
dentists would have to switch between contracts, and also treat a significant number 
of patients under both contracts.  The precision of these effects is dependent on the 
number of movers and given this is only a small percentage; it is possible that the 
estimates are not well defined, hence the insignificant results.  The strict exogeneity 
assumption of the model also means that there should be no endogenous moves of 
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dentists from one contract to the other.  If this assumption is not valid then the results 
are also likely to be biased. 
 Perhaps if there was more confidence about these estimates in the first 
instance, a further robustness check might be to estimate the probability that dentists 
change contract to see if there are any differences between self-employed dentists 
and salaried dentists.  If there is evidence to suggest that they are different, dentists 
may be of a particular ‘type’ who are choosing to switch contracts, then this may 
have an influence on the estimated results.  If this were the case, this would warrant 
further investigation to explore whether or not there are selection effects.  Is it the 
case that dentists have a particular characteristic that makes them choose to change 
contract and is this impacting on the results?  
   There can be more confidence about the estimates regarding the impact of 
exemption status, as there are significantly more patients in the sample switching 
between being a payer and non-payer of dental treatment. 
5.3.4.3 Dentist and Patient Fixed Effects 
 The results presented in Table 5.15 above highlight the importance of 
controlling for both dentist and patient unobserved time invariant effects in the 
model.  As discussed in Chapter 3, AKM (1999) demonstrated that excluding either 
of these effects will result in what is equivalent to omitted variable bias.  From Table 
5.10, when considering the impact of exemption status, the importance of the patient 
unobserved heterogeneity becomes apparent, i.e. when only dentist heterogeneity is 
controlled for (FEj model), the estimates may exhibit downward bias.  Similarly, the 
importance of controlling for dentist unobserved heterogeneity is clear when 
considering the impact of the dental contract on the use of radiographs.  In this 
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instance, models which control for only patient effects will give estimates that are 
likely to be biased upwards (see FEi model in Table 5.15).  To try and eliminate any 
possible bias in the estimates, it is therefore necessary to use models that can control 
for both dentist and patient unobserved effects, as in the 3-way fixed effects error 
component model (FEiFEj). 
 The aim of this analysis was to try and not only identify, but also quantify 
potential sources of variation in the use of dental radiographs.  The results presented 
above indicate the importance of not only observed factors but also the unobserved 
factors in contributing to the observed variation in radiograph provision.  A key 
feature of the models chosen in this study is that they not only allow the researcher to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity but also to recover and analyse estimates of 
both the dentist and patient unobserved factors, thus giving a measure of actually 
how much they contribute to the observed variation.   
 The papers by Andrews et al (2006) and AKM (1999) demonstrate how the 
identification of the individual effects is only possible within groups – where groups 
are defined by, in this case, movement of patients between dentists.  Each group will 
therefore exhibit patient mobility within it but not between groups.   It is therefore 
only possible to compare the individual fixed effects within a group.  It is also worth 
noting not all the dentist effects are identified i.e. no dentist effect will be identified 
in the case where no patients move between dentists and also within each sub group 
one dentist effect will act as the reference, with all other dentist effects being 
expressed as differences from this.  Table 5.16 below shows the groups of dentists 
connected by mobility in the data sample.  
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Table 5.16: Groups of Dentists Connected by Patient Mobility 
Group Claims Patients Movers Dentists
0 224 77 0 32
1 286,608 60,286 19,242 2299
2 7 4 1 2
3 4 3 1 2
Total 286,843 60,370 19,244 2335   
 This shows that in this particular sample of dentists and patients there are 
only 3 groups where individual effects are identified.  Group 1 contains the majority 
of the sample, whilst the other two groups are very small in comparison.  Group 1 
has 60,286 patients, where approximately 32% switch between 2299 dentists.  
Groups 2 and 3 are made up of only 2 dentists, with 1 patient moving between them.  
Given that most of the sample data falls into the same group, only group 1 fixed 
effect estimates are considered further.   
 These estimates are used to construct Figures 5.9 and 5.10 below, which plot 
the distribution of the dentist and patient fixed effects recovered from the estimation 
of the 3-way fixed effects error component model
58
.  These distributions plot the 
percentage of dentists/patients that are more or less likely to provide/receive a 
radiograph compared to the reference dentist/patient, having controlled for all other 
observed characteristics of patients and dentists.  They clearly illustrate the variation 
that exists across both dentists and patients and are useful at showing that all dentists 
and all patients do not behave in the same way.  There are some dentists that behave 
similar to the reference dentist; however there are some dentists that behave very 
                                                 
58
 Note that the distributions of the dentist and patient fixed effects should be treated with some 
caution.  For more information refer to page 166.  Dentist fixed effects have been plotted for dentists 
with 50 or more movers (i.e. patients what have seen at least 1 other dentist) and the patient fixed 
effects have been plotted for patients with 10 observations or more. 
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differently and will nearly always be less likely to provide a radiograph.  This 
provides some support for the idea that unobserved individual characteristics specific 
to the dentist may make them behave quite differently to most other dentists.  The 
results cannot say what these differences are, simply that they might exist.  It may 
simply be due to time invariant dentist preferences which results in a given practice 
style.   
Figure 5.9: Distribution of Dentist Fixed Effects 
  
 The same idea is true in the case of the patient fixed effects, presented in 
Figure 5.10.  There are patients who are more likely to receive a radiograph 
compared to the reference patient, and those which are less likely to receive a 
radiograph.  Again it is difficult to say what the actual driver of this variation is, but 
it is clear that after controlling for other characteristics such as age, gender and 
whether the patient pays for treatment or not there are still differences that exist 
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across patients that result in different treatment patterns.  This may be due to the 
underlying oral health of a patient, where some kind of ‘need’ warrants more 
radiographs, or in the case of those who get less radiographs, it may be due to a 
higher understanding or knowledge of the potential harmful effects from exposure to 
radiation, and there may be some resistance to being given an radiograph.    
 
Figure 5.10: Distribution of Patient Fixed Effects 
 
 The empirical results presented in section 5.3.4.1 provide evidence to show 
that the dentist and patient fixed effects are both individually and jointly significant 
(p < 0.01).  The model also provides information on the contribution of each effect to 
the observed variation in the probability of getting a radiograph.  It suggests that the 
unobserved time invariant heterogeneity of dentists accounts for 5.2% of observed 
variation in the provision of radiographs, whilst as much as 22.5% of the variation 
can be explained by the unobserved time invariant patient effects.  This suggests that 
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patient variation is much more important in explaining total variation than dentist 
variation.  This is a similar result to that found in both the labour and education 
literatures.   
 It is also possible to obtain an indication of the correlation between the 
patient and dentist fixed effects.  AKM (1999) considered this in the context of 
workers and firms and asked the question, ‘Do High Wage Firms Employ High 
Wage Workers’.  This can give some indication about the match between workers 
and firms, or in this case, dentists and patients.  Is it the case that dentists with a high 
probability of providing a radiograph treat patients with a high probability of 
receiving a radiograph?  The correlation between the two sets of fixed effects can 
help answer this.  The results from the model show a small negative correlation (-
0.3).  This is a similar result to that found by AKM and it is not entirely intuitive.  
This suggests that, on average patients with a high probability of getting a 
radiograph sort themselves among dentists in such a way that they are treated by 
dentists who are less likely to provide radiographs.  Woodcock (2008) proposes that 
these results of negative correlation are the result of bias in the estimated dentist and 
patient fixed effects.  Woodcock proposes that match effects have to be included in 
the model specification to correct for this bias; otherwise estimates that omit match 
effects may be misleading.  Woodcock demonstrates that the results found by AKM 
(1999) are overturned when the model specification controls for match effects.  This 
presents an avenue for future work. 
 These results on the patient and dentist fixed effects should be treated with 
some degree of caution, given the way these individual effects are identified and 
determined.  The unobserved patient effects are identified by multiple observations 
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per patient, whilst the unobserved dentist effects are identified when there is mobility 
in the sample.  The precision of these estimates are therefore a function of the 
number of observations per patient and the number of movers in the sample.  The 
section on identification above (5.3.3) shows that a little over 30% of the patients in 
the sample move between dentists.  It is this movement that allows for the dentist 
effects to be separately identified.  The fact that there are a lot of movers in the 
sample, which does provide some support for the prevision of the estimates; it is 
actually the number of movers per dentist that adds to the accuracy of the results.  
Descriptives on the number of movers per dentist revealed that the numbers range 
from dentists with no movers’ right up to dentists with almost 400 patients who have 
changed dentists, so there is some confidence there about the estimate that 5% of the 
variation in the provision of radiographs can be explained by unobserved dentist 
heterogeneity. 
 The accuracy of the results is also going to be very much dependent on the 
strict exogeneity assumption of the model and whether this holds or not.  The 
descriptive statistics on movers versus non movers suggests that it is unlikely that 
there are large differences between the two groups of patients.  Descriptive stats 
alone, however, cannot give us any indication of the accuracy of our estimates and 
the level of potential bias.  This would have to be done by estimating separate 
models for movers and non movers and then determining if the coefficients are the 
same.  If they are the same, this suggests that the results of the model can be 
generalised to non movers too.  This would also lend support to the exogeneity 
assumption and would imply, for example, in relation to the dentist fixed effects, that 
the estimates of the dentist and/or patient fixed effects are picking up the effects of 
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individual time invariant factors.  For example, the probability of providing a 
radiograph might change as a response to the introduction of a new guideline on the 
provision of radiographs or a sudden trauma/accident that requires radiographs.  
 If it was found that the coefficients were widely different across movers and 
non movers, this would provide less confidence about the accuracy of the estimates 
and you would have to consider that the fixed effects are picking up some 
characteristic of the movers and not solely the time invariant characteristics of 
dentists and patients.  One way of checking this would be to use a spell fixed effects 
estimation (as discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.4.3) and estimate separate models for 
movers and non movers.  This was beyond the scope of this thesis but would be a 
good avenue for further research as it will provide a way of judging the accuracy of 
our estimates.   
 The estimate of 22.5% of total variation being explained by unobserved 
patient heterogeneity may not have the same support, as the sample sizes per patient 
are so small.  Table 5.5 in section 5.2.4.6 illustrated that over 70% of the sample of 
patients have only 6 observations or less (the average number of courses of treatment 
per patient was 5).  This could mean that the precision of the estimated patient fixed 
effects are not as accurate as they could be and the estimate of the contribution to 
overall variation may be compromised, thus 22.5% may not be the true value.  Time 
constraints in this particular analysis meant this problem could not be explored 
further, but it could perhaps be investigated in future work.  A larger random sample 
may help to increase the sample size per patient, or changing the sampling approach 
to oversample patients with many observations might be an option.  This could help 
to improve the accuracy of the estimated individual unobserved patient heterogeneity 
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and hence obtain a better measure of the patient contribution to overall observed 
variation radiograph provision. 
5.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter provides a detailed description of the data to be used, which is 
essentially a matched patient provider dataset, similar to the ones described in 
Chapter 3.  The data is taken from the Management Information and Dental 
Accounting System (MIDAS), a large administrative database used primarily to 
process the payments made to dentists, and contains detailed information of all 
dental treatment carried out and paid for in Scotland.  Key features of the datasets 
become the key requirements for the type of analysis described above.  Patient, 
Dentist and Course of Treatment (CoT) unique identifiers allow for the data to be 
linked and make it possible to track both patients and dentists over time, thus 
enabling estimation of models that can control for both dentist and patient individual 
effects (observed and unobserved). 
 A series of linear models are estimated so as to compare and contrast 
between them, with a view to being able to demonstrate the advantages of the three-
way fixed effects error components model, hence identifying it as the ‘preferred’ 
specification for analyses of this type.  This method resolves the issue of omitted 
variable bias and does allow estimates of the contributions of individual 
heterogeneity (dentist or patient) to the observed variation in the use of radiographs 
to be measured.  Using the estimation framework described in Chapter 3 and the 
model specification presented in Equation (5.3.1) above, fixed effects models for 
three scenarios are estimated.  These include the case with only patient fixed effects, 
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only dentist fixed effects and controlling for both patient and dentist fixed effects.  
The empirical results emphasise the importance of including both in the regression 
model.  From this point, discussions around the other results from the analysis will 
be restricted to the model with both patient and dentist fixed effects (FEiFEj). 
   The aim of this investigation was to analyse the variation in the use of 
radiographs across GDS dentists in Scotland.  This has been done with a view of 
being able to account for both observed and unobserved factors.  Of particular 
interest, was to analyse the impact of economic incentives on the treatment decision.  
The organisational framework in which dental care is provided in Scotland lends 
itself well to this as dentists operate under different remuneration systems and on the 
demand side some patients are fully insured from the cost of treatment.  The results 
lend little support to what is typically found in the literature.  Economists would 
predict that self-interested physicians working under a fee for service contract may 
deliver treatment that might not necessarily be in the best interest of the patient, but 
rather, in part due to some financial gain.  This may be more likely in the case when 
the patient is in some way shielded from the cost of the treatment. 
 The results indicate that the remuneration structure has little or no impact on 
the treatment decision to provide a radiograph.  When a dentist changes from being 
on a fixed salary contract to being paid on a fee-for-service basis, they are less likely 
to give a radiograph.  This is regardless of whether the patient pays for their 
treatment or not.  The results may suggest that the self-employed dentist places some 
weight on whether the patient pays for treatment or not as in the case when they are 
exempt from charges; they wouldn’t be as less likely to give a radiograph than if the 
patient were a fee paying one.  This interpretation has to be treated with some 
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caution given the insignificance of the estimates and the fact that they may not be 
well defined, due to lack of mobility in the sample whereby dentists change 
contracts. 
 In considering the impact of exemption status on the probability of being 
given a radiograph, this is essentially like considering the impact of insurance in 
health care markets.  The nature of the Scottish system means that all patients are to 
some extent insured from the cost of dental care, as fee paying patients only pay 80% 
of the full cost of provision, up to a predetermined maximum (currently £384).  
Exempt patients are therefore fully insured from the cost.  The results given above 
show a significant positive impact of exemption status on the likelihood of giving a 
radiograph for self-employed dentists.  This implies that when the only factor that 
has changed is that the patient went from being a fee paying one to not having to 
pay, self-employed dentists will be more likely to give that patient a radiograph.  In 
fact there is also a positive result for the salaried dentist, though the results are not 
significant.  Again, it appears as if self-employed dentists are more influenced by the 
exemption status of the patient than salaried dentists.  There is more confidence in 
the estimates regarding the impact of exemption as there were significantly more 
patients in the sample switching from being a payer to being fully insured to the cost 
of treatment.   
 The evidence suggests that the fee-for-service payment structure provides no 
real incentive for self-employed dentists to provide more radiographs than salaried 
dentists.  Andersen (2009) analysed the impact of professional norms and economic 
incentives on the behaviour and performance of Danish health care professionals, 
including dentists, GPs and orthopaedic surgeons.  The results suggest that supply 
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side incentives only matter when there are no firm professional norms surrounding a 
given treatment.  If there are, it is likely financial incentives will have little or no 
impact on treatment decisions.  This may be applicable here as radiographs are likely 
to be governed by strict guidelines and practices among the profession – therefore 
dentist behaviour is not influenced by any potential financial gain.  It may also be 
that the potential gains are simply not great enough due to the relatively low cost of 
radiographs. 
 However, it could be argued that when the dentist can identify whether the 
patient pays for treatment or not, the self-employed dentist is motivated to provide 
more radiographs.  It is likely that there will be less resistance from non fee paying 
patients and in a market of asymmetric information the dentist may be able to 
‘induce’ demand.  This approach assumes that ultimately it is the dentist that makes 
the decision about whether to provide radiographs or not.  The result could also 
indicate a change of behaviour on the demand side.  The theory predicts that in the 
presence of insurance in health care markets, patients demand more. (Pauly 1986)  
This result may support this idea and so when a patient no longer has to pay for 
treatment they may ‘demand’ more radiographs.  This might be the case where 
patients are of the opinion that ‘more’ treatment means ‘better’ treatment, and now 
price is not a factor to consider.  The results from the empirical analysis are 
consistent with both explanations. 
 Although the results are consistent with both explanations, there is little 
evidence in the literature to support the idea that patients will ‘demand’ more health 
care (particularly dental treatment).  Given the nature of the dentist/patient 
relationship it is assumed that, even though the decision to treat may be a joint 
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decision, the most influence comes from the dentist side, in the form of the dentist 
being able to learn about the characteristics of patients and make a treatment 
decision accordingly. 
The first stage in the decision about whether to provide a radiograph comes 
from the dentist in relation to whether or not there is a clinical need to provide one – 
given it is the dentist who is much more informed about the oral health of the patient.  
Once this decision has been made then it is possible that other patient characteristics 
become important, but again only in so far as that the dentist will consider them 
when making the treatment decision.  From the discussion presented in Chapter 3 
(section 3.5.2) some of the other factors that are likely to impact on the treatment 
decision are: 
o When did the patient last visit and did they have radiographs taken 
o Does the patient pay for their dental treatment 
o Are there constraints about actually doing a radiograph, for example, 
is the patient pregnant, is there time to do one, do are there many 
patients waiting? 
There are both characteristics of the patient and the practice that the dentist 
takes into account when making the decision to provide a radiograph
59
.  The decision 
is also influenced by the characteristics of the individual dentist, for example their 
practice style, opportunity cost of providing the radiograph (is there other treatments 
they could be doing that may be of more financial benefit to them or given there is a 
busy waiting room, will the decision to provide a radiograph impact on waiting 
times).   
                                                 
59
 For a more detailed discussion, refer back to Chapter 3, pp 57-60  
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 The impact of remuneration contract and exemption status of the patient are 
two easily measured observable characteristics.  A key component of this analysis 
was to consider the impact of unobservable characteristics on the probability of 
getting a radiograph.  It is well established that unobserved individual heterogeneity 
needs to be taken into account in analyses like this.  Often there are characteristics 
that are specific to either the patient or the dentist that cannot be easily measured, but 
will help to explain the observed variation in treatment.  The estimation method used 
here allows the researcher to control for this in the model, but also enables an 
estimate of each contribution to be obtained.  The results show that 5.2% of the 
observed variation in the use of radiographs is due to unobserved individual dentist 
effects, whilst the unobserved individual patient effects explain 22.5% of the 
variation in radiograph provision.  The distributions of the dentist and patient fixed 
effects highlight the fact that the group of dentists in the sample behave very 
differently, as do the group of patients in the sample.  The results show that there is 
widespread variation across dentists when it comes to the likelihood of a course of 
treatment containing a radiograph, because there is widespread variation in the types 
of patients that dentists treat.  These differences are mainly unobservable and are 
likely to reflect patients’ underlying oral health need and their preferences and 
attitudes. 
 The overarching aim of this study was to try to account for the widespread 
variation in the use of radiographs across dentists in Scotland (illustrated in Figure 
5.1).  Many studies in the field of health services variation have identified the 
existence of variation at many levels of the health care organisation, however not 
many have tried to explain the variation.  This analysis identifies a number of 
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potential sources of variation and attaches a measure against each one.  Demand and 
supply variables (both observed and unobserved) are included in the regression 
model and the results show that the variation can be explained by four contributing 
factors: 
 Dentist Fixed Effects  5.2% 
 Patient Fixed Effects  22.5% 
 Explanatory Variables 7.2% 
 The Residual   65.1% 
This information highlights the importance of patient heterogeneity as opposed to 
heterogeneity across dentists, a result that is also found in the labour and education 
literature.     
The discussion above highlights that there are a number of characteristics, 
some observable, others not, that are likely to impact on the decision to provide an 
radiograph.  Unfortunately, it has not been possible to include some of these 
desirable characteristics, particularly a measure of the clinical need of the patient, 
which is possibly central to the decision making process.  Although a number of 
treatment categories are included in the regression models, as a way to try and 
account for a patient’s oral health, it is possible that this is not capturing the true 
effect (given the low level of explanation of the dependent variable in all 
specifications).   
It might also have been better to include a variable to capture the level of 
experience of the dentist (maybe how long in practice, qualifications etc.) and where 
they trained to capture any practice style effects.  Practice effects have also been 
identified as being important in the treatment decision and again they have not been 
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considered separately in this model. The model in its current form is not separately 
identifying practice effects from the dentist effects, but in theory another level could 
be added to the estimating equation.  Unfortunately, this will add a further level of 
complexity to what is already a complex model.  In order to be able to identify the 
practice effects, dentists would have to move between practices.  Although it is 
possible to identify dentists at the practice level in the MIDAS dataset, the extraction 
taken for this study does not contain any practice identifier.  This approach may 
therefore represent an avenue for further research.  
The analysis of the number of courses of treatment per patient that contained 
a radiograph (by way of the negative binomial regression) indicated that the 
probability of being provided a radiograph is positively associated with the number 
of courses of treatment that a patient has had.  Patients who move dentists are also 
more likely to receive a radiograph straight after a move.  These are important 
factors that are potentially not being picked up or are more difficult to see in the 
three way error components specification. 
Although the model is likely to not be capturing all the factors that influence 
the variation in the provision of a dental radiograph, it is clear that patient 
characteristics are much more important in the treatment decision process, even if 
the final decision to provide the radiograph ultimately in most circumstances lies 
with the dentist. 
If this is a true reflection of the decision making process, then there is support 
for my results in relation to the contribution of the variation being better explained 
by patient variation than variation across dentists. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Main Conclusions and Implications for Policy 
 This chapter presents a summary of the main conclusions of the thesis and 
identifies potential avenues for further research.  The implications of the findings are 
discussed in the context of economic incentives and unobserved patient and provider 
heterogeneity, and what this means for policy. 
 There is little doubt about the existence of variation in health care markets.  
In a literature spanning more than 60 years, it has been documented at all levels of 
the health care delivery process.  Widespread variations are often considered to be a 
problem and raise questions about efficiency, equity and quality of care, in health 
care sectors facing ever increasing costs.  There is wide recognition among 
governments and providers of health care (and insurance) of the importance of being 
able to identify the sources of variation, with a view to then being able to reduce it.   
 The idea that ‘cause dictates the remedy’ is certainly true in the case of 
medical practice variations.  If the source and underlying cause of the variation can 
be identified, then governments and health care professionals are better placed to 
remedy the problem.  For example, if the main driver of the variation is due to an 
underuse of known ‘effective’ care, this suggests that there may be patients who 
should be receiving a given treatment that are not.  Ways to tackle this type of 
variation can include better guidelines surrounding clinical treatments, matched with 
some effort to ensure compliance with these guidelines.  In the case where variation 
is driven by supply-sensitive services, a potential way to eliminate or reduce the 
variation is to re-design the payment system, from one which rewards ‘over’ care to 
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one which rewards quality care.  A policy of this type is now used within the NHS in 
England, by way of the Payment by Results framework. 
 The literature reveals a range of determinants that can aid explaining 
variation, all operating and interacting in a complex system.  In the absence of a 
relevant theoretical model that can adequately capture these interactions, a slightly 
different approach to motivate the empirical analysis is adopted.   
 In the field of economics, the theoretical model is seen as a construct or 
conceptual framework that represents some real world economic process, by way of 
a set of variables and a set of logical relationships between them.  They are most 
often designed to illustrate complex processes in a simple abstract way.  The role of 
the empirical analysis is to then ‘test’ the proposed relationships of the theoretical 
model using real world data.  In principal this all sounds straightforward and for 
many applications in economics this is a suitable framework for analysis.  The 
problems lie when the theoretical models cannot and do not reflect the real world 
process under investigation.  It is fair to say that a theoretical model is only useful to 
the extent that it mirrors the relationship it plans to describe. 
 In practice, in the real world there are many complexities to consider, and 
many of which are unobserved.  In these situations Baker and Hubbard (2001) 
suggest that empirical testing strategies can follow one of two options; “...either 
attempt to test the theory in the specific context of the theorist or look for other 
implications suggested by a more general application of the theory’s main ideas”.  
This implies that one way to approach the empirical study is to use existing 
theoretical strands of the literature applied in the given context under study and to 
then generate some testable propositions.  This is the approach that has been adopted 
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for this thesis.  A number of theoretical models that have been used to explain 
physician behaviour have been considered and the ideas taken to motivate an 
empirical framework in which the variation in the use of dental radiographs can be 
analysed.  This approach allows for a number of hypotheses to be tested using the 
data. 
 Gaynor et al. (2001) conducted research to study the effects of physician 
incentives within organisations (HMOs).  They identified that in order to conduct 
research of this nature, it relies on three key elements; one is detailed knowledge of 
the institutional context and the particular incentive scheme within; second is a 
model of behaviour that is tailored to this institutional setting and thirdly; rich 
detailed data drawn from within the organisation, on the outcomes under study.  
They argue that without all three elements, “...the ability to draw inferences about 
the incentive system would have been limited”.  Essentially this study provides a 
research setting similar to the one described by Gaynor et al. (2001).  The discussion 
above, and that given in Chapter 3 on the empirical model, indicates that the model 
chosen is appropriate to the context.  Chapter 4 of the thesis provides the detailed 
knowledge of the institutional context, and rich detailed data on the outcome (use of 
dental radiographs) is used in the empirical analysis. 
 Empirical studies that assess variation in health care often fail to produce 
satisfactory measurements of the actual contributions from different sources.  This 
may be due to the fact that to actually achieve this, it requires a large amount of 
suitable data, with a particular structure, and estimation methods that can model the 
data in the correct way.  This thesis presents an empirical framework from which this 
can be achieved.  Much of the information has been borrowed from the field of 
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labour economics where this type of framework has been developing over many 
years.  It makes use of recent advances in micro-econometric modelling techniques 
and demonstrates how using such methods can lead to a better analysis of the 
variation in treatment decisions and/or outcomes in the field of health economics, by 
being able to control for and measure unobserved individual patient heterogeneity 
and unobserved individual provider heterogeneity at the same time. 
 The empirical analysis uses Scottish dental data (a matched patient provider 
dataset), taken from the Management and Information Dental Accounting System 
(MIDAS) to estimate a series of models to explain and account for the variation in 
the provision of dental radiographs.  Fixed effects models are preferred to random 
effects models and estimation with fixed effects for dentists and patients is preferred 
to models that exclude one or the other.  The model that includes both sets of fixed 
effects resolves the issue of omitted variable bias and allows for the separate 
contributions of individual heterogeneity (dentist or patient) to observed variation to 
be measured. 
 A review of the theoretical literature on incentives and physician agency 
helped to identify a number of hypotheses that could be tested to account for the 
variation in the provision of radiographs across GDS dentists in Scotland.  On the 
most part these hypotheses are analysing the impact of economic incentives on the 
treatment decision, whilst hypothesis 4 considers the impact of individual dentist and 
patient heterogeneity and how much these factors impact on the treatment outcome.  
The results provide some support for what has previously been found in the 
literature, but only under certain conditions.  Economists would predict that under a 
fee-for-service remuneration contract, there is an incentive to provide treatment that 
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might be motivated by financial gains for the dentist, and not by what is in the best 
interest of the patient.  The results indicate that the remuneration contract of the 
dentist alone has little or no impact on the decision to provide a radiograph.  When a 
dentist changes from being on a fixed salary contract to being paid on a fee-for-
service basis, they are in fact less likely to give a radiograph, although the results are 
not significant.  However, the result is reversed in the presence of insurance.  This 
can be defined as the case when the patient is exempt from the patient charge.  In this 
instance the results are positive and significant (across all fixed effects model 
specifications) for self employed fee for service dentists, who thus are more likely to 
give a radiograph.  This result provides some support to what has been previously 
found in the literature i.e. financial incentives can impact on treatment decisions.     
 It is likely that there will be less resistance from non fee paying patients and 
in a market of asymmetric information the dentist may be able to ‘induce’ demand.  
This approach assumes that ultimately it is the dentist that makes the decision about 
whether to provide a radiograph or not.  Another way of looking at this result is to 
consider the result as indicating a change in behaviour on the demand side.  The 
theory predicts that in the presence of insurance in health care markets, patients will 
demand more care, so when a patient no longer has to pay for treatment they may 
‘demand’ more radiographs.  This might be the case where patients are of the 
opinion that ‘more’ treatment means ‘better’ treatment, and now price is not a factor 
they have to consider.  The results are consistent with both explanations; however 
given the information asymmetry evident in most health care markets, it could be 
argued that most patients will consume the care as recommended by their physician 
(Zweifel & Manning 2000). 
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 A key component of this analysis was to consider the impact of unobservable 
characteristics on the probability of getting a radiograph.  It is well established that 
unobserved individual heterogeneity needs to be taken into account in analyses like 
this.  Often there are characteristics that are specific to either the patient (underlying 
oral health, aversion to dentist) or the dentist (practice style factors) that cannot be 
easily measured, but will help to explain the observed variation in treatment.  The 
results highlight the importance of accounting for both unobserved patient and 
provider heterogeneity as this enables these effects to be disentangled from each 
other.  The results suggest that patient variation is much more important in 
explaining total variation than dentist variation.  This is a similar result to that found 
in both the labour and education literatures.   
Given that it has not been possible to account for some important 
characteristics relating to patients and practices, the results should be treated with 
some degree of caution.  It is likely that the major contributor in the treatment 
decision process is missing from the estimating equation, i.e. the clinical ‘need’ for a 
radiograph.  This can be considered to be the very first step in the decision process.  
Although it is a patient characteristic, it is important in the decision in so far as the 
dentist has the information on this, which they use to decide whether to provide a 
radiograph or not. If this is a true reflection of the decision making process, then 
there is support for my results in relation to the contribution of the variation being 
better explained by patient variation than variation across dentists. 
 This particular finding has potentially important implications for policy.  It 
relates back to the idea that ‘cause dictates the remedy’ in trying to deal with 
variation.  This analysis allows for different sources of variation to be identified and 
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suggests that a significant proportion of the observed variation in the use of 
radiographs is due to variation in patient specific effects.  This can help inform the 
direction of any policy instrument targeted at reducing variation in the use of 
radiographs.  If it can be identified that the main cause of variation is due to patient 
effects then policies to reduce variation should be directed towards patients, as 
opposed to dentists.  One such example might be in the form of producing guidelines 
for patients that can increase their awareness about the need for and effects 
(potentially harmful) of dental radiographs.  This will essentially enable a better 
informed patient to be involved in a shared decision process, which may help to 
reduce variation at the individual patient level.  
 One of the motivations for analysing variation in the use of radiographs was 
the possible harmful effects from exposure to radiation.  Any suggestion that there 
might be some financial incentive for dentists to provide treatment that may not be in 
the best interest of the patient is particularly important in this context.  The results 
from the model indicate that there is no real incentive for fee for service dentists to 
provide more radiographs than their salaried counterparts. The individual dentist 
effects do not account for very much of the variation, implying that dentist 
preferences or practice styles are not important factors in the decision about 
providing radiographs.  This could suggest that dentists provide radiographs in line 
with the current guidelines and that the observed variation in their use is largely 
random or due to the different ‘types’ of patients dentists treat.  
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6.2 Avenues for Future Research 
 The novel aspect of this thesis is that it is the first to analyse the variation in 
the provision of dental radiographs using routinely collected individual data on 
dentists and their patients.  It does so in a way that includes fixed effects for both 
dentists and patients, in a bid to control for, and measure their unobserved individual 
heterogeneity.  This in itself provides the foundation for further research in this area.  
For example, this study considered only one type of radiograph; it might be useful to 
conduct a study that looked at all radiographs or, some of the other individual types.  
It would be interesting to see if similar results could be identified or if there might be 
other factors specific to radiograph type (for example cost) that changes the impact 
of incentives on the treatment decision. 
 There is a strand in the literature that is concerned about a possible link 
between dental radiographs and the risk of developing some types of cancer.  Most 
of the existing studies in this area come with a range of caveats, particularly related 
to the way in which the data has been collected and the sample sizes involved.  
Typically the data is based on patient recollection, which may or may not be reliable.  
These studies recognise their shortfalls and indicate that more accurate detailed 
studies are required to better assess the risks.  This would require information on the 
patients ages at the time the radiograph was provided, the frequency of radiographs 
carried out and the doses of radiation used.  The framework used in this study could 
potentially provide such a setting to conduct this type of analysis.  It would require 
that the MIDAS dental data be linked with patient cancer data.  It may not be 
possible right now to conduct such a study but with the continued improvements in 
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data collection and recording that is happening in Scotland today, it may be possible 
in the future. 
 Future research might address some of the limitations of this study.  Some of 
the results have to be treated with caution as there is concern about how well defined 
they are.  This is particularly true in the case of the estimated patient fixed effects as 
the sample sizes per patient are so small.  This could mean that the precision of the 
estimated patient fixed effects are not as accurate as they could be and the estimate 
of the contribution to overall variation may be compromised, thus 22.5% may not be 
the true value.  The same is true in the case when estimating the impact of the 
remuneration contract.  These estimates are a function of mobility (i.e. dentists 
switching contracts) and the instances of this happening are relatively small in the 
sample.  A larger random sample may help to alleviate these issues, or changing the 
sampling approach to oversample patients with many observations or dentists 
changing between contracts might be an option.  This could help to improve the 
accuracy of the estimated individual unobserved patient heterogeneity and the impact 
of incentives on variation.   
 Practice effects have not been taken into account in this analysis, even though 
they are likely to have an impact on the decision to provide a dental radiograph.  In 
principle, they could be incorporated into the analysis by adding another level to the 
estimating equation.  Unfortunately, this will add a further level of complexity to 
what is already a complex model.  In order to be able to identify the practice effects 
dentists would have to move between practices.  Although it is possible to identify 
dentists at the practice level in the MIDAS dataset, the extraction that I have used for 
this study does not contain any practice identifier.  Although possibly beyond the 
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scope of this study it is something that could be addressed in further work.  One 
concern I would have, however, is whether or not there would be enough dentists 
who change practice.  The majority of dentists in Scotland are employed as 
independent contractors and essentially run their own business.  If this work was to 
be conducted, it might be better suited to dentists in the salaried service or associate 
dentists who are more likely to move between practices. 
 Further work to consider/test the strict exogeneity assumption of the model 
would also serve as a good robustness check of this model and the results, for 
example the spell fixed effects estimation could be considered separately for patients 
who move between dentists versus those who are treated by the same dentist.  In the 
case of identifying the contract effects it might be possible to estimate the probability 
that dentists change contract to see if there are any differences between self-
employed dentists and salaried dentists.  If there is evidence to suggest that they are 
different, dentists may be of a particular ‘type’ who are choosing to switch contracts, 
then this may have an influence on the estimated results.  If this were the case, this 
would warrant further investigation to explore whether or not there are selection 
effects.  Is it the case that dentists have a particular characteristic that makes them 
choose to change contract and is this impacting on the results?  
 Finally, this study could provide motivation for some further research on the 
theoretical aspects considered here.  There is no doubt that the types of datasets used 
in this study, and described in Chapter 3, can broaden empirical research in the field 
of health economics, however at present it is difficult to find a suitable theoretical 
model that captures all the interactions considered in this analysis.  One avenue may 
be to investigate the possibility of adding to/re-defining existing theoretical models 
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that might better capture the complex processes of health care markets.  The benefits 
of these large scale micro level datasets are obvious; however one consequence is 
that it leads to an awareness of the fact that some conceptual theoretical models have 
limited prospects for detailed understanding of the processes borne out by the data.  
This would provide an interesting, if yet challenging avenue for future research. 
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